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Introduction 
 
 
 
According to the World Bank Report 2002, transition economies are 
formerly socialist countries in the East Asia, the Central and Eastern Europe and 
the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. After the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989, most countries of the former Soviet bloc moved successfully 
from centrally planned economies and one-party governments towards market 
economies with multiparty parliamentary democracy. In the East Asia, Vietnam 
and China are although still led by the communist parties, their economies are 
gradually growing out of central planning through gradualist policies (Peng, 
2003). In the transition process, these countries have opened to Western business 
after more than fifty years following a policy of economic autarky. With a short 
time, the policy environments changed radically, creating new conditions for 
international investment. Many multinational enterprises have been attracted by 
new markets, cheap labor forces and supporting policies toward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in transition economies (Lankes and Venables, 1996; Meyer, 
1998; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2000). 
Among the various forms of international business, FDI is considered the 
most effective way by which transition economies become integrated to the global 
economy. FDI involves the transfers of multiple resources to a host country, 
especially transfers of capital, knowledge, management skills, marketing know-
how and the latest production technology. FDI is hoped to provide urgently 
needed capital for countries with limited access to international capital markets 
and to generate cash revenues through privatization for empty budgets. Further, 
the entries of foreign firms are expected to foster changes in the economic system, 
create competition and promote the development of private sector. Foreign 
investors also facilitate exports to Western markets through their knowledge and 
experience of the relevant markets as well as access to distribution networks 
(Girma et al., 2005; Meyer, 1998; Nguyen and Xing, 2006). FDI therefore 
interacts with many aspects of the transition process through its direct impact on 
macroeconomics such as the balance of payments and employment, through the 
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transfer of knowledge and through the role of investors as new owners of formerly 
state-owned enterprises (Meyer, 1998). The transition vice versa influences FDI 
inflows. For instance, FDI is gravitated to countries with furthest progress in 
economic and institutional reforms to minimize transaction costs of doing 
business (Baniak et al., 2002; Meyer, 2001).  
In order to understand the interaction between foreign investors and the 
local economy, we have chosen Vietnam as a case study. As other transition 
economies, from the late 1970s until 1990, Vietnam was integrated in the trading 
system of the Soviet Union and its allies with few other linkages. In the 1980s, 
Vietnam experienced severe shortages of food and basic consumer goods, a high 
budget deficit, three-digit inflation, chronic trade imbalances and deteriorating 
living standards. The economic stagnation forced the Vietnamese government to 
initiate an overall economic reform from a planned economy to a market economy 
in 1986. The main task of the reform program is to encourage development of 
private sector and to reduce the dependence of the overall economy on inefficient 
state-owned enterprises. In this process, foreign direct investment has played an 
important role in creating an “imported” private sector and strengthening the 
competitiveness of the economy. 
The first Law on Foreign Investment issued in 1987 by the Vietnamese 
government is considered as one of the first concrete steps towards economic 
renovation and FDI encouragement. This law was amended several times in 1992, 
1996, 2000, and most recently replaced by a new law on investment integrating 
both domestic and foreign investment (Unified Investment Law 2006). These 
changes and amendments aimed to remove obstacles against the operation of 
foreign investors and to improve the investment climate in Vietnam, creating a 
level playing field for both domestic and foreign firms. Usually, these changes are 
to provide more tax incentives, to simplify investment licensing procedures, and 
to promote transfer of technology.  
Besides favorable and open policies toward foreign investments, Vietnam 
also attracts foreign investors with a new market and low costs of production 
factors. Before the economic renovation, the consumers in Vietnam had almost no 
access to many consumer goods. After the opening of the economy, Vietnam with 
nearly 80 millions people has become a large market for consumer goods 
manufacturers. Moreover, factor-cost advantages arising from relatively low costs 
of raw materials and low labor costs create the attractiveness of Vietnam 
compared with neighboring countries especially in textile, garment, and sea food 
manufacturing industries (Mirza and Giroud, 2004). 
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 However, foreign firms in Vietnam still have to pay high transaction costs 
associated with searching, negotiating and contracting with domestic partners 
arising from an incomplete, inconsistent and continuously changing institutional 
framework. Many managers in Vietnam complained about the lack of market 
information on suppliers, buyers, price trends and changes in policies and 
regulations, and they have to use personal relationships with local authorities to 
get important information (The Provincial Competitiveness Index Report 2006).  
Moreover, according to the decentralization policy in the FDI law 
amendment in 1996, each province has more power and autonomy in dealing with 
foreign investments such as in granting investment licenses, leasing land, 
recruiting labor and providing export and import licenses. This policy, on the one 
hand, allows provincial authorities to develop innovative ways to attract more 
foreign investors, but on the other hand, it leads to variations in the 
implementation of the central laws and regulations among provinces. Foreign 
investors may experience a lot of red tapes such as corruption or delays in 
administrative progress if local authorities possess conservative inherited norms 
and cognitions. In this context, foreign investors have to consider many factors 
when investing in Vietnam such as modes of entry and location choices for their 
operations so that they can make use of advantages and minimize disadvantages.  
This thesis focuses on determinants of location choices by foreign firms in 
Vietnam at the provincial level of which institutions and agglomeration 
economies are key factors. We also analyze the effect of entry mode choices and 
location choices on the survival probability of foreign entrants. The main data 
sources used for empirical research are the yearly surveys of the enterprises 
operating in Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam since 
2000. These are comprehensive surveys covering all state enterprises, non-state 
enterprises that have equal or greater than 10 employees, 20% of sampled non-
state enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, and all foreign enterprises across 
64 provinces and cities in Vietnam. These datasets provide a useful source to 
analyze the behavior by foreign firms at the firm level. The description of the 
dataset, the surveys’ questionnaire and selected variables definitions are presented 
in Chapter 1 and Appendix A. 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. The first chapter presents a 
literature review on FDI with the aim to explore the motivations driving a firm to 
expand investments abroad, the reasons why FDI is preferred to other investment 
forms, and the main factors affecting location choices of foreign investors. Since 
our thesis focuses on location decisions of foreign firms in Vietnam, we spend 
more room on the discussion of the location theories such as the theory of 
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comparative advantages, localization theory, institutional based view and 
information cost approach. Subsequently, we present a theoretical review on FDI 
determinants in transition economies and in Vietnam. We state that market size, 
labor costs and the riskiness of investment environments are key factors affecting 
FDI inflows to these countries. The final section provides the description of data 
source that is used for the empirical studies in Vietnam. 
The second chapter studies the effect of institutional practices by local 
authorities on the entry rates of foreign firms in Vietnam over the period 2000-
2005. The Vietnamese provincial competitiveness index in 2006 (PCI 2006) and 
its two sub-indices reflecting attitudes of local government toward state-owned 
enterprises and the capability of private enterprises to access to necessary 
information for their business are used as proxies for institutional implementations 
by provincial authorities. The empirical findings show that provinces with better 
institutional performance attract more foreign firms. The results support our 
argument that just as institutions at the national level affecting the overall volume 
of FDI inflows, informal institutions at the sub-national level influence FDI 
spatial distributions among provinces within the country. Formal legal changes 
initiated at the centre have varied impacts across provinces because the 
implementation of laws and regulations at local level depends on the informal 
institutions determined by attitudes (norms and cognitions) of local authorities. 
The third chapter examines the effects of agglomeration economies on the 
location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam. By using a large dataset that 
provides detailed information about individual firms, we examine the location 
choices by 568 newly created foreign firms in 2005 in about 150 different 4-digit 
industries. The estimates of the negative binomial regression model and the 
conditional logit model strongly support our hypotheses that agglomeration 
benefits motivate foreign firms in the same industries and from the same countries 
of origin to locate near each other. Moreover, the empirical results show that 
provinces in Vietnam compete with each other to attract FDI, and the locations of 
Vietnamese firms have no effects on the location decisions by foreign firms in the 
same industry.   
The last chapter investigates the survival probability of foreign entrants in 
Vietnam by looking at the life span of 187 foreign firms created in 2000 over the 
period 2000-2005. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model, we find that 
foreign firms with larger start-up size and growing current size are more likely to 
stay longer in the market. We also reveal that foreign firms entering the market 
with wholly-owned subsidiaries rather than making joint ventures with local 
partners can live longer. In addition, locating in industrial zones or export 
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processing zones increases the survival probability of foreign firms due to tax 
priority and other incentives. However, by contrast to our prediction, 
agglomeration economies have no significant effect on firm survival. As expected, 
cultural distance is found to have a strong impact on the survival of foreign firms. 
Proximities in culture make it easier for foreign firms in cooperating with local 
partners, therefore increasing their success in foreign markets. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review on Foreign Direct Investment 
and Description of the Dataset 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Transition economies are formerly socialist countries in East Asia, Central 
and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union 
(The World Bank Report 2002). The economic stagnation during 1980s forced 
these countries to implement economic reforms by restructuring the economies 
from planned to increasingly market-driven economies. The main task is to 
transfer enterprises from the state ownership to private ownership in order to 
increase efficiency of production and reduce the dependence of the overall 
economy on inefficient state-owned enterprises. In this process, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has played an important role in creating an “imported” private 
sector and strengthening the competitiveness of the economies.  
Empirical studies on FDI in transition economies show that foreign 
investors are mainly attracted to these countries by new markets, low labor costs 
and favorable policies toward FDI (Meyer, 1998; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Bevan 
and Estrin, 2002). FDI is considered one of the most effective ways by which 
transition economies become integrated to the global economy as FDI involves 
the transfers of multiple resources to a host economy, especially transfers of 
capital, knowledge, management skills, marketing know-how and the latest 
production technology. Further, the entries of foreign firms are expected to foster 
changes in the economic system, create competition and promote the development 
of private sector. Foreign investors also facilitate exports to Western markets 
through their knowledge and experience of the relevant markets as well as access 
to distribution networks (Girma et al., 2005; Meyer, 1998; Nguyen and Xing, 
2006).  
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Besides advantages that foreign firms benefit when investing in transition 
economies, they, however, have to face many difficulties coming from low-skilled 
labor forces, backward infrastructure conditions, and especially the weakness of 
incomplete and unstable institutional frameworks such as underdeveloped 
political and constitutional court systems, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency 
(Bevan et al., 2004; Meyer, 2001). In addition, domestic agents in transition 
economies lack the knowledge and experience to use market mechanism and to 
correctly identify potential partners and competitors. These disadvantages increase 
production costs as well as transaction costs associated with searching, 
negotiating and monitoring local partners. Foreign investors, therefore, have to 
think strategically about how to limit disadvantages to obtain the highest benefits 
when entering transition markets.  
In order to understand the interaction between foreign firms and the local 
economy, it is first of all necessary to understand the foreign investors, such as 
what motivates them to invest abroad, why they prefer FDI over other investment 
forms such as exporting or licensing, and which factors influence their location 
decisions. By reviewing literatures on FDI, this chapter provides an understanding 
of the firm’s strategies and builds up the theoretical backgrounds for empirical 
studies in the next chapters. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents general 
literatures on FDI with the focus on three issues: the sources of ownership 
advantages, the reasons for internalization, and the location of FDI. Since our 
thesis concentrates on location choices by foreign firms, this section will spend 
more room on discussions of location theories. Section 3 provides an overview of 
FDI in transition economies through which we can have a comparison of the 
foreign firm’s strategies in foreign countries in general and in transition 
economies in particular. In section 4, we move to summarizing literatures on FDI 
determinants in Vietnam at the national and regional levels. Section 5 introduces 
general descriptions of the dataset that is used for our empirical work. The final 
section is devoted to some conclusions. 
 
2. Determinants of FDI: a review of the literature 
Globalization in business creates opportunities for investors to expand their 
activities and exploit their capabilities abroad to reap greater benefits. FDI is one 
of the ways a firm uses to enter foreign markets. With its enormous potential to 
create jobs, raise productivity, enhance exports and transfer technology, FDI is a 
vital factor in long-term economic growth, especially for developing countries. In 
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this section, we first provide some main concepts of FDI and then move to 
reviewing literatures on FDI. 
FDI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy 
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) to an enterprise resident in another 
country (FDI enterprise). FDI implies that the investor exerts a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy 
(UNCTAD)1.  
FDI involves the transfer of a package of assets which include financial 
capital, technology, management skills and organizational principles of the firm 
from one country to another. There is an important distinction between FDI and 
foreign portfolio investment. Foreign portfolio investment is an investment by 
firms or individuals in financial instruments issued by a foreign government or a 
foreign company (e.g. government bonds, foreign stocks…). Investors can get 
benefits but do not have any right to control the decision taking process (Dunning, 
1993).  
There are two kinds of FDI: horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI, 
where multi-plant firms duplicate roughly the same activities in multiple 
countries, has been distinguished from vertical FDI, where firms locate different 
stages of production in different countries. FDI can take in forms of greenfield 
investments by establishing a subsidiary from the beginning or cross-border 
mergers and/or acquisitions of existing firms in host countries. As FDI is mostly 
implemented by multinational corporations (MNCs) and the theory of MNCs is 
embedded with FDI, it is important to understand some main concepts of MNCs. 
According to Dunning (1993), a multinational or a transnational enterprise 
is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment and owns or controls 
value-adding activities in more than one country. Making the definition more 
detailed, Barlett and Ghoshal (1995) state that an MNC first must have substantial 
direct investment in foreign countries, not just an export business. Moreover, an 
MNC has to be engaged in the active management of these subsidiaries rather 
than simply holds them in a passive financial portfolio. So by this definition, all 
companies that source their raw materials abroad, license their technologies 
offshore, export their products into foreign markets, or even hold minority equity 
positions in oversea ventures without any management involvement can be 
regarded as international corporations, but they are not real MNCs if they do not 
have substantial direct investment in foreign countries, actively manage those 
                                                
1 UNCTAD: UNITED NATIONS  CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3146&lang=1 
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operations, and regard those operation as integral parts of the company both 
strategically and organizationally.  
The question here is that why and when FDI happens. In other words, which 
are the motivations of a firm to invest abroad, why the firm prefers FDI over other 
investment forms such as domestic investment, exporting, and licensing, and 
which factors influence the firm’s location decisions? By reviewing literatures on 
FDI, the following paragraphs intend to provide answers to these questions.  
Early research analyzed FDI as a financial flow between countries (Aliber, 
1970; Logue and Willet, 1977; Batra and Hadar, 1979). Different rates of return to 
capital induce movements of capital flows corresponding to differences in the 
marginal productivity of capital. The basic premise is that firms invest in 
countries with a relatively low capital endowment and high capital costs. FDI 
serves as international capital arbitrage. In this case, foreign firms earn a currency 
premium by utilizing the interest differential between hard currency and weak 
currency countries. Later on, as researchers recognize the special characteristics of 
direct, rather than portfolio, investment, they focus on three issues: (1) the sources 
of firm-specific advantages and knowledge capital (Hymer, 1976; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Markusen, 1995), (2) the reasons for internalization (Dunning, 1993; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976), and (3) the location of FDI (Dunning, 1993; 
Krugman, 1991). Since our thesis focuses on location choices by foreign firms, 
more discussions will be dedicated to the third aspect – the location theory of FDI. 
 
2.1. Firm-specific advantages and knowledge capital 
Most scholars trace the first attempt to systematically explain the activities 
of firms outside their natural boundaries to Hymer’s 1960 dissertation (published 
in Hymer, 1976). By observing a substantial growth in the activities of US firms 
abroad, he found that in order to compete with indigenous firms, foreign entrants 
must possess some specific advantages including intellectual property rights and 
intangible assets embodied in the human capital of the firm, such as management, 
engineering, marketing and financial capabilities. These specific advantages give 
a firm some degree of monopolist power to overcome its lack of knowledge about 
local environment innate in the local firms which foreign entrants can only 
acquire at a cost, and also serve to compensate for the foreigner’s costs of 
operating abroad. 
In terms of the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), 
competitive advantages of firms arise from “tacit knowledge” such as patents or 
other exclusive technical knowledge. Tacit knowledge, as clearly illustrated in the 
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work of Nelson and Winter (1982), is an embedded component of both individual 
skills and organization routines. Unlike machines or blueprints, they cannot be 
easily transferred to other firms. Indeed, they can exist and create value only in 
the firm in which they have evolved.  This view gives rise to the concept of 
knowledge-based assets. 
Markusen (1995) pointed out two reasons why the knowledge-based assets 
are more likely to give rise to FDI than physical assets. First, knowledge-based 
assets can be transferred easily back and forth across space at low cost. An 
engineer or a manager can visit many production sites at a relatively low cost. 
Second, knowledge often has a joint character, like a public good, in that it can be 
supplied to additional production facilities at very low cost. The joint-input 
characteristic of knowledge-based assets allows an MNC to gain economies of 
multiplant production because a single two-plant firm has cost efficiency over two 
independent single-plant firms. By contrast, physical capital usually cannot yield a 
flow of services in one location without reducing its productivity in others. 
Brainard (1993b) stated that scale economies based on physical intensity do not 
by themselves lead to foreign direct investment. This type of scale economy 
implies the cost efficiency of centralized production rather than geographically 
dispersed production. Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that the presence of 
MNEs is the greatest in sectors characterized by large investments in research and 
development, a large share of professional and technical workers, and the 
production of technically complex or differentiated goods (Cave, 1982; Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Brainard, 1993a, b). 
 
2.2. Internalization theory  
Hymer (1976) argued that the existence of special advantages is only the 
necessary condition for foreign firms to invest successfully abroad, but not yet 
enough to explain the motivation for moving their production to another country. 
A foreign firm can exploit its advantages through producing at home and then 
exporting or through licensing or making joint venture with local partners. If a 
firm has a proprietary product or production process and if, due to tariffs and 
transport costs, it is advantageous to produce the product abroad rather than 
export it, it is still not obvious that the firm should set up a foreign subsidiary. The 
firm can license a foreign firm to produce the product or use production process, 
or it can combine with local partners to set up a joint venture. Reasons for wishing 
to set up a foreign subsidiary are referred to as internalization advantages. 
Internalization means that a multinational firm, including its subsidiaries in 
foreign countries, should implement and control the whole production process of a 
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product from raw material inputs to sales stage rather than implement arm’s-
length agreements. This choice is driven by market failures affecting the 
contractual relationship with local firms, creating difficulties and uncertainty for 
MNEs to fully exploit their ownership advantages. In other words, FDI is to do 
with firms choosing to keep activities inside the firm, operating wholly-owned 
foreign subsidiaries (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). 
This theory is rooted on the transaction cost approach initiated by Coase 
(1937) and developed in the well-known work by Williamson (1975). Firms 
operating in an imperfect market have to face informational asymmetry between 
the nature and the value of products or transaction costs arising from enforcing 
contract with the partners and monitoring the quality of intermediate products. 
Internalization thus is likely to be an important strategy by which a market-
making firm can guarantee the quality of the final products it offers to customers.  
There are three sets of issues that may affect market transactions between 
MNEs and local producers in host economies. The first one is hold-up problem 
that arises in the presence of incomplete contracts when it is not possible to write 
contracts covering all possible contingencies affecting the relationship between 
the firm and an input supplier because of uncertainty. Thus, parties in these 
transactions might wish to renegotiate the terms of the contract ex-post, and if the 
investment is specific to the relationship, then the supplier’s bargaining position 
will be weak. Fearing this, the supplier’s initial investment is likely to be 
suboptimal. This inefficiency reduces the total return from outsourcing, making it 
more likely that investments will be undertaken by wholly owned subsidiaries. 
The second one is the dissipation of intangible assets. Local partners may 
learn the firm’s technology to their own advantage and become competitors in the 
future. Moreover, they could dissipate the MNE’s reputation by producing low-
quality products under high-quality brands. In both cases, the risk of dissipation is 
lower if the firm carries out the activities with its own subsidiaries. The third issue 
concerns the principal-agency relationship between MNEs and local firms. In this 
case, the relationship can be affected by problems of hidden action or hidden 
information about the local market. The local agents could have an interest in 
reporting that the market is worse than it actually is to justify their poor 
performance.  
In terms of empirical works, most researchers use transaction cost theory to 
study entry mode choices by foreign firms, especially between wholly owned 
modes and joint ventures. For instance, Kogut and Zander (1993) find that the 
more tacit the technology is, the more firms prefer to set up wholly-owned 
subsidiaries rather than sharing the knowledge with other partners. In their views, 
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there is a distinguishable boundary in the knowledge between the partners in the 
joint venture. It is therefore difficult to have a common understanding between 
partners by which to transfer knowledge from ideas into productions and markets 
efficiently. Meyer (2001) studied foreign firms in transition economies and found 
that they prefer to set up wholly owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures. In 
these countries, foreign firms lack information about local partners, and domestic 
firms lack knowledge of market mechanism and inexperience in doing business 
with foreign firms. Foreign investors, therefore, have to pay high transaction costs 
of searching, negotiating and monitoring if making joint ventures with local 
partners. Moreover, in transition economies, the diffusion of knowledge is of 
particular concern because the institutional framework does not provide for the 
efficient protection of intellectual property rights. Hence, technology-intensive 
firms would prefer to internalize their transactions in high-tech goods and 
services, including transfer of production know-how, assessment of market 
opportunities for innovation products, as well as the training of sales and service 
personnel (Oxley, 1999; Hennart 1991). 
 
2.3. The location of FDI 
In the previous parts, we have learned the reasons why a firm engages in 
FDI.  However, once the firm decides to extend its activities abroad through FDI, 
it will face a two-tier choice of the optimal location for its operation: (1) select the 
country it wants to invest; and (2) pick the best region within that country to 
locate its plant. This part presents the factors that influence location decisions of 
the firm with a focus on the literatures relevant to our empirical studies, such as 
theory of comparative advantages, localization theory, institution-based view, and 
information cost approach. 
 
Theory of comparative advantages  
The traditional basis for analysis of international economic activity is the 
neoclassical theory of international trade. This theory, known as the factor 
endowment theory of international trade, is developed by Heckscher and Ohlin 
from the Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997). It explains international trade in terms of comparative advantages of 
participating countries based on the assumption of perfect competition in which 
certain resources or factors are immobile, production functions and consumer 
preference are identical, and specialization is incomplete. The basic premise is 
that countries should specialize in producing and exporting products that utilize 
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their abundant and cheap factors of production and import products that utilize the 
countries’ scarce factors. The trade theory suggests that location of international 
production is based on comparative advantages of factor costs. If firms use FDI to 
minimize costs, they will move to the location where production costs are lowest.  
The concept of location advantages as reviewed by Cave (1982), Dunning 
(1993) and Brainard (1997) covers many aspects, including production costs and 
factor endowments, market size, and taxation policies to attract FDI. Researchers 
when discussing factors affecting location choices by foreign firms have 
considered FDI in two forms: horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. As mentioned 
before, horizontal FDI implies that the firm duplicates its entire activities by 
setting up a foreign plant in addition to a home plant. Vertical FDI means that the 
firm splits its activities by function. It might decide, for example, to put all of its 
production of a particular component part in a separate foreign plant. In horizontal 
FDI models, the question is how best to serve the host market whereas in vertical 
FDI models, the question is typically how best to serve the domestic and other 
markets. 
Standard models of horizontal FDI revolve around the trade-off between 
plant-level fixed costs and trade costs (Markusen, 1984). When the potential host 
country is small and the potential savings in trade costs (with accrue per unit of 
exports to the host country) are insufficient to offset the fixed costs of setting up a 
production facility there, exports are chosen over FDI as the method for serving 
the market abroad. Bigger market size of the host country, smaller plant-level 
fixed costs, and larger trade costs are more conducive to horizontal FDI. Further, 
the proximity-concentration trade-off theory (Brainard, 1997) refers to the 
common tenet that FDI occurs when the benefits of producing in a foreign market, 
such as proximity to customers, low transport costs and trade barriers, outweigh 
the benefits of scale economies that could be reaped if production is concentrated 
in the home country.  
Unlike horizontal FDI, standard models of vertical FDI involve deciding 
where to locate production to minimize factor costs. The trade-off is between the 
benefits of producing in countries with low factor costs and the trade costs to 
bring the goods back home. FDI occurs if the cost savings from producing abroad 
are greater than the trade costs incurred. Therefore, low-wage locations with good 
transport and trade links to other parts of the corporation will be the favored 
locations of foreign investors (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). 
In terms of empirical works, due to difficulties in splitting the data for 
differentiating horizontal and vertical FDI, most researchers accept that the data 
contain both sorts of investments and econometric regressions report some sort of 
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average effects (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The empirical evidence has 
confirmed important effects of location advantages on FDI inflows both into 
developed and developing countries. Regarding developed countries, Brainard 
(1993b, 1997) find that market size of a host country is a fundamental factor to 
attract investments of U.S. firms. Similarly, Woodward (1992) and Billington 
(1999) reveal that foreign firms in the United States prefer to locate in the states 
with strong market and high population density. Other factors such as low labor 
costs and favorable policies toward FDI are also significant determinants.  
Ireland, for example, becomes known as the Celtic Tiger not only because it 
offers the lowest tax rates in Europe but also it hosts a highly skilled, English-
speaking and relative cheap labor force (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).  
In terms of developing countries, recently there are massive studies on the 
determinants of FDI in these countries when their share of worldwide FDI has 
been increasing, from 24.6% in the period 1988-1991 to 34% in the period 2002-
2007 (The World Investment Report 2005 and 2008). Motives for investments in 
these economies are mainly determined by large market size, low labor costs, 
high return in natural resources and favorable policies towards FDI (The Report 
of Overseas Development Institute, 1997; Chen, 1997). For instance, at the 
national level, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) reveal that South Africa is more 
attractive toward foreign investors than other countries in the region due to its 
large market size. In addition, Mirza and Giroud (2004) find that compared with 
other ASEAN countries, Vietnam is chosen as a destination of FDI because of its 
large population, relatively cheap and qualified labor force, and political stability. 
Market-seeking and resource-seeking are also considered as the most important 
motives of foreign investors in the Central and Eastern European countries 
(Meyer, 1998; Pusterla and Resmini, 2007; Altomonte, 2000).  At the regional 
level, Cheng and Kwan (2000), Wei et al. (1998), and Zhou et al. (2002) show 
that within China the regions with larger market size, better infrastructure 
conditions, lower wage rates and supporting policies especially on taxation and 
administrative procedures can attract more FDI. These findings are consistent 
with the results of Meyer and Nguyen (2005) and Nguyen Phuong Hoa (2002) on 
the FDI spatial distributions among provinces within Vietnam and Boudier-
Bensebaa (2005) in Hungary. 
In sum, there are many factors contributing to location advantages of a host 
country. Foreign investors both in developed and developing countries are mainly 
attracted by large markets, low labor costs and supporting policies toward FDI. 
This explains for the reason why FDI inflows to emerging economies have been 
increasing since 1990s when most of them started the open policy of the 
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economies. This policy created a great opportunity for foreign investors to exploit 
new markets as well as abundant and cheap labor forces. Moreover, priority 
policies, especially on administrative procedures and taxation, make it easier for 
foreign firms to set up plants and profitably operate.  
Besides studying the effects of traditional location advantages such as 
market size or production factor costs on FDI location decisions, international 
business researchers have also focused on the effects of agglomeration economies 
popularized by Krugman (1991). The agglomeration or localization theory 
explains for the reason why firms in the same industries or from the same 
countries of origin have tendencies to cluster in a country or a region, and the 
reason why many emerging countries, such as China and Vietnam, are successful 
in attracting FDI by establishing industrial and export processing clusters. In the 
following part, we will discuss the motivations of firms to agglomerate and how 
agglomeration economies affect location choices by foreign firm. 
 
Localization theory 
Industry localization is defined as the geographic concentration of firms in 
the same industries (Head et al., 1995). One of the mechanisms motivating this 
concentration is the existence of agglomeration economies, which are positive 
externalities that stem from the geographic clustering of industries. The issue on 
industry localization attracted the attention of economists in the late nineteenth 
century. The work of Marshall (1920) is considered as an early and influential 
economic analysis on this phenomenon. Marshall identifies three externalities that 
stem from industry localization: (i) localization enables firms to benefit from 
technological spillovers, (ii) localization provides a pooled market for workers 
with specialized skills that benefits both workers and firms, and (iii) localization 
creates a pool of specialized intermediate inputs for an industry in greater variety 
and at lower cost. These positive externalities have the potential to enhance the 
performance by firms that agglomerate.  
According to Krugman (1991), the concept of technological spillovers is 
quite vague and general but it is the most frequently mentioned as a source of 
agglomeration effects. Useful information can flow between near firms, designers, 
engineers, and managers. For foreign companies, the spillovers of information can 
be the flows of experience-based knowledge about how to operate efficiently in 
the host countries (Head et al., 1995). Many authors use such clusters as 
California’s Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 to show that technological 
externalities are the most obvious reason for firms to agglomerate (Krugman, 
1991; Saxenian, 1994). However, by contrast with the labor pooling or 
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intermediate goods supply that are in principle measurable, technological 
spillovers can be invisible and difficult to measure. It can therefore be difficult to 
state clearly that either technological spillovers or specialized labor play a more 
important role in creating high-technological clusters, for instance in Silicon 
Valley and the high-fashion cluster in Milan (Krugman, 1991). 
As anticipated by Marshall (1920), localized industry allows a pooled 
market for workers with specialized skills to benefit both workers and firms. 
David and Rosenbloom (1990) argue that an increased number of firms reduce the 
possibility that a worker will be unemployed for a long time. Finally, this also 
benefits firms by increasing the supply of specialized employees and reducing the 
risk of high-wage requirements from labor. Popular examples of this phenomenon 
are microelectronic manufacture in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) and carpet 
manufacture in Dalton, Georgia (Krugman, 1991). 
Krugman (1991) argues that the combination of scale economies and 
transportation costs will motivate the users and suppliers of intermediate inputs to 
cluster near each other. Such agglomerations reduce the total transportation costs 
and make large centers of production become more efficient and have more 
diverse suppliers than small ones. This will encourage firms in the same industries 
to concentrate in one location. Krugman points out that a historical accident 
makes a firm locate in a particular place, and then the cumulative location choices 
allow such an accident to influence the long-run geographical pattern of industry.  
From these observations, it seems that firms benefit from geographical 
localization when agglomeration economies exist. So far, there have been two 
types of studies that support the existence of agglomeration benefits. The first 
consists of qualitative studies of agglomerations that identify the existence of 
industry clusters and document the existence of agglomeration externality 
mechanism (Krugman, 1991; Saxenian, 1994). The second is empirical studies, 
mostly on foreign firms in host countries, which try to find whether a foreign firm 
has benefits when locating near other domestic and foreign firms in the same 
industry or from the same country of origin. For instance, Crozet et al. (2004) 
study foreign firms in France and find that proximity allows foreign entrants to 
learn experience from others and to exploit earlier investors’ understanding of 
new business environment. Head et al. (1995; 1999) studying Japanese firms in 
the United States show that foreign firms in the same industries prefer to cluster to 
obtain benefits from technology spillovers, specialized labor markets, and 
availability of input suppliers to the industry. Further, Mariotti and Piscitello 
(1995) when studying location decision by foreign firms in Italy stated that  by 
locating close to large firms, especially the world’s leading multinational 
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enterprises, new foreign firms can access sources of important and cost-free 
information about new business opportunities. Regarding developing countries, 
there are still few studies on the effects of agglomeration economies on location 
choices by foreign firms mostly due to the lack of data at firm level. We can count 
the works of Head and Ries (1996) and Cheng and Kwan (2000) on China using 
data at firm level and the works of Boudier-Bensabaa (2005) on Hungary and 
Meyer and Nguyen (2005) on Vietnam using data at provincial level. The 
empirical results of these studies are consistent with the findings in developed 
countries. 
However, most papers studying agglomeration economies neglect firm 
heterogeneity and competition among firms. As a result, the localization literature 
mostly ignores firm capacities which determine whether firms can absorb desired 
knowledge and that firms are not only receivers but also sources of knowledge. 
Firms would therefore strategically choose locations to gain exposure to others’ 
localized knowledge while reducing leakage of their own knowledge to 
competitors (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcacer and Chung, 2007). The empirical 
study of Shaver and Flyer (2000) shows that under the existence of agglomeration 
economies, many foreign firms will perform better if they do not cluster. Large 
foreign firms with the greatest capacity in technologies, human capital, training 
programs, suppliers, and distributors will try to locate away from their 
competitors because the benefits they gain from locating close to their competitors 
will be less than what the competitors gain from them. By using new entrants into 
the United States, Alcacer and Chung (2007) find that foreign firms consider not 
only gains from inward knowledge spillovers but also the possible costs of 
outward spillovers. While less technologically advanced firms favor locations 
with high levels of industrial innovative activity, technologically advanced firms 
choose only locations with high levels of academic activity and avoid locations 
with industrial activity to distance themselves from competitors. 
The problems firms will experience when participating in an industrial 
cluster can be the spillover of technology, employee defection to competitors, and 
the sharing of distributors and suppliers with neighboring firms. Yoffie (1993) 
shows that semiconductor managers decide to locate far from their competitors 
due to their concern that their technology might spill over to the near firms. Baum 
and Mezias (1992) indicate that locating closer to other hotels in Manhattan 
increases the survival chance of a hotel, but this benefit of agglomeration 
diminishes when hotel districts become crowded, pushing up prices and 
exacerbating competition.  
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So far, we have discussed the location decision of FDI as a function of the 
costs and quality of local factors of production such as labor force, market size 
and agglomeration economies. Another theoretical foundation to explain the FDI 
location, according to Meyer and Nguyen (2004), is the institutional perspective. 
Indeed, empirical research in emerging economies has found major institutional 
influences on the strategies of both domestic firms (Peng, 2000) and foreign direct 
investors (Meyer, 2001; Bevan et al., 2004). In the following part, we will discuss 
how institutions at both national and sub-national levels affect location choices by 
foreign firms with the focus on transition economies. 
 
Institution-based view  
The World Investment Report 1998 stated that besides business facilitation 
and economic factors, institutional framework is a principal determinant of the 
FDI location. However, when studying the location decision of foreign investors, 
the researchers in international business have almost exclusively focused on the 
effects of agglomeration economies popularized by Krugman (1991) and 
traditional location advantages such as factor endowments and market attraction. 
Recently, the studies on emerging economies whose institutions differ 
significantly from those in developed countries have led to the emergence of an 
institution-based view of firm strategies (Peng, 2002; 2003; Peng et al., 2008). 
The institution-based view has explored how the institutional set-up 
influences economic activity and thus the strategies pursued by firms. North 
(1990) distinguishes formal institutions such as laws and regulations and informal 
institutions that are grounded in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. Scott 
(1995) describes institutional frameworks as consisting of three pillars: regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutions where the regulatory dimension roughly 
corresponds to formal institutions in North’s terminology. Institutions and their 
enforcement mechanisms set the “rules of the game” which organizations must 
follow. The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both transaction costs 
and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure that facilitates interactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The legal and 
governmental arrangements as well as informal institutions underpinning an 
economy influence corporate strategies (Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2000) and thus affect 
the operation and performance of business (Scott, 1995). 
According to Mudambi and Navarra (2002), institutions are important as 
location advantages in international business because they represent the major 
immobile factors in a globalized market. Legal, political and administrative 
systems tend to be the internationally immobile framework whose costs determine 
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international attractiveness of a location. Institutions affect the capacity of firms to 
interact and therefore affect the relative transaction and coordination costs of 
production and innovation. For foreign investors, the restrictions and incentives 
created by institutions of host countries favor some deals and opportunities while 
disadvantage others. They force the investing firms to think strategically about 
how to avoid the limits imposed by domestic laws as well as how to reap the 
benefits that the law and particular circumstances are capable of providing (Spar, 
2001). Empirical research finds that institutions influence international business 
strategies of firms, notably the choice of entry mode, the magnitude of 
investment, the probability of survival and the location decision (Meyer, 2001; 
Henisz, 2000; Bevan et al., 2004; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
The effect of institutions on FDI location in transition economies attracts 
special attentions as the legal frameworks in these countries have been changed 
radically when the economies were restructured from planned to market 
economies during 1990s. Privatization and the open policies of these countries 
create a great opportunity for foreign firms to enter and exploit new markets. 
However, they also have to pay high transaction costs and information costs 
arising from incomplete and unstable institutional frameworks. Moreover, 
domestic economic agents in these economies lack knowledge and experience of 
how to use market mechanism and correctly identify potential partners and 
competitors. This increases the costs of searching, negotiating and contracting 
with local partners. Further, the rapidly changing institutions may generate 
inconsistency between the requirements of different institutions as well as 
uncertainty over future institutional changes (Meyer, 2001). As firms in reality are 
risk adverse, they prefer to locate in the place of which the gap between 
institutional framework at the macro level and that of their home countries as 
developed markets is small so that they may not have to change much their 
internal institutions reflecting their firm-specific norms, values and enforcement 
mechanism (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).  
Similarly, Meyer (1998; 2001) found that investors prefer to invest in 
transition economies that have progressed furthest in institutional reforms because 
progress in reform brings the institutional framework closer to that of developed 
countries, therefore reducing psychic distance and thus facilitates international 
business. Low psychic distance reduces the need to invest in information, to train 
local staff and to adapt management processes to the local environment. Indeed, 
among the Central and Eastern European countries, the most successful countries 
in attracting foreign investments have been those more advanced in the transition 
process toward market economies, namely Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
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(Resmini, 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Holland and Pain, 1998). More 
particularly, researchers revealed that foreign investors gravitate towards countries 
or regions that have predictable future policy regime (Mudambi and Navarra, 
2002), low corruption level (Lipsey, 1999), political stability and low perceived 
risk level (Lankes and Venables, 1996), progress in reforms of capital market, 
regulations on property rights, and labor market (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Bevan et 
al., 2004).  
Besides studying the effect of institutions on FDI location at country level, 
researchers recently pay increasing attentions to institutions at local level when 
they knowledge that informal institutions such as the practices of law enforcement 
by local authorities may affect spatial distribution of FDI among regions within a 
country. In transition economies, reform initially concern primarily formal 
institutions at the central level, then this directly affects formal institutions at the 
sub-national level. However, the implementation of law and regulations issued by 
central governments enforcement at local level may vary due to variations of 
normative or cognitive aspects of local authorities. Especially in some transition 
economies such as China, Vietnam, and Russia which implement decentralization 
policy, local authorities can decide how to practise policies set at central level. 
Many local decision makers therefore influence the implementation of 
institutional change with their individually held norms and cognitions. If 
conservative inherited norms and lack of recognition of the purpose of regulatory 
changes dominate, then foreign investors may experience a lot of red tape at local 
level such as corruption or delays in administrative progress. On the other hand, 
friendly and supportive treatment by local authorities will reduce difficulties and 
transaction costs foreign firms have to bear when investing in transition 
economies, thereby encouraging their investment in the province. It is noted that 
in industrialized countries with a federal structure, such as Australia, Germany or 
the United States, the responsibilities of different levels of government are clearly 
delaminated by law. In contrast, formal institutions in transition economies are 
somewhat still vague such that the actual influence of provincial authorities is to a 
much higher degree based on informal institutions (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
Up to date, there have been few studies investigating the influences of 
institutions at local level on FDI location most probably due to the lack of data 
and difficulties in finding appropriate proxies for institutions. We can count the 
work of Meyer and Nguyen (2005) on Vietnam, Zhou et al. (2002) on China and 
Bruno et al. (2008) on Russia. Meyer and Nguyen (2005) show that foreign 
investors in Vietnam prefer to locate in regions that have more developed market-
supporting institutions proxied by facilitation by local authorities towards foreign 
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firms to access scarce local resources.  Zhou et al. (2002) stated that specific 
incentives policies issued by Chinese local government such as tax incentives and 
development of special economic zone positively influence the location choice by 
Japanese firms. Bruno et al. (2008) find that in Russia, regions with better 
institutional practice measured by the region’s risk index attract more new firms.  
In sum, we have argued that foreign investors are likely to locate in the 
place of which the institutional framework is close to that of their home countries, 
thereby reducing psychic distance and facilitating international business. Lower 
psychic distance makes it easier for firms to understand local business 
environments, therefore reducing the costs of getting information. Indeed, in order 
to operate efficiently, foreign firms need to have enough information about local 
markets and they prefer to locate in places where necessary information is 
transparent and available (The PCI Report, 2006). However, up to date there have 
been few studies judging information cost as a determinant factor of investment 
location decisions. In the following part, we will discuss how information cost 
affects FDI location choices, especially in transition economies.   
 
Information cost approach  
The location decision by a foreign firm is considerably affected by 
uncertainties arising from informational asymmetry and from the unpredictability 
of the host country’s business environment (Mariotti and Piscitello, 1995; 
Figueiredo et al., 2002; He, 2002). Unlike domestic investors, foreign firms lack 
information about the local product and factor market conditions as well as social 
and political situations of the host country. As a consequence, they always have to 
pay higher costs of obtaining information about such as local knowledge, local 
suppliers, market opportunities, and skilled labor (Arrow, 1972). Foreign firms 
therefore prefer to locate in places where necessary information for their business 
is transparent and easy to access. 
He (2002) stated that foreign firms use both public information and 
privately-held information to make new investment decision. Public information, 
for instance, about market size, economic growth, infrastructure, and foreign 
investment policies is easier to access in large and urban places.  By contrast, 
privately-held information about, for example, the strategies for selecting partners 
or the practical implementation of foreign investment policies is obtained through 
personal relationship or through a network of foreign investors clustering nearby. 
Hence, foreign investors incline to locate in urban or metropolitan locations where 
they can benefit information cost savings associated with proximity to a market, 
labor supply, good communications, and financial and commercial services. 
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Moreover, they also prefer to concentrate in industrial clusters because physical 
proximity to other firms allows them to learn experience of earlier investors in 
doing business in new environments, therefore reducing the need to invest in 
information.  
The empirical evidence supports the argument that location choice of 
foreign firms is affected by information costs. Mariotti and Piscitello (1995) find 
that foreign firms in Italy prefer to locate in regions where they can easily obtain 
information such as metropolitan or boundary provinces. Moreover, they are also 
likely to locate close to large firms, especially the world’s leading multinational 
enterprises, so that they can access important and cost-free information about new 
business market. He (2002) also finds that foreign firms in China favor places 
where they can minimize information costs such as coastal cities and urban areas 
because reliable public information usually appear and spread easily in these 
regions as well as to locate in industrial clusters so that they can get information 
through networks of vicinal  firms. These empirical results are confirmed by the 
studies of Figueiredo et al. (2002) and Guimaraes et al. (2000) on foreign firms in 
Portugal. 
Up to date, we have learned that foreign firms prefer to locate in places 
where they can minimize information costs arising from physical or cultural 
distance between the home countries of foreign investors and the host countries 
where they invest. Indeed, in the part of localization theory we have discussed that 
reducing information costs is an important factor motivating firms to agglomerate. 
However, an easy or difficult access to information is also regulated by the 
institutional framework underpinning the economy of the host country. According 
to Hoskisson et al. (2000), the role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both 
transaction costs and information costs through reducing uncertainty and 
establishing a stable structure that facilitates interactions. Hence, economic agents 
in transition economies characterized by inconsistent and unstable institutional 
frameworks have to pay higher transaction and information costs associated with 
searching, negotiating and contracting with domestic partners (Meyer, 2001). 
Indeed, during the early phase of transition, uncertainties in institutional 
frameworks and lack of information about local environment often force foreign 
firms to rely on relationships not only with managers of other firms but also with 
governmental officials or to create joint ventures and alliances with local partners 
(Peng and Health, 1996; Peng, 2003). As a consequence, foreign investors may 
have to pay higher costs of obtaining information about local business 
environment. Private enterprises in Vietnam thus evaluate transparency and easy 
access to information are one of the most crucial factors in distinguishing between 
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environments that are conductive, or not conductive to the private sector (The PCI 
2006 Report).  
Summarizing, we have identified the advantages and conditions under 
which direct investment will occur by introducing three explanations of FDI: the 
firm’s ownership advantages; internalization advantages; and location advantages. 
However, Rugman (1981) and Buckley (1985) argued that internalization is really 
the only thing that matters to understand the multinational. By contrast, Dunning 
(1977, 1981) suggested that because of the inherent disadvantages and higher 
costs of foreign production, three conditions all need to be present for a firm to 
have a strong motive to undertake direct investment. This has become known as 
the OLI framework which is reviewed in the following section. 
 
2.4. A synthesis: Dunning’s OLI framework  
Dunning (1977) integrated many theories of FDI into a general paradigm of 
international production and extended the framework repeatedly (1981; 1993). 
The basic premise is that FDI is undertaken if three sets of determining factors are 
met simultaneously: ownership specific advantages (O), location advantages (L) 
and the advantages from internalization (I). If not, exporting or licensing may be 
superior strategies. Based on the acronyms of the three components, this approach 
is commonly known as the “OLI framework”. 
The first factor is the firm’s ownership advantages, which are specific assets 
to facilitate the firm obtaining a competitive advantage over local competitors. 
They include not only tangible assets such as capital and manpower but also 
intangible ones such as technology, tacit knowledge, brand name, reputation and 
management skills. The second factor is location advantages, meaning that the 
host country must possess advantages such as factor cost advantages, proximity to 
the market, and the appropriate legal, social and political frameworks. The third 
factor is the advantages from internalization of the whole firm’s activities which 
arise from the presence of market failure. Internalization allows the firm to fully 
exploit owner-specific and location-specific assets.  
This framework suggests that FDI will bring the best results if all the three 
determining components are combined. A firm will engage in FDI if three 
following conditions are satisfied: (i) firms have to possess ownership-specific 
advantages over other firms in serving particular markets; (ii) given the ownership 
advantages of firms, it must be more beneficial for them to exploit the advantages 
themselves rather than to sell or license them to foreign partners; (iii) given the 
two conditions are satisfied, firms must get more profit to combine these 
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advantages with some factors in the foreign countries. The key point is that any 
one of the ownership-location-internalization advantages may be necessary but 
not sufficient to explain the reasons why firms would be multinational engaging in 
FDI.  
This framework is still the most common analytical tool for the 
determinants of FDI although it has some limitations (Meyer, 1998). It is mainly 
criticized about the ability to explain dynamic processes. Dynamic models focus 
on particular types or aspects of FDI and thus are less general than the OLI 
paradigm. The most familiar dynamic approaches are those of the 
internationalization process models based on the work of the Uppsala school in 
the 1970s, the economic geography (Krugman, 1991), and the modern 
international trade theory (Hortman and Markusen, 1992; Brainard, 1993a). 
Dunning (1983) also admitted the impossibility of predicting which of the OLI 
variables was likely to be the most significant in motivating or expanding FDI.  
Moreover, the OLI framework only considers the conditions necessary for direct 
investment. It has little to offer about the choice among alternatives, such as 
licensing versus joint venture versus exporting (Markusen, 1995). 
In this section, by reviewing general literatures on FDI we have explored the 
motivations driving firms to expand investments abroad, the reasons why FDI is 
preferred to other investment forms, and the main factors affecting location 
choices of foreign investors. However, we have not yet intensely discussed the 
reasons why transition economies become attractive destinations for FDI. Since 
the aim of this thesis is to understand the behavior of foreign firms in transition 
economies, the next section will be dedicated to an overview of FDI in these 
countries.  
 
3. Foreign direct investment in transition economies 
According to the World Bank Report 2002, transition economies are 
formerly socialist countries in East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union
2
. After the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989, most countries of the former Soviet bloc moved successfully 
from centrally planned economies and one-party governments towards market 
economies with multiparty parliamentary democracy. Vietnam and China are 
although still led by the communist parties, their economies are gradually growing 
                                                
2 There are 30 transition economies, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia/Montenegro, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of). 
Source: http://www.ssrn.com/update/ern/tran_econs.html 
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out of central planning through gradualist policies (Peng, 2003). These transition 
economies have strengthened their market mechanism through liberalization, 
stabilization and privatization. Under the market mechanism, prices and trade 
have been liberalized, the double price system has been abolished, and import and 
export restrictions have been greatly reduced. For instance, China has moved from 
state monopoly on foreign trade to free trade, and from import-substitution to 
export-oriented policies (Lin et al., 1996). However, most transition economies 
experienced periods of hyperinflation coming from price liberalization at the 
beginning of transition. Therefore, macroeconomic stabilization mainly through 
monetary policies has become a major concern in most transition economies 
(Meyer, 1998).  
Recent research has focused more on microeconomic restructuring of which 
the main task is the transfer of enterprises from state ownership to private 
ownership. The motive is to increase efficiency of production and reduce the 
dependence of economies on inefficient state-owned enterprises (Balcerowicz et 
al., 2002). Privatization in transition economies differs from Western experiences 
by the scope of the task, by the absence of efficient capital markets, and by the 
lack of private domestic savings. The main methods of privatization through sale 
and free distribution have offered great opportunities for foreign investors to 
acquire local firms (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Meyer, 1998). In addition, the 
openness of the economy and incentive policies toward FDI have attracted foreign 
firms to transition economies. FDI indeed is considered as one of the most 
effective ways by which transition economies become integrated to the global 
economy as FDI provides not only capital but also technology and management 
know-how necessary for restructuring firms in the host economies (Kinoshita and 
Campos, 2002; Lankes and Venables, 1996).  
The World Investment Report 2008 shows that FDI inflows to transition 
economies have been increasing since the economic reforms at the end of 1980s. 
In 2007, FDI flows in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) and the 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (CIS) accounted for 4.7% of 
the world FDI and 17% of developing countries compared with 1% and 3.8% 
respectively in 1997. However, the vast majority of investments have gone to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, three of the largest transition economies 
and the earliest to begin liberalization. In the East Asia, China remains the biggest 
host country of FDI, accounting for more than 50% of FDI inflows to this region 
since 1995.  In 2007, China accounted for 4.4% of FDI inflows of the world, 
nearly equaled to the share of the CEE and the CIS and 16.7% of FDI running to 
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developing countries. It also ranks first in the UNCTAD 2008-2010 survey of the 
most attractive locations for FDI. 
Empirical research on FDI in transition economies has mainly focused on 
entry mode choices and determinants of location choices by foreign investors. In 
terms of entry mode choices, most studies discuss the choices between wholly 
owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. The literature suggests that joint ventures 
will be preferred when investors need access to information, particularly about 
local market conditions, while fully-owned subsidiaries will be the preferred 
control mode when control of production aspects, such as technology or 
production quality, is paramount (Kokko et al., 2003; Meyer, 2001; Hennart 
1991). Kokko et al. (2003) show that at the beginning of the transition process 
difficulties in access to information about investment environment in Vietnam 
encouraged foreign investors to make joint ventures with SOEs. The privileged 
positions and the large network of SOEs could help foreign firms a smooth entry 
and succeed in the market. However, at more advanced stages of economic 
transition, information is more open to foreign firms. They therefore prefer to set 
up wholly owned subsidiaries to avoid transaction costs arising from searching, 
negotiating and monitoring local partners in the case of joint ventures (Meyer, 
2001). Moreover, due to the weakness of law enforcement on intellectual property 
rights, technology-intensive firms would prefer to internalize their transactions in 
high-tech goods and services (Hennart, 1991). 
With respect to location choices, key factors such as market size, low labor 
cost, and the riskiness of investment both in terms of the economic and political 
environments are found to have strong effects on location decisions of foreign 
firms in transition economies.  Lankes and Venables (1996) summarize seven 
surveys on foreign firms in the CEE and show that market seeking is a 
predominant motive of foreign investors in these transition economies. Meyer 
(1998) explain that before the economic reform, the consumers in these countries 
had almost no access to many consumer goods that were readily available to 
consumers at similar levels of per capita income in other parts of the world. This 
creates opportunities for foreign firms to explore these new markets while their 
home established markets are saturated. Market seeking indeed is one of the most 
important factors to explain the attractiveness of China toward foreign firms 
(Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Wei et al., 1998).   
Besides market size, low labor cost is considered as a key resource driving 
resource-seeking foreign investors to transition economies. Labor forces in most 
transition economies in the Central and Eastern Europe are regarded as having 
relatively a high level of skills and training and a strong scientific base in 
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comparison for example to regions with comparable income per capita levels in 
South East Asia or Latin America (The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Report 1999). These countries therefore attract not only labor-
intensive but also knowledge capital-intensive foreign enterprises. The empirical 
works of Cheng and Kwan (2000) on foreign firms in China, Nguyen Phi Lan 
(2006) in Vietnam, Meyer (1998) and Kinoshita and Campos (2002) in the CEE 
and the CIS confirmed the effect of low labor costs on investment decisions by 
foreign firms in transition economies. 
Studies of FDI in transition economies have paid special attentions to 
indicators of economic and political risks (Lucas, 1993; Singh and Jun, 1996). 
This comprises three main elements: macroeconomic stability, e.g. growth, 
inflation, exchange risk; institutional stability, such as policies towards FDI, tax 
regimes, the transparency of legal regulations and the scale of corruption; and 
political stability, ranging from indicators of political freedom to measures of 
revolutions (Bevan and Estrin, 2000). During the transition stage, many aspects of 
the economic and political structures in these countries have been changed 
radically, creating risks and uncertainties for economic environments. As firms in 
reality are not neutral risk but instead they are risk adverse, foreign investors are 
therefore likely to invest in places where economic and political environments are 
stable and have progressed furthest in institutional reforms (Baniak et al., 2002; 
Meyer, 2001). Progress in reform brings the institutional framework closer to that 
of developed countries, therefore reducing psychic distance and thus facilitates 
international business. Low psychic distance reduces the need to invest in 
information, to train local staff and to adapt management processes to the local 
environment. The empirical evidence in transition economies has revealed that 
foreign investors gravitate towards countries or regions that have low corruption 
level (Lipsey, 1999), political stability and low perceived risk level (Lankes and 
Venables, 1996; Bruno et al., 2008), progress in reforms of capital market, 
regulations on property rights, and labor market (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Bevan et 
al., 2004; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
Up to date, there have been many empirical studies on FDI in transition 
economies. However, most of them concentrate on the Central and Eastern 
European countries and China. To fulfill this gap, in our opinion, Vietnam is a 
suitable choice to investigate the strategic behavior of foreign investors in 
transition economies. From the late 1970s until 1990, Vietnam was integrated in 
the trading system of the Soviet Union and its allies, with few other linkages. In 
the 1980s, Vietnam experienced severe shortages of food and basic consumer 
goods, a high budget deficit, three-digit inflation, chronic trade imbalances and 
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deteriorating living standards. The economic stagnation forced the Vietnamese 
government to initiate an overall economic reform from a planned economy to a 
market economy in 1986. Different from some countries (e.g. Poland and Russia) 
choosing to drop central planning through shock therapies, Vietnam just like 
China attempted to gradually grow out of central planning through gradualist 
policies (Peng, 2003).   
In the scope of this thesis, we focus on determinants of location choices by 
foreign firms in Vietnam of which institutions and agglomeration economies are 
key factors. We also analyze the effects of location choices and entry mode 
choices on the survival probability of foreign firms in Vietnam. We suggest that 
when foreign firms invest in a transition economy whose characteristics, 
especially institutional frameworks, differ from their home countries, they need to 
implement strategic choices for their survival.  Before moving to the empirical 
studies, in the following parts we present a literature review on FDI determinants 
in Vietnam and provide an overview description of the dataset used for empirical 
works. 
 
4. The determinants of the FDI in Vietnam at the literature 
The first Law on Foreign Direct Investment issued in 1987 to encourage 
investments of foreign firms in Vietnam was considered one of the first concrete 
steps toward the economic renovation of the government.  Since then, FDI inflows 
into Vietnam have increased rapidly both in terms of the number of project and 
the amount of funds. By 1990, Vietnam licensed 211 projects with the registered 
capital of $1.57 billion, but by 2005, these numbers increased up to 7279 and 
66.24, respectively (The General Statistics Office of Vietnam – GSO website). In 
2007, FDI inflows to Vietnam achieved the highest record with $21.3 billion of 
registered capital after twenty years of issuing the Law on FDI, and it ranks sixth 
in the UNCTAD 2008-2010 Survey of the most attractive locations for FDI in the 
next three years (The World Investment Report 2008).  
The FDI inflows have been considered as an important source of economic 
development of Vietnam during its transition from a planned to a market oriented 
economy (Le Dang Doanh, 2002; Kokko et al., 2003). The FDI benefits the 
economy in terms of economic growth and domestic investment stimulation (Le 
Viet Anh, 2002; Nguyen Phuong Hoa, 2002; Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006), the 
development of the local industry stemmed by technological spillovers (Nguyen et 
al., 2004; Le Thanh Thuy, 2005; Mizra and Giroud, 2003, 2004), export boosting 
(Schaumburg-Muller, 2003; Nguyen and Xing, 2006), and poverty reduction 
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(Nguyen Phuong Hoa, 2002). For instance, during the period 2001-2005, foreign 
companies constituted almost 15.5% of Vietnam’s GDP, accounted for around 
35% of total non-oil export revenues and created 11000 new jobs each year (The 
GSO, 2004, 2007). 
According to Mirza and Giroud (2004), the achievement of Vietnam in 
attracting FDI is noticeable. Vietnam has become the third largest recipient of FDI 
inflows in the ASEAN, behind Singapore and Malaysia. Meyer (1998) stated that 
there are six aspects of the economic environments in the transition economies in 
which international business partners are particularly interested: the process of 
economic restructuring, large scale privatization, an evolving institutional 
framework, the reorientation of international trade, new markets, and low labor 
costs. In the centrally planned economy, the state owned all production facilities, 
and all economic activities in particular factor allocation were centrally 
coordinated through the central plan. The system implied not only a different 
mode of resource allocation but also many structural differences in the pattern of 
industry, the role of enterprises and the routines of individual behavior.  
The economic stagnation during 1980s forced the Vietnamese government 
to implement an economic reform in 1986 by restructuring the economy from a 
planned to a market economy. The major, if not the main, task of microeconomic 
restructuring is the transfer of enterprises from the state ownership to private 
ownership and the encouragement for foreign investment by favorable policies; 
thereby the role of private sector is strengthened. Besides developing the 
regulation framework for FDI, Vietnam has signed bilateral investment treaties 
with over sixty countries and has become the member of many international 
organizations such as the WTO and the ASEAN. The economic integrations with 
the Asian region and the world have contributed to making the investment regime 
in Vietnam more in line with international standards and more favorable to 
foreign investors.  
Besides the open policies for foreign investment, a new market in Vietnam 
is potentially attractive for many businesses. Before the economic renovation, the 
consumers in Vietnam had almost no access to many consumer goods that are 
available to consumers at similar levels of per capita income in other parts of the 
world. After the opening of economy, Vietnam with nearly 80 millions people has 
become a large market for consumer goods manufacturers. Moreover, Vietnam as 
a poor country with the desire to rapidly upgrade the economy is also an attractive 
market for many other businesses such as machinery supply or infrastructure 
construction. Moreover, factor-cost advantages arising from low costs of some 
raw materials and low labor costs create the attractiveness of Vietnam compared 
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with neighboring countries especially in textile, garment, and sea food 
manufacturing industries.  
Although there are numerous reports on the FDI in Vietnam, the empirical 
research is still limited. This is partly because of data availability. Vietnam does 
not publish many data on the operations of foreign affiliates, and the statistical 
office did not undertake regular surveys of foreign investors until the late 1990s. 
Moreover, it is hard to find a systematic socio-economic statistics that are useful 
for studies on determinants of FDI. It is therefore impossible to conduct 
comprehensive analyses of foreign investment in a long-term perspective (Kokko 
et al., 2003). However, since 2000 the GSO has implemented surveys on 
enterprises in all provinces of Vietnam. This dissertation uses the dataset from 
these surveys for empirical studies. We believe that these surveys will create good 
conditions for research on FDI in Vietnam. 
With respect to the empirical works on location choices by foreign firms in 
Vietnam, there have been very few studies exploring the reasons why foreign 
firms choose Vietnam to invest or why a specific region within Vietnam is 
preferred by foreign investors over the others. Moreover, all these studies can use 
data only at provincial level with conventional variables reflecting location 
advantages suggested by Dunning and Narula (1996) such as labor cost, labor 
productivity, market size, market growth, infrastructure, government policies, 
political stability, and geographical proximity. 
In terms of national determinants, we can count the works of Mirza and 
Giroud (2004), Hsieh (2005) and Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton (2002). The 
paper of Mirza and Giroud (2004) surveyed transnational corporations with 
operations in the ASEAN and found that Vietnam is chosen as a destination of 
FDI because of its political stability, large population, quality of labor force and 
diversified industrial base. The authors stated that around 45% of firms investing 
in Vietnam do so with the motivation of market seeking, only 14% can be 
regarded as efficiency seeking, and the other motives are mixed and can be either 
efficiency or market seeking, depending on contingencies.  
Hsieh (2005) studied the determinants of FDI inflows into the Southeast 
Asia transition economies including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
during the period 1990-2003 and found that the most important determinants are 
the lagged FDI inflows, GDP per capita, and the degree of openness. In addition, 
the Asian financial crisis is found to reduce FDI inwards to these countries. 
Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton (2002) estimated the effects of the Bilateral 
Trade Agreement between the United States and Vietnam, which came into effect 
in December 2001, on FDI in Vietnam and found that the Bilateral Trade 
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Agreement should lead to 30% more FDI into Vietnam in the first year, and in the 
longer term, the FDI will double. However, the inflow would only be maintained 
if Vietnam makes the changes required to join the WTO. 
Once the firms have decided to invest in a particular country, they face the 
location choices for their operations inside the country. The location-specific 
characteristics and policies of local authorities can affect the decisions of firms. In 
the case of Vietnam, there have been some studies investigating the regional 
determinants of FDI including Meyer and Nguyen (2005), Nguyen Phuong Hoa 
(2002), Pham Hoang Mai (2002), Le Viet Anh (2004), Nguyen Ngoc Anh and 
Nguyen Thang (2007), and Nguyen Phi Lan (2006). The work of Meyer and 
Nguyen (2005) examined the distributions of both newly registered FDI in 2000 
and the cumulative FDI up to 2000 by using logit model. The authors found that 
foreign investors are interested in the existence of industrial zones and the friendly 
policies of local authorities. Moreover, the provinces with larger population, 
better transport infrastructure, higher GDP growth and better educational system 
can attract more FDI. The location decisions by foreign firms are also driven by 
agglomeration effect that is proxied by the lagged FDI stock.  
Nguyen Phuong Hoa (2002) estimated the regional determinants of FDI 
distributions across provinces in Vietnam during the period 1990-2000 and 
revealed that market size presented by provincial GDP, technical workers, GDP 
per capita and industrial zones are the most important determinants of 
distributions of both registered and implemented FDI. By using the linear 
regression, Pham Hoang Mai (2002) analyzed the factors that influence the pattern 
of regional location of FDI during 1988-1998 and found that foreign investors are 
attracted by infrastructure, the quality of labor force and the size of the local 
market. Government tax incentives, on the other hand, do not make any 
significant impact on attracting FDI flows to poor and remote provinces.  
Similarly, the study of Nguyen Phi Lan (2006) used conventional variables 
with the data at provincial level to show that economic growth, market size, 
human capital, labor cost, infrastructure conditions, domestic investment and 
exchange rate affect the location decisions by foreign firms. By using the ordinary 
least square regressions, Le Viet Anh (2004) and Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen 
Thang (2007) have some changes when respectively including agglomeration 
effect measured by the cumulative FDI and institutional performance by local 
authorities proxied by the Vietnamese Provincial Competitiveness Index 2006 in 
the econometric models besides other conventional variables. They pointed out 
the importance of market, labor quality, infrastructure, and agglomeration effect in 
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attracting FDI. However, the institutional performance by provincial authorities 
seems not to be a significant factor.  
In summary, most studies on the determinants of FDI in Vietnam at national 
or provincial level have exploited conventional variables. The consistent results of 
studies on the importance of market size, market growth, labor force, and 
infrastructure conditions to the FDI distributions imply the motivations of market 
seeking, efficiency seeking and factor endowment seeking by foreign firms when 
investing in Vietnam. However, the empirical studies on the FDI of Vietnam are 
still very few and only exploit the data at the provincial level by using the 
conventional econometric models. The future work should go further by looking 
at the behavior by each foreign firm, thereby reflecting more exactly the 
determinants of location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam. 
 
5.  Data source description and the FDI patterns in Vietnam 
General description 
This dissertation uses the data from the early surveys on the enterprises 
operating in all provinces of Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office 
of Vietnam since 2000. An enterprise in these surveys is defined as “an economic 
unit that independently keeps business account and acquires its own legal status. It 
may be set up and operate under the regulations of State Enterprise Law, 
Cooperative Law, Enterprise Law, Foreign Investment Law or the Agreements 
between the Government of Vietnam and the Governments of Foreign Countries” 
(The GSO, 2007). There are three types of enterprise in the surveys: 
• The state enterprises at central level and at local level, including also 
enterprises which are under the control of the Communist Party and 
mass organizations of which the capital is provided by the government.  
• The non-state enterprises: enterprises set up by Cooperative Law except 
cooperatives of agricultural, forestry, and fishing sectors; private 
enterprises; collective name enterprises; limited liability companies; 
joint-stock companies including also privatized state enterprises and 
companies which have the capital share of the Government less than 
50%. 
• The foreign enterprises: wholly-owned foreign enterprises and joint 
venture enterprises. 
These enterprises belong to all industries excluding cooperatives of 
agricultural, forestry, fishing sectors and business households. Industrial 
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classification is based on main activity of the enterprise that contributes the largest 
share to total gross output of the enterprise. The number of enterprises in the 
surveys and their statistical indicators are counted only when they are still 
operating by the 31st of December every year, excluding enterprises that had 
received business licenses, tax codes but still do not operate; enterprises that were 
dissolved or jointed to other enterprises; enterprises that got operation licenses but 
do not locate in local area; economic units that do not independently keep 
business account such as branches, dependent economic units and other non 
economic bodies. 
The contents of the surveys cover indicators to identify enterprises including 
their name, address, type, and economic activities of the enterprises and indicators 
to reflect production situations of the enterprises such as their employees, income 
of employees, asset and capital source, turnover, profit, contributions to the state 
budget, investment capital, taxes and other obligations to the government, job 
training, and evaluations on the investment environment. The GSO designed some 
questionnaires that are applied to different kinds of enterprises. For instance, the 
questionnaire 1A-ðTDN is used for all state enterprises, non-state enterprises that 
have equal or greater than 10 employees, 20% of sampled non-state enterprises 
with fewer than 10 employees, and all foreign enterprises. The description of the 
questionnaire 1A-ðTDN and selected variables definitions are shown in 
Appendix A. The investigators can either deliver the questionnaires to enterprises 
with necessary instructions and the time and address to receive their answers back 
or they have to directly interview the owners of the enterprises especially with the 
questionnaire on investment environment. The methodologies and contents of 
surveys are in general similar every year to assure comparability of information 
among years.  
Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the dataset from the surveys 
conducted from 2000 to 20053. The average increase of number of enterprises in 
the six years from 2000 to 2005 is around 28% per year. The contribution to GDP 
of enterprises has been increasing which accounted for 53% in 2005, increasing 
10% compared with 1995. Most enterprises operate in commerce and 
manufacturing sectors and have tendencies to concentrate in the Red River Delta 
and the South East regions, where two biggest cities Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City 
are respectively located. The majority of enterprises have small and medium size 
(from 5 to 300 employees). Every year, enterprise sector creates new jobs for 
around 500 thousand employees (The GSO, 2007). 
 
                                                
3 The data are calculated up to the 31st of December of each year. 
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Table 1.1: The principle indicators of enterprises 
Principle Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
1. Total numbers of surveyed enterprises  
 
42288 
 
51680 
 
62908 
 
72012 
 
91755 
 
113352 
By type of ownership (%)             
State enterprises 13.62 10.36 8.53 6.73 5.01 3.60 
Non-state enterprises 82.78 85.75 87.80 89.60 91.55 93.13 
Foreign enterprises 3.61 3.89 3.67 3.67 3.44 3.26 
By kind of economic activity(%)       
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 2.19 1.69 1.55 1.30 1.11 0.94 
Fishing 5.80 4.96 3.83 2.04 1.48 1.20 
Mining and quarrying 1.01 1.23 1.40 1.43 1.30 1.13 
Manufacturing 24.59 23.90 23.52 23.49 22.38 21.23 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.35 0.19 0.18 
Construction 9.46 11.02 12.47 13.49 13.42 13.46 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair vehicles 41.49 40.10 39.41 39.43 40.74 41.60 
Hotels and restaurants 4.54 4.65 4.52 4.56 4.31 4.18 
Transport, storage and communications 4.25 4.92 5.15 5.52 5.83 5.97 
Financial intermediation 2.21 2.00 1.66 1.46 1.23 1.00 
Science and technology activities 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Real estate, renting and business activities 3.25 4.25 5.14 5.74 6.73 7.68 
Education and training 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.35 
Health and social work 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.18 
Cultural and sport activities 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.35 
Other community and social activities 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.52 
By size of employee (%)        
Less than 5 persons 24.05 23.09 19.20 18.18 19.59 20.64 
From 5 to 9 25.78 26.89 28.83 28.38 28.84 30.66 
From 10 to 49 28.54 30.45 32.93 35.02 35.36 34.42 
From 50 to 199 13.32 12.20 11.99 11.85 10.69 9.65 
From 200 to 299 2.66 2.31 2.15 1.95 1.67 1.43 
From 300 to 499 2.48 2.24 2.15 1.95 1.65 1.37 
From 500 to 999 1.93 1.71 1.66 1.64 1.31 1.05 
From 1000 to 4999 1.17 1.04 1.01 0.95 0.83 0.71 
From 5000 and above 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 
By regions (%)       
Red River Delta 21.01 22.60 25.43 27.02 27.44 26.92 
Northeast 4.91 5.38 5.85 6.14 6.75 6.43 
Northwest 0.90 0.95 0.96 1.10 1.14 1.18 
North Central Coast  5.33 5.43 6.03 6.07 5.86 6.36 
South Central Coast  7.81 7.50 7.27 7.09 6.82 6.90 
Central Highlands 4.32 3.75 3.40 3.21 3.14 3.14 
Southeast 32.02 33.92 33.39 33.77 34.73 36.34 
Mekong River Delta 23.26 20.08 17.33 15.32 13.90 12.58 
2. Average employees per one enterprise  84 76 74 72 63 55 
State enterprises 363 395 421 467 490 499 
Non-state enterprises 30 30 31 32 29 28 
Foreign enterprises 267 243 299 326 331 330 
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3. Avg. capital per enterprise (bill. VND) 26 24 23 23.9 23.6 23.7 
State enterprises 130 153 167 210.2 264.7 355 
Non-state enterprises 3 4 4 5.2 5.9 6.7 
Foreign enterprises 157 133 134 139.6 142.4 142.8 
4. Profit rate (%) compared with capital 3.7 3.8 4.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 
State enterprises 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.4 
Non-state enterprises 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.4 
Foreign enterprises 9 8.7 10 11.6 13 11.2 
5. Profit rate (%) compared with 
turnover 
5.1 5 5.1 5.4 6 5.3 
State enterprises 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 5.3 5.7 
Non-state enterprises 1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 
Foreign enterprises 13.3 13 13.6 14.6 15.4 11.8 
Source: The GSO (2004, 2007), “The situation of enterprises”, the Statistical Publishing House. 
 
Due to the re-organization and privatization in the direction of multi-sector 
economic development by the government, there are some changes in the 
structure of enterprise sector. In 2005, the number of state enterprises accounted 
for 3.6% of the total number of enterprises, reducing 10% compared with 2005. 
However, their scale has been enlarged. For example, in 2000 the average number 
of employees per one enterprise is 363, but in 2005 is 499, or the average capital 
per one enterprise in 2000 is 130 billion VND, but in 2005 is 355 billion VND. 
Currently, state enterprises are mainly operating in the following sector: industry 
(30.6%); construction (17.3%); agriculture, forestry and fishing (14%); commerce 
(16.3%).  
Opposite to state enterprises, the number of non-state enterprises has been 
rapidly growing, from 35004 enterprises (accounting for 82.78% of the total 
enterprises) in 2000 to 105569 (equivalent to 93.13% of the total enterprises) in 
2005 (an increase of 14113 enterprises per year). However, most of them are 
micro and small enterprises. The average number of employees per one enterprise 
is only 30 and 32 in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The average capital per one 
enterprise is 3 billion VND in 2000 and 7 billion VND in 2005. These levels are 
really small compared with state enterprises. The number of foreign enterprises 
has also been increasing, from 1525 enterprises in 2000 to 3697 in 2005 (an 
increase of 362 enterprises per year) of which most of them are wholly-owned 
enterprises, accounting for 77.1% (The GSO, 2007). In terms of production 
efficiency that is based on the profit rate compared with production capital or 
turnover, foreign firms operate much more productively than state and non-state 
enterprises (more than double state enterprises and ten times more than non-state 
enterprises).  
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The FDI patterns in Vietnam  
In 1987, Vietnam for the first time issued the Law on Foreign Direct 
Investment. Compared with other countries in the region, FDI in Vietnam has a 
short history of development. However, Vietnam has attracted a substantial 
amount of FDI and has been quite successful as compared with other countries in 
the region, ranking the third largest recipient in the ASEAN (Mirza and Giroud, 
2004).  
Figure 1.1 shows the overall trend of FDI inflows in Vietnam for the period 
1988-2005. Together with the number of investment projects, the amount of 
registered capital for licensed projects increased rapidly in the first half of the 
1990s, which is generally referred to as the “investment boom” period in Vietnam. 
However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 strongly influenced the economies of 
countries in the region, leading a sharp decline of the FDI in Vietnam during the 
final years of 1990s. The FDI inflows started to pick up again as countries in the 
region recovered from the crisis and the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement was signed in 2001. Although not shown here in the Figure 1.1, the 
trend of FDI inflows has increased strongly after Vietnam became a formal 
member of the WTO in the beginning of 2007. As a result, after twenty years of 
issuing the first Law on Foreign Direct Investment, FDI flowing to Vietnam in 
2007 achieved the highest record with $21.3 billion of registered capital, $8.03 
billion of implemented capital and 1544 new investment projects (The Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam – MPI website). 
 
Figure 1.1: FDI inflows into Vietnam during 1988-2005 
 
Source:  The GSO website 
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Together with the increase in registered capital and investment projects, 
Table 1.1 shows that the number of foreign firms entering Vietnam’s market also 
increases over time, from 1525 enterprises in 2000 to 3697 in 2005. However, 
foreign firms are unevenly distributed among the regions and provinces within 
Vietnam. Table 1.2 shows that most investors prefer to locate in the Red River 
Delta and the Southeast regions4. For instance, in 2005 these two regions 
accounted for 89% of total number of foreign firms, of which 20.2% in Hanoi and 
68.8% in Ho Chi Minh City. By contrast, the Northwest and the North Central 
Coast attracted only 0.4% and 0.9% respectively of the total foreign firms. 
Regarding industry distribution, the data from the surveys shows that most 
foreign firms invested in manufacturing sector, accounting for 71.8% of total 
number of foreign firms in 2005. Following are activities relating to business 
consultancy, communications and transport. The data also shows that most 
investors prefer the form of 100% foreign ownership. For example, in 2005 the 
100% foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 77.1% of the total foreign 
enterprises in Vietnam. 
 
Table 1.2: Regional distribution (%) of foreign enterprises in Vietnam 
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Red River Delta  22.7 20.5 20.7 20.5 20.7 20.2 
Northeast  2.0 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.0 
Northwest  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
North Central Coast  1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 
South Central Coast 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.7 
Central Highlands  2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.9 
Southeast  64.5 68.5 68.1 67.6 67.7 68.8 
Mekong River Delta  3.5 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 
Source: The GSO, the Enterprise Surveys in Vietnam 2000-2005 
 
In term of the investors’ nationalities and their location patterns, the data in 
the surveys reveal that up to the end of 2005, there were seventy five countries 
and territories investing in Vietnam. Among them, the number of investors from 
Asian countries accounted for 78.7%, Europe 11.6%, and America and Caribbean 
5% of the total foreign enterprises. The top five investors were Taiwan, South 
Korea, Japan, Singapore, and China. However, the geographical locations of 
investments were diversified. While most investors from Taiwan or the United 
                                                
4 The positions of the provinces and regions are presented in the map of Vietnam in Appendix C and 
Appendix 3.1. 
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States preferred to concentrate in some provinces of the Southeast region such as 
Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong and Da Nang provinces, Japanese or Chinese 
investors were likely to choose some provinces of the Red River Delta region 
such as the cities of Hanoi and Hai Phong for their firm location. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This chapter provides a theoretical review on FDI with the aim to explore 
the motivations driving a firm to expand investment abroad, the reasons why FDI 
is preferred to other investment forms, and the main factors affecting location 
decisions by foreign firms. Since our thesis focuses on location choices by foreign 
firms in Vietnam, we spend more room on the discussion of the location theories 
such as the theory of comparative advantages, localization theory, institutional 
based view and information cost approach.  
The theory of comparative advantages suggests that if firms use FDI to 
minimize costs, they will move to locations where production costs are lowest. 
The localization theory states that benefits from agglomeration economies 
motivate foreign firms to cluster in the same place. However, clustering firms are 
not only receivers but also sources of spillover knowledge. They would therefore 
choose locations to gain exposure to others’ localized knowledge while reducing 
leakage of their own knowledge to their competitors. The effect of agglomerations 
on the firm’s location decision will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The 
institutional-based view suggests that foreign firms gravitate toward countries and 
regions that have market-supporting institutions where they can reduce transaction 
costs associated with searching, negotiating, monitoring local partners. The effects 
of institutions on FDI location will be explored in Chapter 2. The information cost 
approach indicates that foreign investors prefer to locate in areas where they are 
able to minimize the expected information costs. The effects of information costs 
on FDI location choices will be discussed partly in Chapter 2.  
Subsequently, we present a literature review on FDI determinants in 
transition economies and in Vietnam. We state that market size, labor costs and 
the riskiness of investment environments are key factors affecting FDI inflows 
into these countries. The final section provides the description of data source that 
is used for the empirical studies in Vietnam. The dataset show that since the 
economic reform in 1986, Vietnam’s economy has experienced many changes. 
One of them is the decrease of the number of state enterprises and the increase of 
non-state and foreign enterprises. This reflects that the economy gradually reduces 
its dependence on inefficient state-owned enterprises and private sector has been 
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strengthened over time. Especially, FDI has important effects on the economy by 
encouraging domestic investment, creating employment opportunities, 
transferring technology, and boosting exports. However, the dataset also reveal 
uneven distributions of FDI across regions within the country, contributing to the 
unequal development among regions. This issue suggests that in the coming time, 
Vietnam should design policies on the one hand to promote FDI inflows into the 
country, and on the other hand to fulfill the gaps among regions in attracting FDI.   
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Chapter 2 
Institutions and Entry Decisions by Foreign 
Firms in Vietnam 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both transaction costs 
and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure that facilitates interactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In order to succeed 
in foreign markets, foreign investors have to adapt their strategies to formal 
institutions, such as laws and regulations, and informal institutions, such as 
practices of law enforcement by local authorities, of host countries, especially 
when entering transition economies characterized by incomplete, inconsistent and 
unstable institutional frameworks. For instance, foreign firms prefer to set up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures to reduce transaction costs of 
searching, negotiating and contracting with local partners (Meyer, 2001; 
Brouthers, 2002), or they are likely to locate in places that have developed 
market-supporting institutions (Bevan et al., 2004; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer 
and Nguyen, 2005).  
International business scholars have extensively studied how institutional 
variables influence the location of FDI in terms of host country selection (Bevan 
et al., 2004; Hoskisson et al.; Lipsey, 1999; Mudambi and Navarra, 2002), but 
they have largely ignored institutional effects on intra-country location. This 
study contributes to fulfill this gap by showing that just as formal institutions at 
the national level affecting the overall volume of FDI inflows in a country, 
informal institutions at the sub-national level influence spatial distributions of FDI 
among regions within the country. We emphasize that inappropriate institutional 
practices by local authorities are a barrier to entries and development of foreign 
firms in the regions. 
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We have chosen Vietnam to study the impact of informal institutions on 
FDI inflows. This is a suitable choice because Vietnam has gone through a major 
economic transition process since 1986 while weakness in the formal and 
informal institutions remains obstacles to business. The communist party still 
remains in power and many aspects of the economy are subject to regulations or 
direct interference by the authorities of the local government or the ruling party. 
Moreover, the important amendment of the FDI law in 1996 decentralized some 
policy responsibilities to provinces, leading to variations in how local authorities 
implement central regulations and may develop different ways to deal with 
foreign firms. 
The study applies the Tobit model to investigate the effect of institutional 
practice by local authorities on the entry rates of foreign firms in provinces of 
Vietnam over the period 2000-2005. The Vietnamese provincial competitiveness 
index in 2006 (PCI 2006) and its two sub-indices reflecting attitudes of local 
government toward state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the capability of private 
enterprises to access to necessary information for their business are used as 
proxies for institutional practices. The empirical results reveal that provinces with 
better institutional practices attract more foreign firms. The efforts of local 
authorities in interpreting and implementing central regulations and policies are an 
important factor creating attractiveness toward domestic and foreign investors. 
Transparency and access to information are found to have a strong effect on the 
attractiveness of a province to foreign investors. By contrast to our prediction, the 
favorable treatments of local authorities toward SOEs do not inhibit the entry of 
foreign firms to the region.  
The empirical results support our argument that institutional practices by 
local governments influence the FDI spatial distributions among regions within 
the country. Formal legal changes initiated at the centre have varied impacts 
across provinces because the implementation of laws and regulations at local level 
depends on the informal institutions determined by attitudes (norms and 
cognitions) of local authorities. This shows that decentralization policy may, on 
the one hand, generate opportunities for entrepreneurial local authorities to push 
forward economic reforms, but on the other hand, it can deter investments if local 
decision makers possess conservative inherited norms and lack recognitions of the 
purpose of regulation changes. However, in our opinion, this policy is successful 
in encouraging creativeness and competitiveness among provinces to attract 
foreign investments.  
We organize this chapter as follows. Section 2 reveals an overview of 
institutional reforms and their effects on the foreign direct investment in Vietnam. 
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Section 3 presents the theoretical framework to develop hypotheses. Section 4 
provides a detailed description of the Vietnam provincial competitiveness index as 
a proxy for institutional practice. Section 5 is devoted to the methodology and 
empirical results. The final section is conclusions. 
 
2. An overview of institutional reforms and their effects on the 
FDI in Vietnam 
In 1986, Vietnam embarked on a path of reform, known as “Doi moi”, by 
restructuring the economy from a planned to a market economy. With the collapse 
of the communist regime, the transformation of the old economic structure had to 
take place through the entry of new and market-oriented firms particularly in the 
undeveloped sectors of the economy and the exit of inefficient and uncompetitive 
enterprises. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Vietnam has recognized the legal 
existence of the domestic private enterprises and has issued favorite policies to 
attract FDI. Despite this legal landmark, the policy environment, however, 
remained hostile to private businesses in the 1990s. Consequently, non-state firms 
had faced many constraints to their establishment and growth. 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 led to an economic stagnation and thus 
contributed to the second phase of Vietnam’s economic reform. This reform stage 
targeted at the sustainable growth of the non-state sector and was supported by the 
issuance of the Enterprise Law in 1999. In this section, we present the institutional 
reforms in Vietnam and their impacts on the patterns of foreign direct investment. 
Following Balcerowicz et al. (2002), we focus on four aspects of institutional 
performance of which their weaknesses are main constraints for the entry and 
development of new firms in Vietnam: (i) regulatory reforms focusing on 
administrative procedures, fiscal and financial system; (ii) security of private 
property rights concentrating on land access and security of tenure and dispute 
resolution; (iii) provision of information; and (iv) competitive environment, 
particularly the role of existing state-owned enterprises. 
 
2.1. Institutional reforms 
(i) Regulatory reforms in administrative procedures, fiscal and financial system 
 Since the issuance of the Enterprise Law in 1999, a significant change in 
business costs has arisen in that many barriers preventing the establishment of 
firms have been reduced. As a result, the time it takes for business registration has 
been reduced from 90 to 7 days on average. The registration fee has also 
decreased nearly twenty times, from VND 10 million (around $570) to VND 500 
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thousand (around $29). The registration process is generally perceived without 
much difficulty (Tran et al., 2008). 
Recently, the government has implemented a series of actions to improve 
administrative procedures: Decision 181 on April 5, 2005 on one-stop shops in 
provinces to improve business registration; Decision 23 on January 26, 2005 to 
create an inter-disciplinary group to address difficulties and complaints from 
businesses regarding business procedures; Decision 22 on January 24, 2006 on 
assigning responsibility to address concerns and complaints from people, 
organizations and businesses; and other actions to improve the relationship 
between the state and citizens and businesses, and make administrative procedures 
public, transparent, and simplified. 
The land law which was enacted in 1993 and amended in 2003 was a big 
advancement on reforming institutions related to land ownership and land use 
right of market actors. In 2007, one enterprise had to spend 90 days for getting 
Land Use Rights Certificate and negotiating with previous owners of the land 
compared with 231 days in 2006. While this improvement is substantial, 90 days 
are still a long time for a business to wait (The PCI 2007 Report).   
As pointed out by Balcerowicz (2002), tax system is one of the main 
problems for firms in transition economies. In Vietnam, the complexity and non-
transparency of tax regulations still remain as major obstacles for establishment 
and growth of private firms. Although since the day of reformation in 1986, 
Vietnam has implemented a significant reform in tax system including a gradual 
reduction of tax rates, more uniform tax ranges and improvement in the tax 
collection mechanism, firms often complain about the discretion and bureaucratic 
attitude of tax officers. The fact that firms have to pay unofficial fees is common 
because tax officers usually hide information, making the regulation environment 
unclear (Carlier and Tran, 2004a). According to the survey conducted by the 
Central Institute for Economic Management in Vietnam (CIEM) on 360 firms in 
2007, a firm on average has to spend 2000 hours or 245 days per year, which is 
equivalent to hiring one employee to take charge of all tax procedures (Tran et al., 
2008). The recent reform in tax system is the issuance of the Tax Law in 2006 that 
allows firms to calculate and pay tax online. This will reduce the complexity and 
costs firms have to pay in terms of business taxation. 
Regarding the financial system, during the beginning years of reform, the 
Vietnamese economy had to cope with hyper-inflation. The State Bank system 
had both currency printing and credit supply functions. Thus, the transformation 
from the one-tier to the two-tier banking system that separated the state 
management function of the State Bank from the business function of commercial 
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banks and other non-banking financial institutions was a crucial step to curb 
inflation as well as to create conditions for the implementation of a monetary 
policy corresponding with the market mechanism. Moreover, a stock market that 
was established in late 2000 has contributed to attract private saving for 
investment.  
However, despite the efforts of the government in reforming the financial 
system, the Vietnamese financial market, overall, has not caught up with and 
satisfied socio-economic demands. The financial market, in general, and the 
monetary market and capital market in particular have remained at a low 
development level. The security market has been newly-established and weak. At 
present, many secondary markets in Vietnam have not been developed. The 
cooperation and interaction among markets in the system remained loose. The 
banking system has had many potential risks. The information transparency has 
not always been guaranteed. Moreover, the current legal system has not created 
the conditions for the necessary independence of the State Bank and loosened 
conditions for financial market penetration of investors, especially foreign 
investors. The legal system on credit has also showed quite clear discriminations 
among credit suppliers as well as among customers of credit organizations. Many 
private firms, especially the small and medium ones, complain that it is very 
difficult for them to access loans from banks, and most of loans run to state-
owned enterprises. Consequently, most private firms have to use their own 
savings or the profit from the previous years for their firm’s operation (Dinh Van 
An, 2006).  
 
(ii) Security of private property rights 
In 2000, the International Monetary Fund observed that Vietnam did not 
have secure private property rights. Six years later, the Heritage Foundation 2007 
gave a score of just 10% to Vietnam in terms of security of its property rights 
whereas other measures of institutional performance were rated above 50% (Kane 
et al., 2007). Main problems that are related to private property rights and often 
cited as impeding the private sector performance in Vietnam are land access and 
security of tenure and dispute resolution. 
 
Land access and security of tenure 
One issue that is often cited by private firms in Vietnam is unclearly defined 
land policies. Essentially, land property issue can be divided into two dimensions: 
access to land and the security of tenure (The PCI 2006 Report).  
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According to the Constitution of Vietnam, land belongs to the state. The 
Land Law 1993, however, recognizes the right to use land of individuals and 
firms through Land Use Rights Certificates (LURCs). These certificates legalize 
their owners’ rights to the long-term use of the allocated land (for as little as 20 
years, but up to 70 years) and to transfer, exchange, lease, inherit and mortgage 
the land use right. Particularly important is the ability to use formal LURCs as 
collateral in accessing bank loans. However, the Land Law 1993 does not define 
clearly the functions of related government bodies, leading to the weakness in 
providing LURCs. Consequently, many private firms have their own premises but 
cannot have an LURC, or they have informal land rights inherited from previous 
generations or purchased through informal exchange.  
A consequence of the planned economy and the Vietnam‘s Constitution is 
that all utilized land is allocated to individuals and state-owned enterprises. The 
procedures to apply for land for business purposes are both complicated and 
costly. Firms have to pay transaction costs by visiting many government agencies 
as well as informal fees, then waiting for around 2-3 years for the final decision 
(Carlier and Tran, 2004b). Private firms that cannot have their own LURCs must 
either rent land from family, friends, or -in strikingly high numbers- rent land 
from state-owned enterprises or local agencies. Moreover, renting land from state-
owned enterprises is a short-term lease with monthly or yearly payments rather 
than the quasi-property right offered by the LURC. This makes firms suffer from 
an additional set of costs over time, both in terms of regular rent and opportunities 
foregone due to an inability to access bank capital.  
In order to increase the land supply for non-state enterprises, the 
government issued the Land Law Amendment in 1998 and the Domestic 
Investment Promotion Amendment in 1998 that encourage provinces with little 
available land to construct industrial zones and publish information about 
available land. However, constructing industrial zones takes time because it 
requires compensation for confiscated land and the publication of information on 
available land depends on local governments. Moreover, many private firms 
complain that many industrial zones are ill-suited to the needs of the private sector 
and instead were designed to accommodate foreign firms or state-owned 
enterprises. As a result, many provinces have a large number of industrial zones, 
but very few firms located within them.  
Besides the capacity of land access, private firms are also concerned about 
the security of land tenure once they get LURCs. The more secure the tenure, the 
more firms will be emboldened to invest in the long term productivity of their 
land allocation. But if expropriation or fundamental changes in lease contracts are 
 46 
possible, firms will take a more short-term outlook with their investment and 
business decisions. In special cases, firms are forced to surrender their property, 
they are concerned about if they can receive fair compensation for the value of 
that land. One of the break-through of the new Land Law in 2003 is that it tries to 
bring state compensation prices into closer accordance with market prices. 
However, there is inevitably a delay between the bureaucratic process of revaluing 
land and more rapid changes in the market value of land. Moreover, the 
implementation of this law depends on practices by local government authorities 
(Carlier and Tran, 2004b). 
 
Dispute resolution 
For many years, scholars and practitioners have stressed legal development 
and formal modes of dispute resolution as a weak link in Vietnam’s economic 
transformation and development (The PCI 2007 Report). In fact, most Provincial 
People’s Courts have very little independence in staffing, budgeting, or decision 
making from the Central People’ Court. Strengthening legal institutions and local 
courts will become even more vital as Vietnam enters the WTO. Despite the 
reforms of the judiciary system in recent years, most individuals and private firms 
still choose informal mechanisms of dispute resolution. For example, of the 6500 
firms in the survey for the provincial competitiveness index in 2006, only 0.8% 
saw courts as their top dispute resolution option. The reasons for not using courts 
when firms’ disputes arise include the fear of the complication of lawsuits, the 
possibility of an unfair judge and negative reputation with business partners. As a 
result, firms rely mostly on business associations to solve their disputes. 
 
(iii) Provision of information 
Transparency is one of the most crucial factors highlighted by academics 
and development practitioners in distinguishing between environments that are 
conductive or not conductive to private sector. Vietnam has been characterized by 
a lack of transparency and a service sector to support business development. 
Managers often complain about the lack of market information about inputs, 
output, alternative suppliers, buyers, price and price trend. Moreover, information 
about changes in policies and regulations as well as basic business registration 
such as firm name, address, and other details were not available to public and 
responsible officials (Tran et al., 2008). The capacity to access market 
information or new regulations and policies to some extent is based on the 
relationship with provincial officials (The PCI 2006 Report). Information 
 47 
openness to firms, however, is implemented differently by provinces. For 
instance, Binh Duong province provides all firms with a compact disc that 
contains copies of all relevant national legal documents and provincial 
implementing documents from the previous years. The solution of Vinh Phuc 
province is less high-tech, but of a similar spirit. Firms in this province are 
provided with a binder containing paper copies of all relevant regulatory 
documents.  
The lack of information about the market and changes in regulations 
constrains development of non-state firms. Acknowledging these difficulties, the 
government issued Decree No.90/2001/CP-ND to support development of small 
and medium enterprises and Decree No.94/2002/QD-TTG to reform the 
mechanism and policies to stimulate the development of the non-state sector. 
These decisions led to the formation of the Agency for Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development in October 2002. The key roles of this agency are to 
provide firms with information about markets, technology, management, and 
governmental regulations. However, information provision by this agency remains 
weak and depends on the attitudes of the local government official towards the 
non-state sector (Tran et al., 2008). 
In order to overcome the shortage of information and to promote 
cooperation, firms have established their own business associations. These 
associations provide information about policies and legal issues to their members. 
However, there are very few associations that are large and effective enough to 
give firms fully necessary information. Besides information provided by 
associations or local governments, firms can buy information from business 
development services, but normally the quality of information does not satisfy 
firms’ requirements.  
 
 (iv) Competitive environment 
In order to encourage development of private firms, the government has 
issued regulations aimed at creating a fair and balanced competition environment 
for all economic actors. However, many non-state firms complain that provinces 
have favorable treatments to the state-owned enterprises especially in access to 
bank credit and land, creating barriers to entry and develop of non-state firms. 
Some provinces have stated explicitly that their primary goal is to promote large 
state-owned champions as the primary engine of growth. Others may not have 
such an explicit bias, but instead have an institutional incentive to promote state-
owned enterprises because of the high employment or revenue they generate for 
the province (The PCI 2006 Report).  
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Traditionally, SOEs played a leading role in Vietnam’s economy and still 
contribute more than the domestic private sector to the GDP although their share 
has been gradually declining (Nguyen et al., 2004). However, most of SOEs 
suffered from inefficiency, outdated technology, non-competitive products, poor 
management and an inability to respond to market demands. To realize the goals 
of the “Doi moi”, the government policy aims to restructure SOEs by equitization, 
therefore reducing the dependence of the overall economy on SOEs and the 
dependence of SOEs on the government’s support. 
Despite the reforms in the SOE sector by the government, private firms 
often complain that provinces have bias attitudes to the state sector. One of the 
key sources of state sector bias is a collateral requirement on loans to the private 
sector, whereas no collateral is required to loan to the state sector. Bankers in 
state-owned commercial banks tend to believe that lending to the state sector is a 
safer bet. Over time, the banking environment has improved for private sector 
clients in many provinces. But in others, there continues to be a significant 
disparity (The PCI 2006 Report). Using the PCI 2005 data, Nguyen Van Thang 
(2005) shows that the density of SOEs in a province has a negative impact on the 
private sector’s access to market and key resources such as land and bank loans 
and a negative influence on the private sector’s growth in terms of the number of 
firms and employment. Moreover, his study found that private sector development 
tends to have a more positive contribution to a province’s overall economic 
performance than the SOE sector, and those provinces hosting a higher density of 
SOEs tend to have a lower GDP growth rate.  
 
2.2. The effects of institutional reforms on the FDI in Vietnam 
In order to strengthen the role of private sector in the economy, besides the 
policies to encourage the development of domestic private firms, the government 
has issued favorable policies to attract FDI. The first Law on Foreign Investment 
in Vietnam that was passed by the National Assembly of Vietnam on 29 
December 1987 is considered as one of concrete steps towards this goal. This law 
was amended several times in 1992, 1996, 2000, and most recently replaced by a 
Unified Investment Law 2006 that integrates both domestic and foreign 
investment. These changes and amendments aim to remove obstacles against the 
operation of foreign investors and to improve investment climate in Vietnam. 
Usually, these changes are to provide more tax incentives, to simplify investment 
licensing procedures, and to promote transfer of technology.  
The FDI law amendment in 1992 granted foreign investors with more rights 
and incentives, allowing FDI in construction of infrastructure facilities, giving the 
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same tax treatment between wholly-owned foreign firms and joint ventures, and 
providing foreign firms with longer operation duration. This amendment has 
encouraged foreign firms to set up wholly-owned affiliates when entering 
Vietnamese market. For example, during 1991-1998, joint ventures had been the 
most common form of investment, but in 2000, the licensed capital for wholly-
owned projects for the first time was larger than that of joint ventures (Kokko et 
al., 2003). Moreover, under the 1987 FDI Law, a foreign enterprise could open 
Vietnamese and foreign currency bank accounts at the Bank for Foreign Trade of 
Vietnam, or at the branch of a foreign bank established in Vietnam. This would 
need approval from the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). In the 1992 Law, these 
enterprises were able to open bank accounts at any banks operating in Vietnam, 
and could open loan capital accounts at overseas banks with approval from the 
SBV. From the year 2000, in special cases approved by the SBV, a foreign 
enterprise can mortgage assets attached to the land and use the value of the land-
use rights for borrowing loans from credit institutions operating in Vietnam. 
In 1996, the FDI law was modified to allow for new forms of investment 
including BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) and BT 
(Build-Transfer) contracts. The modification also gave more rights and incentives 
to investors, such as the right to assign the contributed capital to other parties.  
Moreover, before 1996, pre-licensing evaluation procedures applied to all foreign 
investment projects. During the evaluation process, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment of Vietnam could request any necessary documents apart from those 
stipulated by law. The time it took to acquire an investment was supposed to be 
three months from the date of receiving a completed application dossier. 
However, in reality this usually took much longer, possibly even years. The FDI 
law amendment in 1996 has reduced procedures for registration, and it has 
decentralized some policy responsibilities to provinces and has given them some 
autonomy in issuing investment licenses for foreign investment projects up to 
specified sizes.  
In 2000, the FDI law was amended again to acknowledge the right of 
foreign investors to merge and to acquire companies or branches, and the right to 
transfer the form of investment. Most recently, the Unified Law of Investment 
was passed on 29 December 2005 to replace all previous laws and regulations on 
domestic and foreign investment. The new law which came into force on 1 July 
2006 was prepared to meet requirements of the accession to the WTO. Under this 
new law, foreign and domestic enterprises are treated equally according to the rule 
of non-discrimination under the WTO. In addition, that Vietnam has signed 
bilateral investment treaties with over sixty countries contributes to make the 
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investment regime in Vietnam more in line with international standards and more 
favorable to foreign investors. 
Besides amendments of the FDI law, the government has also passed 
several other laws in order to create a good business environment for foreign 
investment such as the Competitive Law and the Law on Bankruptcy both issued 
in 2004. Remarkable are the Land Law Amendment and the Domestic Investment 
Promotion Amendment issued in 1998 that encourage provinces with little 
available land to construct industrial zones and publish information about 
available land. By doing this, the government has increased land supply and 
foreign investors may have easier access to land, therefore making it unnecessary 
to seek joint ventures as a means to access land-use rights (Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005).  
To increase attractiveness of industrial zones, the government has issued 
some tax incentives applied for firms locating in these places. The standard profit 
tax rate is 28% and preferred rates range from 10% to 20% if the investment is 
located in priority areas or satisfies certain investment promotion criteria. In 1991, 
the government issued the first regulation on export processing zones (EPZ). An 
EPZ specializes in the production of export goods and in the provision of services 
for the production of export goods and export activities. Enterprises operating in 
EPZs enjoy a profit tax rate at 10% and 15% in respect of production and service 
enterprises. Industrial zones (IZ) have been established since 1994. An IZ is a 
concentrated zone specializing in the production of industrial goods and services 
for industrial goods production. Enterprises operating in IZs enjoy profit tax rates 
at 15%, 10%, and 20% respectively for production, exporting and service 
enterprises. A high-tech zone concentrates high-technology industrial enterprises 
and units providing hi-technology development services, including scientific 
technological research and development, training and other related services. 
Enterprises operating in high-tech zones have to pay 10% of profit tax rate after 
an eight-year tax holiday from the first year in which the enterprises are 
profitable.  
As a result of amendments of the FDI law toward encouraging FDI and 
issuance of other supporting laws, FDI inflows to Vietnam have been increasing 
and have had important effects on the economic growth. In the first half of the 
1990s, both the number of investment projects and the amount of registered 
capital for licensed projects increased rapidly. However, the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997 strongly influenced the economies of countries in the region, leading a 
sharp decline of the FDI in Vietnam during the final years of 1990s. The FDI 
inflows started to pick up again as many changes had been implemented due to 
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either subjective or objective factors such as countries in the region recovered 
from the crisis, the FDI Law had some important amendments, the United States-
Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 2001, and Vietnam became a 
formal member of the WTO in the beginning of 2007. Indeed, in 2007 after 
twenty years of issuing the first Law on Foreign Direct Investment, FDI in 
Vietnam achieved the highest record with $21.3 billion of registered capital, $8.03 
billion of implemented capital and 1544 new investment projects (The Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam – MPI website). 
The increasing FDI inflows reveal their important contributions to economic 
transition, business liberalization and macro-economic growth of Vietnam over 
past decades. Moreover, FDI also creates positive spillovers that support the 
development of the local industry, boosts the exports and reduces the poverty 
(Nguyen Phuong Hoa, 2002; Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006; Le Thanh Thuy, 2005). For 
instance, during the period 2001-2005, foreign companies constituted almost 
15.5% of Vietnam’s GDP, accounted for around 35% of total non-oil export 
revenues and created 11000 new jobs each year. At present, FDI accounts for 
100% in oil exploration and automobile production, 60% in steel, 28% in cement, 
and 33% in electronic production (The MPI website).  
However, despite favorable policies of the government to foreign 
investment sector in recent years, foreign enterprises still complain about  
different treatment by local authorities in some respects such as giving more 
favorable conditions to domestic rather than foreign-owned firms, and to state-
owned rather than private enterprises. An important amendment of the FDI law in 
1996, the decentralization of administrative responsibilities to provinces has 
created opportunities for entrepreneurial-minded local authorities to push forward 
economic reform, and just foster the development of both local businesses and 
foreign investment. However, the decentralization of authority also implies that 
provincial authorities may vary in how they use their newly gained 
responsibilities to develop innovative ways of dealing with foreign investors 
(Nguyen et al., 2004). Thus, the implementation of laws and decrees at local level 
may not meet the intentions of the legislators, and may be slow and inconsistent. 
The differences in law practices by provinces cause challenges for foreign 
investors and contribute to unequal distributions of FDI among provinces within 
Vietnam. The data of the MPI show that during the period 1988-2007, more than 
60% of projects and 52% of registered capital ran to the Southeast region of which 
most of them belong to Ho Chi Minh City and its two neighboring provinces, 
Dong Nai and Binh Duong, and nearly 25% of investment projects and registered 
capital flew to the Red River Delta of which Hanoi, the capital city, took the 
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largest proportion. By contrast, the Northwest and the North Central Coast 
attracted less than 1% of the FDI inflows. It seems that provinces pursuing FDI-
friendly policies in the liberalization process such as Binh Duong or Dong Nai 
provinces may benefit from first-mover advantages in the long run and develop 
into a hub of economic activity. For instance, only Binh Duong province in 2005 
accounted for 19.8% of the total foreign investment in Vietnam while hosting 
about 2% of the total Vietnamese firms (The General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
- GSO, 2007). 
 
2.3. Reasons for differences in institutional practices in Vietnam  
The previous part mentioned that provincial authorities in Vietnam vary in 
interpreting the central government’s laws and regulations, and they may develop 
innovative ways to deal with foreign investors. In fact, it is difficult to understand 
what truly drives differences in economic governance among provinces. In this 
context, it is important to keep in mind that the political system and government 
structures are identical in all provinces in Vietnam, and there are no over-arching 
regional authorities on economic policy. In particular, differences are more 
pronounced between the North and the South of the country. In this study, we 
present three factors that may explain the variation in institutional practices by 
provinces: (i) Urban versus Rural, (ii) North versus South, and (iii) the complexity 
and ambiguity of the laws and regulations. 
 
(i) Urban versus Rural 
The differences between provinces and highly urbanized national-level 
cities are quite easy to understand. Cities tend to attract the best educated and 
talented citizenry from neighboring provinces, including officials in the provincial 
bureaucracy. Cities also have more active and influential business associations, 
leading to greater cross-fertilization of ideas between the public and private 
sector. The PCI 2007 shows that cities outperform provinces because they have 
advantages in labor policies and private sector development services due to 
possessing more resources to expand on business match-making, trade fairs, 
vocation schools, and labor exchanges. 
However, firms in provinces may have better conditions in land access and 
security of tenure. Population density works against urban centers, making land 
become more expensive. In addition, population growth due to migration puts 
enormous pressure on pre-existing infrastructure. Cities are forced to repossess 
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land more often, for example, in order to expand roads and zone off areas for new 
residential development. 
 
(ii) North versus South 
Overall, southern provinces have better institutional performance than 
northern provinces according to the ranking of the PCI 2007. The differences 
between the North and the South may come from historical factors.  
Vietnamese culture originated from the North and in the Red River Delta in 
particular. The Vietnamese culture was historically characterized by wet rice 
cultivation and village settlements. The village was an autonomous community 
which collected taxes from citizens and fulfilled its obligations to the state. Due to 
unclear demographic system and difficulties in communication and monitoring, 
chiefs of villages had incentives to keep a part of collected taxes and to create 
their own rules, leading to a high level of independence of local authorities and 
lack of transparency between local and central governments (Tran et al., 2008).  
The South was settled by people from the North and the Centre of Vietnam 
in the 17
th
 century, concentrating around the Mekong River Delta. Difficulties in 
setting up a new life stimulated migrants to have open and cooperative attitude. 
This can help to explain the reasons why provincial leaders in the South have 
greater familiarity with the needs of the private sector that is presented by policies 
relating to trade, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner 
matchmaking, provision of industrial zones and technological services aimed at 
promoting development of private sector (Tran et al., 2008). 
In addition, recent political and historical factors may have more effects on 
the variation in institutional practice between southern and northern provinces. 
Before 1975, under the control of the United States, the South followed a market-
oriented economy. When the country was unified in 1975, the central planning 
economy was applied in the whole country. Because strict central planning was 
only implemented in the provinces south to the 17th parallel for 11 years (1975-
1986), as opposed to 32 years (1954-1986) in the northern provinces, and because 
key components of a central planning economy such as the collectivization of land 
and agriculture were never fully implemented in the South, southern provinces 
had a enormous head-start at developing streamlined economic governance for a 
market economy at the on-set of the “Doi moi” era. 
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(iii) The complexity and ambiguity of the laws and regulations 
 In Vietnam, due to the complexity of the laws, large number of sub-laws 
such as decrees, decisions and regulations are issued to guide the implementation 
of laws. Moreover, the rapidly changing institutions may generate inconsistency 
between the requirements of different institutions as well as uncertainty over 
future institutional changes (Meyer, 2001). These problems create complexity and 
ambiguity of many laws and regulations issued at the central level that in turn 
make the implementation of laws depend much on the interpretation of local 
officials. In addition, Tenev et al., (2003) indicate that even when regulations are 
clear, there are always opportunities for local authorities to apply their own 
interpretation to central policies. 
 
3. Theoretical framework and hypothesis development  
The World Investment Report 1998 stated that besides business facilitations 
and economic factors, institutional framework is a principal determinant of the 
FDI location. However, when studying the location decision of foreign investors, 
the researchers in international business have almost exclusively focused on the 
effects of agglomeration economies popularized by Krugman (1991) and 
traditional location advantages such as factor endowments and market attraction 
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Recently, studies on emerging economies whose 
institutions differ significantly from those in developed countries have led to the 
emergence of an institution-based view of firm strategies (Peng, 2002; 2003; Peng 
et al., 2008). 
The institution-based view has explored how the institutional set-up 
influences economic activities and thus the strategies pursued by firms. North 
(1990) distinguishes formal institutions such as laws and regulations and informal 
institutions that are grounded in customs, traditions and codes of conduct. Scott 
(1995) describes institutional frameworks as consisting of three pillars: regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutions where the regulatory dimension roughly 
corresponds to formal institutions in North’s terminology. Institutions and their 
enforcement mechanisms set the “rules of the game” which organizations must 
follow. The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both transaction costs 
and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure that facilitates interactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The legal and 
governmental arrangements as well as informal institutions underpinning an 
economy influence corporate strategies (Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2000) and thus 
influence the operation and performance of business (Scott, 1995). 
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According to Mudambi and Navarra (2002), institutions are important as 
location advantages in international business because they represent the major 
immobile factors in a globalized market. Legal, political and administrative 
systems tend to be the internationally immobile framework whose costs determine 
international attractiveness of a location. Institutions affect the capacity of firms to 
interact and therefore affect the relative transaction and coordination costs of 
production and innovation. For foreign investors, the restrictions and incentives 
created by institutions of host countries favor some deals and opportunities while 
disadvantage others. They force the investing firms to think strategically about 
how to avoid the limits imposed by domestic laws as well as how to reap the 
benefits that the law and particular circumstances are capable of providing (Spar, 
2001). Empirical research finds that institutions influence international business 
strategies of firms, notably the choice of entry mode, the magnitude of 
investment, the probability of survival and the location decisions (Meyer, 2001; 
Henisz, 2000; Bevan et al., 2004).  
In this section, we present a theoretical framework showing how institutions 
affect FDI with a focus on informal institutions. We suggest that within one 
country, formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, and informal 
institutions, such as practices of law enforcement by local governments, are not 
homogeneous, especially in transition economies. Because in these countries the 
ambiguity of many laws and regulations issued at the central level and the 
decentralization policy of administrative responsibilities to provinces lead to 
variation in interpretation and implementation of governmental laws by local 
authorities (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
 
3.1. Institutions and business strategies in transition economies 
Transition economies are formerly socialist countries in East Asia, Central 
and East Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union 
(World Bank, 2002). Historically, transition economies were planned economies 
and ruled by power relations and bureaucratic controls. The state curbed 
opportunism and allocated resources so there was little need for formal laws to 
define exchange relationships among economic actors. Property rights were held 
and protected by the state, and individual could use assets but did not own them. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were closely tied to governments, receiving direct 
financial subsidiaries and indirect preferential treatment. The collapse of 
Communism in 1989 created transition economies committing to strengthening 
their market mechanism through liberalization, stabilization and privatization with 
the encouragement of domestic and foreign firms. Indeed, privatization and the 
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open policies create great opportunities for foreign firms to explore new markets 
of transition economies. 
In the new context, the legal framework has been changed radically to create 
a new set of formal institutions. To attract foreign investors, besides the core 
framework for FDI consisting of such as rules and regulations governing entry 
and operations of foreign investors and standards of treatment of foreign affiliates, 
transition economies have issued complementing policies with many incentives 
and improvements such as on taxation, administrative procedures and business 
laws (The World Investment Report 1998). However, the weakness of 
institutional frameworks in most transition economies such as underdeveloped 
political and constitutional court systems, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency 
increases search, negotiation and enforcement costs, especially for foreign 
investors who are not familiar with local business environments (Bevan et al., 
2004; Meyer, 2001). Moreover, rapidly changing institutions may generate 
inconsistency between the requirements of different institutions as well as 
uncertainty over future institutional changes. As firms in reality are risk adverse, 
they prefer to locate in the place of which the gap between institutional framework 
at the macro level and that of their home countries as developed markets is small 
so that they may not have to change much their internal institutions reflecting 
their firm-specific norms, values and enforcement mechanism (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008).  
Similarly, Meyer (1998; 2001) found that investors prefer to invest in 
transition economies that have progressed furthest in institutional reform because 
progress in reform brings the institutional framework closer to that of developed 
countries, therefore reducing psychic distance and thus facilitates international 
business. Low psychic distance reduces the need to invest in information, to train 
local staff and to adapt management processes to the local environment. Indeed, 
among the Central and Eastern European countries the most successful countries 
in attracting foreign investments have been those more advanced in the transition 
process toward market economies, namely Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
(Resmini, 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Holland and Pain, 1998). More 
particularly, researchers revealed that foreign investors gravitate towards 
transition economies that have predictable future policy regime (Mudambi and 
Navarra, 2002), low corruption level (Lipsey, 1999), political stability and low 
perceived risk level (Lankes and Venables, 1996), progress in reforms of capital 
market, regulations on property rights, and labor market (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Bevan et al., 2004).  
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Besides studying the effect of institutions on FDI location at country level, 
researchers recently have paid increasing attention to institutions at local level 
when they knowledge that informal institutions such as the practices of law 
enforcement by local authorities may affect spatial distribution of FDI among 
regions in a country. In transition economies, reforms have primarily started with 
formal institutions at the central level, they then directly affect formal institutions 
at the sub-national level. However, the implementation of law and regulations 
issued by central governments at local level may vary due to variations of 
normative or cognitive aspects of local authorities. Especially in some transition 
economies such as China, Vietnam and Russia which implement decentralization 
policy, local authorities can decide how to practise policies set at central level. 
Many local policy makers therefore influence the implementation of institutional 
change with their individually held norms and cognitions. If conservative 
inherited norms and lack of recognition of the purpose of regulatory changes 
dominate, foreign investors may experience a lot of red tape at local level such as 
corruption or delays in administrative progress. On the other hand, friendly and 
supportive treatment by local authorities will reduce difficulties and transaction 
costs foreign firms have to bear when investing in transition economies, thereby 
encouraging their investment in the province (Meyer and Nguyen, 2004). It is 
noted that in industrialized countries with a federal structure, such as Australia, 
Germany or the United States, the responsibilities of different levels of 
government are clearly delaminated by the laws. In contrast, the formal 
institutions in transition economies are somewhat still vague such that the actual 
influence of provincial authorities is to a much higher degree based on informal 
institutions.  
Regarding empirical studies, there is little research on the effect of informal 
institutions on FDI spatial distributions at regional level, most probably due to 
lack of dataset for institutional variable. We can count the studies of Meyer and 
Nguyen (2005) on Vietnam, Zhou et al. (2002) on China and Bruno et al. (2008) 
on Russia. Meyer and Nguyen (2005) show that foreign investors in Vietnam 
prefer to locate in provinces that have more developed market-supporting 
institutions proxied by facilitation by local authorities towards foreign firms to 
access scarce local resources.  Zhou et al. (2002) stated that specific incentives 
policies issued by Chinese local governments such as tax incentives and 
development of special economic zone positively influence the location choice by 
Japanese firms. Bruno et al. (2008) find that in Russia, regions with better 
institutional practices measured by the region’s risk index attract more foreign 
investments.  
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Our central hypothesis of this study is that just as institutions at the national 
level affect the overall volume of FDI inflows to the country, informal institutions 
such as implementations of laws and regulations by local authorities affect the 
spatial distribution of investment among regions within the country. Foreign 
investors prefer to locate in places where institutional barriers least inhibit their 
access to local resources, thereby reducing the transaction costs of setting up and 
develop their local operations. We therefore expect a relationship between 
informal institutions at the sub-national level and the FDI distributions. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Regions with better developed market-supporting institutions 
attract more foreign investors. 
 
To test this hypothesis, Vietnam is a suitable choice for empirical setting as 
Vietnam has gone through a major economic transition process since 1986 while 
weakness in the formal and informal institutions remains obstacles to business. 
The communist party still remains in power and many aspects of the economy are 
subject to regulations or direct interference by the authorities of the local 
government or the ruling party. Moreover, the important amendment of the FDI 
law in 1996 decentralized some policy responsibilities to provinces such as 
investment licensing, land leasing, and import and export licensing for some FDI 
projects. For larger FDI projects, provinces are responsible for supporting foreign 
investors in the preparation of application at central level. Provincial authorities 
vary in how they implement central regulations and may develop different ways to 
deal with foreign firms. In section 2, we have stated that the variation in 
institutional practices among provinces in Vietnam may come from differences 
between urban and rural, the North and the South and the ambiguity of the laws 
and regulations. 
 
3.2. Focus on institutions: which ones really matter? 
In order to discover which aspects of institutions are more likely to impact 
the FDI location in transition economies, in this section we extend the literatures 
on institutions and develop two other hypotheses.  
The key element of formal institutional change in transition economies 
possibly is the change of ownership (The World Bank Report 1996). Balcerowicz 
(2002) stated that in the early stage of transition, the main task of the reform 
program is the transfer of enterprises from the state ownership to private 
ownership in order to encourage development of private sector and reduce the 
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dependence of the overall economy on inefficient state-owned enterprises. Under 
the planned economy, SOEs were tripped of most subsidiaries and other privileges 
and they played a leading role in the economies. However, most SOEs suffered 
from inefficiency, outdate of technology, non-competitive products, poor 
management and an inability to respond to market demands. During the reform 
period, transition economies have privatized many SOEs and encouraged 
development of private domestic and foreign firms. The privatization process 
increases competitiveness in the economy and creates opportunities for foreign 
firms to explore new markets.  
Although the number of SOEs in transition economies is strongly reduced 
during the reformation, they, as incumbents, still control local resources including 
business networks, distribution channels and labor markets. Incumbent local firms 
normally have long-standing personal relationships with central or local 
governments and may lobby them to protect their interests and thus create 
administrative barriers to entry (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). For example, in 
Vietnam despite the reform in the SOE sector, private firms often complain that 
provinces have favorable treatments toward the SOEs, especially in access to bank 
credit and land (The PCI 2006 Report). As a result, SOEs continue growing and 
remain the largest sector of the Vietnamese economy, contributing around 38% to 
GDP in 2007 (The GSO website). We expect that incumbent SOEs use their 
power to influence provincial institutions, especially informal ones, to favor their 
interests over those of foreign investors which in turn create a business 
environment that is perceived as less favorable by foreign firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign investors are less likely to locate in regions where local 
governments are biased toward SOEs. 
 
As mentioned before, the role of institutions in an economy is to reduce 
both transaction costs and information costs through reducing uncertainty and 
establishing a stable structure that facilitates interactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
Economic agents in transition economies therefore have to pay higher transaction 
cost and information costs arising from inconsistent and unstable institutional 
frameworks. In this system, domestic firms lack knowledge of using market 
mechanism and correctly indentifying potential partners and competitors. This 
increases transaction costs and information costs associated with searching, 
negotiating and contracting new business relationships between foreign firms and 
domestic partners (Meyer, 2001). During the early phase of transition, 
uncertainties in formal institutional constraints and lack of information about local 
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environment often force foreign firms to rely on informal and international 
relationships not only with managers of other firms but also with governmental 
officials or to create joint ventures and alliances with local partners (Peng and 
Health, 1996; Peng, 2003). As a consequence, foreign investors may have to pay 
higher costs of obtaining information about such as local knowledge, local 
suppliers, market opportunities, and skilled labor compared with domestic firms. 
Indeed, information transparency is one of the most crucial factors highlighted by 
academics and development practitioners in distinguishing between environments 
that are conductive or not conductive to private sector (The PCI 2006 Report).  
Vietnam just like other transition economies has been characterized by a 
lack of transparency and a service sector to provide economic agents with 
information about business environment. Managers often complain about the lack 
of market information about inputs, output, alternative suppliers, buyers, price and 
price trend. Moreover, information about changes in policies and regulations as 
well as basic business registration such as firm name, address, and other details is 
not available to public and responsible officials (Tran et al., 2008). The capacity 
of access to market information or new regulations and policies somewhat is 
based on the relationship with provincial officials (The PCI 2006 Report). 
Acknowledging the importance of information to investors, the government has 
issued policies to encourage provinces to set up agencies and centers to provide 
market information and trade promotion. However, information provision to firms 
is differently implemented among the provinces in Vietnam. For instance, Dong 
Nai province, known to be investor friendly and supportive, is one of the 
provinces that have attracted many direct foreign investments. Local authorities in 
this province provide a timely, clearly and consistent interpretation of laws and 
regulations to investors so that they would know “the rules of the game” before 
committing to invest (Meyer and Nguyen, 2004). We therefore expect that foreign 
firms consider information costs they have to confront with when deciding to 
invest in a region. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign investors prefer to locate in regions where information 
about market and legal documents necessary to run their business is transparent 
and easy to access.  
 
4. The measurement of institutional practices in Vietnam 
An indicator which measures the attitude and the practice of laws and 
regulations issued by the central government at provincial level is the Vietnam 
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provincial competitiveness index (PCI). This index was developed at the first time 
in 2005 by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded Vietnam 
Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI). The PCI is an effort to explain the reasons 
why some parts of the country perform better than others in terms of private sector 
dynamism and growth. The PCI is a composite index of the ten sub-indices 
capturing different elements of business environment that can be directly 
influenced by provincial authorities in the short-to-medium term: business entry 
costs, land access and security of tenure, transparency and access to information, 
time costs of regulatory compliance, informal charges, state-owned enterprise bias 
(competitive environment), pro-activity of provincial leadership, private sector 
development services, labor training and  legal institutions (see Appendix 2.1 and 
Table 2.1 for more details). 
Compared to the PCI 2005, the PCI 2006 had some modifications and 
improvements. First, the PCI 2006 based on a larger sample of 6379 responses 
from firms compared to 2020 of the PCI 2005. Second, all 64 provinces of the 
country included in the survey, up from 42 in the previous year. Most 
impressively, the PCI 2006 had the strong response from the smaller and more 
remote provinces that were not included in the PCI 2005. A larger dataset allows 
for greater flexibility and more robustness in the statistical analyses of provincial 
performance. Third, the PCI 2006 included two new sub-indices Legal institutions 
and Labor training, two key areas where provincial authorities can take actions 
that affect the local business environment. Moreover, there are some 
modifications in weighting the sub-indices that will allow for easier replication of 
the index in subsequent years. As the PCI 2006 is more reliable and robust in 
terms of statistical analyses, this study will use the PCI 2006 and its sub-indices in 
econometric regressions. 
The PCI’s methodology can be divided into three major steps: data 
collection of company perceptions survey and hard data; construction of sub-
indices; and weighting of each sub-index to create the final PCI. 
 
Data collection 
Two general types of data were used to construct the sub-indices. The first 
was company perceptions data, drawn from a mail-out survey to 31186 private 
firms across all 64 provinces. This perceptions, or “soft”, data was combined with 
objective, or “hard”, data gathered from statistic yearbooks and interviews with 
third parties, such as state-owned commercial banks or estate real firms, or 
collected from business associations.  
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The survey instrument was an updated version of the Asia Foundation 
(TAF)-VCCI economic governance survey used in 14 provinces in 2003. It asked 
questions about basic business performance data, as well as covering twelve 
separate dimensions of economic governance, across 60 questions (See Appendix 
B). Some of the questions were modified from the World Bank’s Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, but most questions were 
specifically for the Vietnamese context. After the survey was written, it was 
translated into Vietnamese and then circularly translated into English to make sure 
the original meaning of the questions was retained. 
Following the technique used for the PCI 2005, a list from the Tax 
Authority of tax-paying private firms was used to generate the firm sample. The 
tax list is more reliable than business registration lists, which sometimes are not 
updated to exclude firms that have gone out of business and often include firms 
that have not yet begun operations. As of November 2005, this list provided 
information on 151140 active tax paying private firms. As it was not feasible to 
survey every firm on this list, a stratified sample of firms was generated that 
would be representative of the total population of firms. For this reason, this tax 
list of firms was then categorized into 24 stratifications, across 3 dimensions: 
ownership type (joint stock, limited liability and sole proprietorship), sector 
(manufacturing, natural resource exploitation, trade/service, and agriculture), and 
age of firm (established before or after 2000).  
A random stratified sample of 31186 firms was then constructed. The total 
number of firms per province in this sample depended upon the total population of 
private firms in the province. In provinces with less than 500 private firms on the 
tax list, the entire population of firms was sampled. The research team then sent 
out the questionnaire to stratified sample of firms. By April 2006, VCCI had 
received 6379 responses, delivering a response rate of 20.5%.  
Hard data was collected from as many published data sources as possible. 
These included data compilations such as the Statistic Yearbook of the GSO, 
Labor Statistics from the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs, data on 
court cases from the People’s Supreme Court, and GSO’s Enterprise Census, and 
the General Department of Vocational Training. A final important source was 
provincial budget data and targets from the Ministry of Finance. The research 
team also engaged in third-party interviews to collect additional hard data. 
Logistic and freight forwarding companies were surveyed to collect price data on 
the cost of shipping. Real estate firms and local business associations were 
interviewed regarding the price of land. State Commercial Banks were asked to 
provide their lending data to SOEs and private firms by province. 
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Construction of the ten sub-indices  
An important strength of the PCI is that it compares provincial economic 
governance against best practices already found in Vietnam, not against some 
idealized standard. For this reason, each indicator was standardized to a ten-point 
scale5, whereby the best and worst performing provinces were awarded the scores 
of 10 and 1 respectively, and the other 62 provinces distributed somewhere along 
scale between these two scores. 
 
Table 2.1: Detailed description of sub-indices and component indicators 
 
1. Entry Costs 
• % of firms waiting over 01 month to start a 
business 
• % of firms waiting over 03 months to start 
a business 
• Effective land wait days (determined by 
government efforts, not supply/demand 
conditions)† 
• Length of business registration in days 
• Length of business re-registration in days 
• Number of licenses and permits required to 
operate 
• % of firms having difficulty to obtain all 
licenses/ permits to start a business 
 
2. Land Access and Security of Tenure 
• Land Access 
o % of firms with LURCs or in the process 
of receiving them 
o If land is easier to obtain, business 
would expand 
o % of firms without LURCs that rent land 
from the state sector 
o Firm rating of provincial land conversion 
policies 
o % of total land with LURCs* 
• Security of land tenure 
o Risk of expropriation 
o Perception of fair compensation values 
o Risk of change in lease contract 
o Perception of fair process for disputing  
changes in lease contracts 
 
o Duration of tenure 
 
3. Transparency 
• Transparency # 
o Transparency of planning documents 
o Transparency of decisions and decrees 
• Equity and consistency of application 
o Importance of “relationship” to get 
access to these provincial documents 
o Importance of family and friends when 
dealing with government officials 
o Negotiations with tax officials are an 
essential part of doing business 
• Predictability and consistency 
o Predictability of local implementation of 
laws 
o Provinces discuss regulatory changes 
with firms 
o Quality of services provided by 
provincial public agencies on business 
consulting on regulatory information 
• Openness: Assessment of provincial 
webpage. Note that this is worth 40% of the 
sub-index. 
 
4. Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance 
• Days reduced dealing with bureaucracy 
since the Enterprise Law 
• % of firms spending over 10% of time 
dealing with bureaucracy 
• Median number of inspections and median 
tax hours 
                                                
5 The following standardization formula was used if a high score on an indicator meant good governance: 
[9*((Province Score – Sample Minimum)/ (Sample Maximum – Sample Minimum)) + 1]. If a high score on 
an indicator meant poor performance, the above formula was subtracted from 11, that is: 11 - [9*((Province 
Score – Sample Minimum)/ (Sample Maximum – Sample Minimum)) + 1]. 
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• Decrease in inspections since the 
Enterprise Law 
 
5. Informal Charges 
• Informal charges are a major obstacle to 
doing business 
• Firms in the same line of business make 
extra payments 
• % of firms paying over 10% of revenue in 
informal charges 
• Officials use compliance with local 
regulations to extract rents 
• Informal charges delivered expected 
results 
 
6. SOE Bias (Competition Environment) 
• Perception of bias toward SOEs 
o Provincial government is biased toward 
SOEs 
o Provincial government is biased toward 
equitized companies 
o Provincial attitude toward the private 
sector 
o Attitude to the private sector is 
improving 
o Monetary contributions influence 
attitude toward the private sector 
o Firm rating of provincial equitization 
effort 
• Hard indicators of bias toward SOEs 
o The ratio of local SOE share of liabilities 
to their share of revenue* 
o % change in number of SOEs (2000-
2004)* 
o Average proportion of bank loans to 
state sector* 
 
7. Pro-activity 
• Province is good at working within central 
laws 
• Province is creative and clever in solving 
problems confronting business community 
• Good initiatives at provincial level but 
center frustrates 
 
 
• No initiatives at provincial level  
 
8. Private Sector Development (PSD) 
Services 
• Perception of quality of services provided 
by provincial public agencies 
o Market information and trade promotion 
o Technology and technology-related 
services 
o Match-making for business partners 
o Export promotion and trade fairs 
o Industrial zones 
• Hard indicators of PSD activities  
o Trade fairs held by province (2004-
2005)* 
 
9. Labor Training and Development 
• Education services provided by provincial 
public agencies 
• Labor vocational training services provided 
by provincial public agencies 
• Labor exchange services provided by 
provincial public agencies 
• Number of vocational schools adjusted for 
provincial differences in population* 
 
10. Legal Institutions 
• Legal system provided mechanism for 
firms to appeal officials’ corrupt behavior 
• Firm confidence in legal institution 
• Use of legal institutions as primary mode 
of dispute resolution 
• Number of cases (where claimant was not 
an SOE or an FIE) per 100 active firms* 
Note: The first three soft indicators worth 
60% of the sub-index and the last one hard 
indicator worth 40%. 
 
Notes:  
* denotes component uses only hard data 
# derived from factor analysis 
† indicator modified in 2006 
 
In all sub-indices, each primary component is 
given equal weight unless otherwise noted.  
 
 (Source: The PCI 2006 Report) 
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Using the existing literature on the business environment as a guide, 
indicators were grouped into 10 sub-indices. Considerable effort was made to 
ensure that these sub-indices correspond with previous research on the obstacles 
to private sector entry and growth in Vietnam. Once the indicators were 
standardized, an average (either weighted or simple) of all indicators was taken to 
create the sub-index. Table 2.1 provides detailed description of sub-indices and 
component indicators. Weighted averages were used to integrate hard data into 
four of the sub-indices (Land access and security of tenure, SOE bias, labor 
training, and legal institutions).  
 
Construction of the final PCI 
A simple summation of these sub-indices yields the un-weighted index, with 
a maximum possibility of 100 points. While this is clearly the easiest and simplest 
method of calculating the final PCI, it would be less appropriate as a policy tool, 
as some sub-indices are more important than others in explaining private sector 
development. Hence it was important to re-weight the sub-indices, based on their 
actual contributions to private sector development. To do this, the research team 
used multivariate regression analysis to determine how each of the sub-indices 
impacted upon three key economic performance variables which researchers and 
practitioners in Vietnam deem to be the most important gauges of private sector 
development.  
• The ratio of private enterprises actively operating in the provinces to the 
number of citizens in the province in 2004. The number of active enterprises 
allows for the identification of firms that completed registration procedures 
and have been successful enough to continue their business operations 
beyond the entry stage.  
• Average private sector long-term investment per capita (2000-2004) was 
chosen to gauge the size of the risk entrepreneurs were willing to make. The 
assumption is that private entrepreneurs will be more willing to make sizable 
investments in more conducive regulatory environments, where they can 
more accurately assess the long-term potential risks and benefits to their 
enterprise 
• Average profit per firm in millions of VND (2000-2004) was selected as a 
measure of the success of individual firms over the Post-Enterprise Law 
period. Competitive provinces are more likely to create an environment in 
which entrepreneurialism is encouraged and rewarded by business profits, 
rather than by public largesse. 
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In each case, the research team regressed the above economic performance 
variables, controlling for the initial structural conditions of private sector 
development, specifically:  
• The distance from markets measured by the distance in kilometers from the 
provincial capital to Ha Noi or Ho Chi Minh City;   
• The quality of human capital measured by the secondary school graduates as 
a percentage of the population in 2000 to account for the relevant labor force 
private firms would draw upon; and   
• Initial infrastructure endowment measured by telephones per capita in 1995. 
 
Table 2.2: Sub-index weights 
 Sub-index Average  weight Round  weight Weight class 
PSD services 17.21% 15% High 
Transparency 16.25% 15% High 
Labor training 15.35% 15% High 
Pro-activity 13.15% 15% High 
Time cost of regulatory 
compliance 
11.92% 10% Medium 
Legal institutions 7.62% 10% Medium 
SOE Bias 5.98% 5% Low 
Informal charge 5.76% 5% Low 
Land access and security 3.57% 5% Low 
Entry cost 3.18% 5% Low 
 100% 100%  
(Source: The PCI 2006 Report) 
 
Determination of sub-index weights would involve regressing all ten sub-
indices on the three dimensions of competitiveness, controlling for the structural 
conditions. Weights could be read directly from the coefficients of the regression 
output, which records the substantive impact of a one-point change in the sub-
index. These weights were then rounded to the nearest 5% to deliver three basic 
classes of weights, as shown in Table 2.2. These weights were then applied to the 
sub-indices, which were then aggregated into the final PCI6. Appendix 2.2 
presents PCI sub-indices scores by province in Vietnam. 
 
 
                                                
6 See “The PCI 2006 Report” for more details in the methodology behind the PCI. 
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5. Methodology and empirical results 
5.1. Data and variables 
The dataset is obtained from the yearly surveys of the enterprises operating in 
Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam since 2000. These 
are comprehensive surveys covering all state enterprises, non-state enterprises that 
have equal or greater than 10 employees, 20% of sampled non-state enterprises 
with fewer than 10 employees, and all foreign enterprises across 64 provinces and 
cities in Vietnam. The contents of the surveys cover indicators to identify 
enterprises including their name, address, type, and economic activities of the 
enterprises, and indicators to reflect production situations of the enterprises such 
as their employees, income of employees, asset and capital source, turnover, 
profit, contributions to the state budget, investment capital, taxes and other 
obligations to the government, job training, and evaluations on the investment 
environment.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effect of institutional 
practices by provincial authorities on the entry rates of foreign firms across 56 
industries (2-digit SIC) and 64 cities and provinces in Vietnam over six years 
from 2000 to 2005. Following Geroski (1995), the entry rate of new foreign firms 
in a particular year is defined as the number of new foreign firms divided by the 
total number of both Vietnamese and foreign incumbents plus new foreign firms 
operating in that year. We include Vietnamese firms in the equation because a 
foreign entrant when entering a new market obviously has to compete with both 
domestic and foreign firms. As average size of Vietnamese firms that is measured 
by the number of employees is quite small of which nearly 50% have fewer than 
10 employees (The GSO, 2007), we use all kinds of firms to calculate the 
denominator.  
In order to identify new foreign firms created in each year, we implement a 
two-step procedure. First, we merge all foreign firms over the six years from 2000 
to 2005 by using tax codes that are unique for each firm. It is noted that numbers 
of foreign firms that are surveyed in a particular year include foreign firms that 
already started their operations and still exist until the day of survey and new 
foreign entrants of that year. After merging, we can obtain the longitudinal 
information of all foreign firms during the six years. Second, by using the 
information about the year of starting operation, we can keep new foreign firms 
created in a particular year. The first step provides longitudinal information that 
allows a firm to be followed over time, therefore we can find out the foreign firms 
that in fact were surveyed in the previous years but had the year of operation of 
the later years due to mistakes during conducting the surveys. For instance, some 
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firms that have the year of operation equal 2002, but in fact they already appeared 
in the survey in 2001. Thus, by using both tax codes and the year of starting 
operation, we can find the exact number of new foreign firms created in a specific 
year. In sum, there were 187 new foreign firms created in 2000, 291 in 2001, 263 
in 2002, 363 in 2003, 409 in 2004 and 568 in 2005. 
This study uses the PCI 2006 as a proxy for institutional practices of local 
authorities to test hypothesis 1 and its two sub-indices reflecting attitudes of local 
governments toward state-owned enterprises (SOE bias) and the capability of 
private enterprises to access information (transparency and access to information) 
to test hypotheses 2 and 3. In addition, some other variables affecting the entry 
rates of new foreign firms are also included in the empirical analysis. At the 
industrial level, we analyze the influences of the density of large SOEs and large 
foreign firms in industries by province. Following the argument of Head et al. 
(1995) and Mariotti and Piscitello (1995), we expect that existence of these 
incumbent firms in a region attract more new foreign firms to locate there in order 
to obtain benefits arising from agglomeration economies. Numbers of incumbent 
SOEs and foreign firms with equal and greater than 500 employees in the same 2-
digit industry and province cumulated up to the year of entry are proxies 
respectively for the density of large SOEs and large foreign firms.  
At the provincial level, we control for the initial endowments of provinces 
that can affect the entry of firms. According to the factor endowment theory, firms 
have tendencies to locate in places where the required factors of their production 
are relatively abundant to reduce production and transportation costs (Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 1997). The control variables for the location-specific characteristics 
are the size of local consumer market measured by the proportion of population of 
each province over the total population of the country, income per capita by 
province, human capital development measured by the proportion of 
undergraduate students in the total population of each province or the proportion 
of students enrolled in professional schools in the total population of each 
province, and infrastructure conditions proxied by the distance to the nearest big 
harbor. It is noted that there are some other candidates that can be proxies for 
infrastructure conditions such as the distance to the nearest international airport, 
the number of kilometres of highways, or the number of telephone registrations, 
but we believe that the distance to the nearest big harbour is the most appropriate 
choice because foreign firms prefer to transport goods by sea than by air. All this 
information is taken from the Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam published by the 
GSO in the period 2000-2005. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the descriptive 
statistics and the correlations of variables used in this study. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Description Average Min Max 
1. Entry rate 21504 
The entry rates of foreign firms across 56 industries and 64 
provinces and cities over six years from 2000 to 2005 
0.16 0 1 
2. Large foreign firm 21504 
The number of incumbent foreign firms with equal and greater 
than 500 employees in the same 2-digit industry by province 
0.09 0 48 
3. Large SOE 21504 
The number of incumbent SOEs with equal and greater than 500 
employees in the same 2-digit industry by province 
0.25 0 128 
4. Student (1) 19768* 
The percentage of undergraduate students in the total population 
of each province 
0.83 0.01 16.3 
5. Student (2) 19488* 
The percentage of students enrolled in professional schools in 
the total population of each province 
0.29 0.01 2.54 
6. Income per capita 20776* 
Income per capita in the province where foreign firms locate 
(thousand VND/person) 
4191 1354 43360 
7. Population 20944* 
The proportion of population of each province over the total 
population of the country 
1.60 0.36 7.11 
8. Distance to harbor 21504 The distance in km to the nearest big harbour by province 150 0 388 
9. Institutional practice 21504 
The Vietnam provincial competitiveness index in 2006 by 
province 
52.45 36.76 76.23 
Note: * There are 21504 observations in total. The smaller number of observations is due to the missing information on the provincial characteristics for two 
years of 2003 and 2004 because since 2003 the Vietnamese government divided the 61 provinces in to 64. 
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Table 2.4: Correlations in the dataset 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entry rate 1         
2. Large foreign firm 0.09 1        
3. Large SOE 0.06 0.13 1       
4. Student (1) 0.09 0.10 0.23 1      
5. Student (2) 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.73 1     
6. Income per capita 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.16 1    
7. Population 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.35 0.16 0.16 1   
8. Distance to harbor -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.19 -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 1  
9. Institutional practice 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.29 0.20 0.08 -0.29 1 
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5.2. Econometric model  
In order to estimate the effect of institutional performance on the entry rates 
of new foreign firms in Vietnam across 56 industries and 64 provinces and cities 
over the six years from 2000 to 2005, we use the Tobit model on three-dimension 
panel database (industry, province and year). The Tobit model is appropriate 
when the dependent variable is roughly continuous over strictly positive values 
but is zero for a nontrivial fraction of the population (Wooldridge, 2003). The 
values of the entry rates of foreign firms range from 0 to 1, and totally there are 
21504 observations7 of entry rates (equal 56 industries*64 provinces*6 years) of 
which 20663 entry rates equal zero. Thus, the entry rate of foreign firms is a good 
candidate for a Tobit model.  
The basic Tobit equation specification is: 
ERirt = β0 + β1Ir + β2Xirt + β3Zrt + εirt 
where “i” stands for industry, “r” for province and city and “t” for year;  ERirt  is 
the entry rates of foreign firms across 56 industries and 64 provinces and cities 
over the six years from 2000 to 2005; Ir is a vector of institutional performance by 
local authorities in 64 provinces including the PCI 2006 and its two sub-indices; 
Xirt is a vector of the industrial characteristics including the number of large SOEs 
and large foreign firms  across 56 industries and 64 provinces and cities over the 
six years from 2000 to 2005; Zrt is a vector of the provincial characteristics from 
2000 to 2005 including the size of local consumer market, income per capita, 
human capital development and infrastructure condition, and εirt is the error term. 
The estimations are performed by maximum likelihood methods. 
 
5.3. Empirical results 
Table 2.5 presents the empirical results generated by the maximum 
likelihood estimation. In Column 1, we estimate the effect of the institutional 
practice on the entry rates of foreign firms proxied by the PCI 2006 controlling 
for the differences in industrial and provincial characteristics. The percentage of 
professional-school students is not included in the model due to its high 
correlation with the percentage of undergraduate students. As expected, the 
provinces that have better practices of laws and regulations issued by the central 
government and have more friendly and supportive attitude toward private sector 
attract more foreign firms. We can take Dong Nai, one of the provinces that have 
attracted more FDI, as an example. The local authorities in this province have 
                                                
7 In the regressions, there will be fewer numbers of observations due to missing variables for location-specific 
characteristics. See Table 2.3 for more details. 
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created flexible mechanism to facilitate the process of obtaining investment 
licenses. In some cases, the chairman of the province accompanied investors in 
person to support investment plan in front of higher authorities. The authorities 
also support FDI enterprises beyond issuing investment licenses, for instance by 
providing advice on how to deal with the complex regulations on import, export, 
labor recruitment, construction, land lease, etc (Meyer and Nguyen, 2004). 
 
Table 2.5: the effects of institutional practices at local level in Vietnam 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: entry  rate of new foreign firm 
     1                              2                           3 
Large foreign firm 0.030** 
(0.0027) 
0.033** 
(0.0027) 
0.030** 
(0.0027) 
Large SOE 0.004** 
(0.0013) 
0.004** 
(0.0013) 
0.004** 
(0.0013) 
Student (1) 0.015** 
(0.0020) 
0.015** 
(0.0023) 
0.013** 
(0.0020) 
Income per cap.  0.000** 
(9.88e-07) 
0.000** 
(1.03e-06) 
0.000** 
(9.87e-07) 
Population 0.024** 
(0.0045) 
0.022** 
(0.0045) 
0.021** 
(0.0045) 
Distance to harbor -0.001** 
(0.0001) 
-0.001** 
(0.0001) 
-0.001* 
(0.0001) 
Institutional practice 0.006** 
(0.0008) 
  
SOE Bias  0.001 
(0.0112) 
 
Transparency and  
access to information 
  0.052** 
(0.0057) 
Number of obs. 19656 19656 19656 
Log likelihood -2017.9 -2003 -2048.5 
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.233 0.216 
Chi square 1191.7** 1221.5** 1130.4** 
 
Note: Standard error in parentheses.  **p-value < 0.01. 
(+) When the variable student (1), the percentage of number of undergraduate students in the total 
provincial population, is replaced with the variable student (2), the percentage of number of 
professional school students in the total provincial population, the significance and the sign of the 
variable institutional practice and other control variables do not change. 
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This result supports our argument that informal institutions influence the 
FDI spatial distributions among regions within a country. Foreign investors are 
particularly concerned about the implications of regional policy for institutional 
development and investment risk. Formal legal changes initiated at the centre 
have varied impacts across provinces because the implementation of laws and 
regulations at local level depends on the informal institutions determined by 
attitudes (norms and cognitions) of local authorities. For instance, the Vietnamese 
government acknowledged the importance of information openness to investors 
and issued policies to encourage provinces to set up agencies and centers to 
provide market information and trade promotion. However, information 
transparency to firms is implemented differently by provinces. The empirical 
finding confirms that decentralization policy may, on the one hand, generate 
opportunities for entrepreneurial local authorities, but on the other hand, it can 
create barriers to investors if local decision makers possess conservative inherited 
norms and lack recognitions of the purpose of regulation changes. 
In Column 2, we estimate the effect of the local authorities’ treatment 
towards SOEs compared with other private enterprises on FDI decisions in the 
province by including the sub-index SOE bias in the regression. This index 
measures the competition regime confronting private business focusing on the 
perceived bias of provincial governments toward SOEs in terms of incentive, 
policy and access to capital. It therefore reflects attitudes of local governments in 
creating a fair and balanced competition environment for all economic actors. 
However, the estimated result shows that favorable treatments of local authorities 
toward SOEs do not inhibit the entry of foreign firms to the region. The 
coefficient is positive as predicted in Hypothesis 2, but statistically insignificant. 
The result indicates that lobbying and economic bargaining power of SOEs at the 
provincial level do not have a significant deterrent effect on foreign investors, or 
the incumbents may not perceive foreign entrants as a threat to their market share.  
This empirical result is consistent with the finding of Meyer and Nguyen 
(2005). The authors show that the domination of SOEs measured by the ratio of 
output by SOEs over output of domestic firms does not constrain the inflow of 
FDI at the local level. As mentioned in the previous parts, under the planned 
economy, SOEs received most subsidiaries and other privileges from the 
government and played a leading role in the economy.  However, most SOEs 
suffered from inefficiency, outdate of technology, non-competitive products, poor 
management and an inability to respond to market demands. Weak SOEs 
therefore may consider partnering with foreign investors as a means to enhance 
their competitiveness rather than perceive FDI as threat to their market position. 
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Girma et al. (2005) found that partnering with foreign firms increases innovation 
activity of SOEs in China. Moreover, SOEs with their privileged positions and 
local business network could help foreign firms a smooth entry into market in the 
case of Vietnam (Kokko et al., 2003).  
The impacts of information access on location decision by foreign firms are 
investigated through two sub-indices, transparency and access to information and 
private sector development services. While the first indicator is a measure of 
whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal documents necessary 
to run their business, whether those documents are equitably available, whether 
new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, 
and the business utility of the provincial web page, the second indicator reflects 
the availability of market information and the assistances of provincial authorities 
toward firms in understanding unclear regulations and policies. However, only 
transparency and access to information is included in the econometric regression 
because these two indices are highly correlated and the second one has lower 
fitted values (Pseudo R2). 
The statistical significance of the variable transparency and access to 
information in Column 3 shows that foreign firms prefer to locate in the regions 
where they can easily access necessary information relating to legal documents, 
provincial master socio-economic plans and market information such as 
information about inputs, outputs, alternative suppliers, buyers, price and price 
trends. Moreover, the assistances of provincial leaders in working with unclear 
national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local private 
firms can increase attractiveness of provinces toward foreign firms. It is noted that 
this variable has the strongest effect on the entry rates of foreign firms in 
provinces compared with the other sub-indices. 
As discussed in section 3, economic agents in transition economies have to 
pay high transaction cost and information costs arising from inconsistent and 
unstable institutional frameworks. Especially, foreign firms from mature market 
economies that are unfamiliar with local culture, language and business 
environment may have to pay high cost to get information about local market such 
as local knowledge, local suppliers, market opportunities, and skilled labor 
compared with domestic firms. The more firms know about their business 
environments or “the rules of the game”, the better they can assess the costs and 
risks of subsequent investment decisions and the more comfortable they feel about 
risking their hard-earned capital. It is noted that this variable is among the four 
sub-indices that have the highest impacts on investments, profitability and growth 
of private sector in Vietnam (see Table 2.2). The ranking of the PCI 2006 shows 
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that the provinces that lie in the “excellent” or “high” performing group 
performed well on these four sub-indices.  
The empirical finding confirms the importance of information transparency 
that we advance in Hypothesis 3, suggesting that foreign firms in transition 
economies prefer to locate in place where they can access necessary information 
about business environment at the lowest costs. For instance, Binh Duong, a 
province in the Southeast region of Vietnam that has the highest score in the PCI 
2006, can be a good an example for the empirical result. While the population of 
Binh Duong equals to only nearly 1% of the total population in the country, it 
accounted for nearly 20% of the total foreign firms in Vietnam in 2005 (The GSO, 
2007). This province is famous for having innovative ways to make relevant 
national legal documents and provincial implementing documents from the 
previous years available for investors as well as friendly attitudes of local 
authorities toward investors. 
The effect of information costs on location choices by foreign firms have 
been investigated recently by some scholars such as Mariotti and Piscitello (1995) 
and He (2002). According to these studies, information costs arise from the 
physical or cultural distance between the home countries of foreign firms and the 
host countries where they invest. Foreign investors’ location decisions are 
affected by market uncertainty stemmed from a lack of knowledge of how to run 
business operations in an unfamiliar environment. Foreign firms therefore are 
likely to locate in economic centers or metropolitan communities where better 
quality information appears and spreads. However, in this study we argue that 
information costs are influenced by the recognition of policy makers on the 
importance of information openness toward foreign investors. They can issue 
appropriate policies to reduce information costs incurred by foreign investors. 
Compared with domestic investors, foreign firms may always have disadvantages 
in accessing information about local business environment due to differences in 
language, culture and business manners. Yet, these disadvantages will reduce if 
firms locate in regions where local authorities can create the ways to make 
necessary information transparent and easy to access for investors. This can 
explain the reason why in the PCI 2006 Report private enterprises evaluated Lao 
Cai, a small and poor province in the Northeast region of Vietnam, better than 
Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, in information provision to investors. 
With regard to the control variables, all the variables reflecting provincial-
specific characteristics have statistically significant effects as predicted. Provinces 
with larger local consumer market, higher income per capita, better human capital 
development and infrastructure conditions can attract more new foreign entrants. 
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As expected, new foreign firms are likely to locate in places already hosting large 
incumbent SOEs and large incumbent foreign firms. Clearly, locating near these 
large firms, new foreign firms can get benefits from positive externalities. For 
instance, Crozet et al. (2004) find that proximity allows foreign entrants to learn 
experience from others and to exploit earlier investors’ understanding of new 
business environment. Head et al. (1995; 1999) show that foreign firms in the 
same industries prefer to cluster to obtain benefits from technology spillovers, 
specialized labor markets, and availability of input suppliers to the industry. 
Further, Mariotti and Piscitello (1995) stated that  by locating near large firms, 
especially the world’s leading multinational enterprises, new foreign firms can 
access sources of important and cost-free information about new business market. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In order to succeed in foreign markets, especially in transition economies 
characterized by inconsistent and unstable institutional framework, foreign 
investors have to adapt their strategies to formal and informal institutions of the 
host countries. In this study, we argue that formal institutions, such as laws and 
regulations, and informal institutional, such as practices of law enforcement by 
local authorities, shape the transaction costs in transition economies and 
consequently, location decision by foreign investors.  
We use the Tobit model to investigate the effect of institutional practice by 
local authorities on the entry rate of foreign firms in Vietnam over the period 
2000-2005. The Vietnamese provincial competitiveness index in 2006 (PCI 2006) 
and its two sub-indices reflecting attitudes of local government toward state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and the probability of private enterprises to access to 
necessary information for their business are used as proxies for institutional 
implementation by provincial authorities. The empirical findings show that 
provinces with better institutional performance attract more foreign firms. The 
efforts of local authorities in interpreting and implementing central regulations 
and policies are important factors creating attractiveness toward domestic as well 
as foreign investors. Transparency and access to information is found to have a 
strong effect on the attractiveness of a province to foreign investors, suggesting 
that more efforts both of the central and local governments should be made to 
assure that information relating to regulatory procedures and market are as openly 
available and easy to understand as possible for foreign investors. By contrast to 
our prediction, the favorable treatments of local authorities toward SOEs do not 
inhibit the entry of foreign firms to the region, indicating that lobbying and the 
economic bargaining power of SOEs do not have a significant deterrent effect on 
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foreign investors, or the incumbents may not perceive foreign entrants as a threat 
to their market share. 
The empirical results support our argument that just as institutions at the 
national level affecting the overall volume of FDI inflows, informal institutions at 
the sub-national level influence FDI spatial distributions among regions within the 
country. Formal legal changes initiated at the centre have varied impacts across 
provinces because the implementation of laws and regulations at local level 
depends on the informal institutions determined by attitudes (norms and 
cognitions) of local authorities. This shows that decentralization policy may, on 
the one hand, generate opportunities for entrepreneurial local authorities, but on 
the other hand, it can create barriers to investors if local decision makers possess 
conservative inherited norms and lack recognitions of the purpose of regulation 
changes. However, in our opinion, this policy is successful in encouraging 
creativeness of and competitiveness among provinces to attract foreign 
investment.  
With this study, we provide a better understanding of how formal and 
informal institutions influence entry strategies of foreign investors in transition 
economies at the national and regional levels. Indeed, the effect of informal 
institutions on location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam has investigated by 
Meyer and Nguyen (2005). However, the authors only employ data at provincial 
level and their proxies for institutions do not allow a clear separation of the formal 
and informal aspects of the institutional framework. The empirical findings 
suggest that the government should encourage provinces to exchange information 
and experience as well as facilitate cross-provincial communication and learning. 
This study has some limitations. First, we discover the effects of only two 
aspects of institutions (SOEs bias and transparency and access to information). 
Future research should consider other aspects that may have important influence 
on business strategies of foreign firms. Second, we use the PCI referring to only 
the year 2006 as a proxy for institutions. This can lead to bias conclusions about 
the effect of institutional practice due to un-variation of the variable PCI across 
time. Any future study should exploit the PCI variable in longer periods, so as to 
increase its cross time variance and ensure the exactness of the empirical results. 
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Appendix 2.1: The summarized descriptions of the ten sub-indices 
of the PCI 2006. 
(Source: The PCI 2006 Report) 
 
1. Entry Costs: A measure of time it takes firms to register, acquire land, and 
receive all the necessary licenses to start business, the number of licenses 
required and the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all licenses/ permits. 
2. Land Access and Security of Tenure: A measure combining two dimensions of 
the land problems confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and 
the security of tenure once land is acquired. The first dimension comprises 
whether firms possess their official land use rights certificate, whether they 
have enough land for their business expansion requirements, whether they are 
renting from SOEs and an assessment of land conversion efforts. The second 
dimension includes perceptions of various tenure security risks (such as 
expropriation, unfair compensation values, or changes in the lease contract) as 
well as the duration of tenure. 
3. Transparency and Access to Information:  A measure of whether firms have 
access to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their 
business, whether those documents are equitably available, whether new 
policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, 
and the business utility of the provincial web page.  
4. Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance:  A measure of how much time firms 
waste on bureaucratic compliance as well as how often and how long firms 
must shut  their operations down for inspections by local regulatory agencies. 
5. Informal Charges:  A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, 
how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, 
whether payment of those extra fees results in expected results or 'services', 
and whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to 
extract rents. 
6. SOE Bias (Competition Environment):  A measure of the competition regime 
confronting private business focusing on the perceived bias of provincial 
governments toward state owned enterprises (SOES) and equitized firms in 
terms of incentives, policy, and access to capital. 
7. Pro-activity of Provincial Leadership:  A measure of the creativity and 
cleverness of provinces in both implementing central policy, designing their 
own initiatives for private sector development, and working within sometimes 
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unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local 
private firms. 
8. Private Sector Development Services:  A measure of provincial services for 
private sector trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, 
business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial zones or industrial 
clusters, and technological services for firms. 
9. Labor Training: A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote 
vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in 
the placement of local labor. 
10. Legal Institutions: A measure of the confidence of the private sector in the 
provincial legal institutions, whether firms regard provincial legal institutions 
as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution or as an avenue for lodging 
appeals against corrupt official behavior. 
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Appendix 2.2: The PCI 2006 sub-indices scores by province in Vietnam 
(Source: The PCI 2006 Report) 
Rank Province 
Entry 
cost 
Land 
access and 
security 
Trans-
parency 
Time 
costs 
Informal 
changes 
SOE 
bias 
Pro-
activity 
PSD 
service 
Labor 
training 
Legal 
institution 
Weighted 
PCI 
1 Binh Duong 8.49 6.21 8.5 7.12 6.46 7.24 9.08 8.86 6.52 5.46 76.23 
2 Da Nang 9.17 4.7 7.68 5.83 6.18 6.47 6.38 9.62 9.6 6.38 75.39 
3 Binh Dinh 7.16 6.86 7.97 4.93 6.88 7.5 6.64 8.15 6.18 3.95 66.49 
4 Vinh Long 8.44 6.8 6.25 4.91 6.8 7.33 5.1 7.5 7.96 4.86 64.76 
5 Dong Nai 7.02 6.27 6.18 4.95 6.99 6.31 6 7.76 8.45 3.79 64.64 
6 Lao Cai 7.78 5.93 7.8 4.33 6.78 8.4 6.59 7.01 6.46 3.52 64.11 
7 Ho Chi Minh 7.07 5.07 6.97 5.12 6.02 6.35 6.18 7.63 7.35 3.81 63.39 
8 Vinh Phuc 7.31 6.3 6.27 3.25 6.13 6.36 7.74 6.31 6.98 4.03 61.27 
9 An Giang 7.64 6.37 6.64 4.57 7 6.43 7.59 7.06 4.55 3.38 60.45 
10 Can Tho 6.55 6.7 6.83 4.87 5.7 6.57 3.52 8.68 5.56 3.8 58.3 
11 Dong Thap 7.92 6.38 5.81 3.87 7.44 7.43 6.06 6.3 6.14 3.2 58.13 
12 Yen Bai 7.2 6.32 5.99 5.7 6.9 8.3 6.38 4.49 5.12 3.81 56.85 
13 Tra Vinh 6.85 6.35 5.79 3.81 6.86 6.46 6.31 6.14 5.85 3.63 56.83 
14 Quang Nam 7.76 5.55 4.44 4.32 5.27 6.96 6.61 5.26 5.7 6.31 56.42 
15 Bac Giang 8.18 6.01 5.81 4.78 6.32 6.66 4.89 5.31 6.41 4 55.99 
16 Hung Yen 6.65 6.91 6.49 5.36 7.64 7.82 5.82 5.53 3.89 3.52 55.97 
17 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 7.49 5.38 5.43 5.59 5.85 5.7 5.46 5.82 5.56 4.73 55.95 
18 Ninh Binh 7.87 5.92 5.11 5.87 6.29 6.17 5.64 4.78 6.6 3.63 55.82 
19 Soc Trang 7.82 7.98 5.78 4 6.3 7.2 7.31 4.5 4.16 4.06 55.34 
20 Khanh Hoa 8.23 5.3 6.02 5.37 6.51 6.36 5.11 6.12 5.08 3.27 55.33 
21 Phu Yen 8.83 7.03 6.09 2.64 5.35 6.58 5.09 6.49 5.44 3.73 54.93 
22 Bac Ninh 7.25 6.06 6.09 3.04 6.24 6.76 5.75 4.6 6.53 4.14 54.79 
23 Nghe An 7.85 5.56 5.78 5.06 6.29 6.15 4.69 4.28 6.53 4.53 54.43 
24 Phu Tho 8.32 6.5 5.35 4.73 6.61 6.96 4.59 5.7 5.56 3.7 54.42 
25 Quang Ninh 6.81 6.31 4.77 4.74 6.47 6.46 6.03 5.25 4.74 4.3 53.25 
26 Ben Tre 7.65 6.2 4.9 3.73 8.35 5.99 6.38 4.42 5.47 3.54 53.11 
27 Gia Lai 7.08 6.16 6.03 3.26 7.32 6.36 4.91 5.77 5.06 3.68 53.06 
28 Thai Nguyen 7.02 5.66 6.08 3.66 6.18 6.66 3.53 5.25 6.64 4.05 52.71 
29 Hai Duong 6.19 6.15 5.81 4.23 5.7 7.28 5.84 5.09 4.52 3.91 52.7 
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30 Binh Thuan 6.39 5.92 6.71 4.22 7.27 7.06 4.47 4.58 5.64 3.02 52.66 
31 Hau Giang 7.67 6.01 5.12 3.97 7.74 6.08 6.79 3.98 4.67 4.06 52.61 
32 Lam Dong 7.2 6.97 5.54 4.83 6.56 6.37 3.82 6.39 4.19 3.93 52.25 
33 Tien Giang 5.85 6.43 4.48 4.59 7.25 6.65 5.31 5.76 5.05 3.6 52.18 
34 Quang Tri 8.83 5.67 4.93 4.79 6.52 6.85 4.26 4.12 6.78 3.32 52.18 
35 Dak Lak 6.48 5.95 4.99 4.83 6.03 6.74 5.87 5.27 4.19 3.74 51.65 
36 Kien Giang 7.87 7.72 4.86 4.42 6.63 6.01 5.6 4.88 3.89 3.89 51.27 
37 Thai Binh 6.89 5.46 5.27 6.13 6.62 7.17 4.81 3.73 5.13 2.92 50.54 
38 Thua Thien - Hue 7.52 4.99 5.43 4.4 5.98 6.23 4.63 4.68 5.79 2.98 50.53 
39 Long An 7.88 7.07 3.62 3.88 5.68 7.02 5.59 5.63 4.85 3.16 50.4 
40 Ha Noi 5.73 4.19 5.6 5.25 5.21 4.7 4.23 6.12 5.24 3.39 50.34 
41 Hoa Binh 6.62 6.57 5.13 5.02 7.39 7.3 4.61 3.51 5.16 3.62 50.17 
42 Hai Phong 7.38 4.48 6.07 4.41 5.54 5.85 3.76 4.98 5.83 2.98 49.98 
43 Lang Son 6.87 4.39 5.65 5.17 6.21 6.5 3.3 5.2 5.07 3.65 49.64 
44 Nam Dinh 7.4 5.71 3.63 4.84 6.65 7.54 5.16 4.75 4.48 3.37 48.89 
45 Bac Kan 7.21 4.34 3.18 4.6 6.47 7.04 4.02 3.28 6.21 6.55 48.73 
46 Ha Giang 7.39 6.19 5.03 3.44 6.01 6.44 4.92 4.87 4.52 3.04 48.49 
47 Tay Ninh 8.49 6.26 4.56 3.7 6.12 6.06 4.11 4.42 4.3 5.09 48.35 
48 Quang Binh 8.02 6.07 5.46 4.05 7.22 6.17 3.55 3.84 4.92 3.46 47.9 
49 Ha Nam 6.58 5.58 6.48 3.9 6.51 6.29 4.79 4.39 2.87 3.09 47.27 
50 Tuyen Quang 8.59 5.13 4.04 4.09 6.47 7.02 4.57 5.3 3.43 3.5 47.21 
51 Cao Bang 7.65 4.83 4.62 4.7 6.3 7.44 4.38 3.07 5.1 3.07 46.63 
52 Binh Phuoc 4.96 6.82 4.36 5.28 6.12 6.37 4.72 4.36 4.13 2.52 46.29 
53 Ninh Thuan 7.5 6.66 5.39 3.48 6.08 5.52 2.6 3.84 5.5 3.47 45.82 
54 Thanh Hoa 7.83 5.95 4.63 4.73 5.24 6.79 3.11 4.61 3.73 3.53 45.3 
55 Son La 7.78 5.94 3.95 3.5 5.82 7.4 4.37 4.65 3.44 3.63 45.22 
56 Quang Ngai 6.73 5.99 5.24 4.42 5.44 5.79 2.36 4.57 4.94 2.13 44.2 
57 Ca Mau 5.99 5.74 5.07 4.33 6.97 5.73 4.1 3.47 3.65 3 43.99 
58 Bac Lieu 5.67 6.91 2.53 4.24 6.34 5.6 4.17 4.32 4.3 3.41 42.89 
59 Ha Tinh 7.36 5.93 2.86 4.93 5.05 6.22 3.09 3.99 5.1 2.59 42.35 
60 Dien Bien 8.82 5.72 4.38 4.19 6.45 5.6 3.24 3.42 3.5 2.99 42.28 
61 Kon Tum 8.73 4.95 4.28 3.22 5.17 6.09 3.43 3.33 3.6 3.74 41.38 
62 Ha Tay 6.12 4.92 5.56 4.28 5.07 6.7 2.53 3.6 2.92 3.13 40.73 
63 Dak Nong 5.56 4.82 2.15 3.81 6.66 5.07 4.15 2.4 4.11 4.83 38.91 
64 Lai Chau 7.99 3.84 2.46 3.06 5.2 7.1 4.32 2.96 1.99 4.05 36.76 
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Chapter 3 
Agglomeration Economies and Location Choices by 
Foreign Firms in Vietnam 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to traditional trade theory, location choice by a foreign firm 
depends on factor endowments of host countries such as natural resources, labor 
capital and infrastructures. The “factor endowment” theory, which was developed 
from Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages by Heckscher and Ohlin 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997), claims that firms have tendencies to locate in 
places where the required factors of their production are relatively abundant. 
However, recent theories of economic geography suggest that firms in the same 
industries may be drawn to a particular location in order to benefit from positive 
externalities or agglomeration effects.  
The theory of agglomeration economies was introduced by Marshall (1920) 
in which he provided three reasons for the clustering of firms in the same 
industries: it provides a pooled market for workers with specialized skills, 
facilitates the development of specialized inputs and services, and enables firms to 
benefit from technological spillovers. Subsequent research by Krugman (1991) 
and Saxenian (1994) construct formal models to analyze and extend the concepts.  
To date, there have been few empirical studies on agglomeration effects, 
especially in transition economies. Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) examine 
location choices by Japanese firms in manufacturing industries in the United 
States, showing that Japanese firms prefer to locate near both US and Japanese 
firms in the same manufacturing industries. Guimaraes et al. (2000) and Crozet, 
Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) also indicate similar behavior by foreign firms in 
France and Portugal, respectively. However, there are also studies that do not 
support the existence of agglomeration effects.  Shaver and Flyer (2000) examine 
foreign manufacturing firms in the United States and find that large firms are not 
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likely to locate near other firms because the benefits they contribute to 
agglomeration economies are less than what they receive from agglomeration 
effects.  Empirically, Baum and Mezias (1992) and Baun and Haveman (1997) 
also support this conclusion. For transition economies, there are many fewer 
studies of agglomeration effects on location choices by foreign investors. Most 
important are the works of Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) on Hungary, Meyer and 
Nguyen (2005)8 on Vietnam, and Head and Ries (1996) and Cheng and Kwan 
(2000) on China. However, due to the lack of detailed firm-level information, 
these studies can use only aggregate numbers of firms or foreign investment 
projects at provincial levels to estimate agglomeration effects.  
This study includes investments of 568 newly created foreign firms in 2005 
in about 150 different 4-digit industries. We also controls for the effects of 
province-specific factor endowments by using provincial characteristics in the 
model and for the effect of industry-specific endowments by using the 
geographical patterns of 88420 Vietnamese firms in the same industries during 
2004. The study shows that the deviation of foreign firms from these patterns 
indicates agglomeration effects. Different from many other studies, “country of 
origin” is used as a new dimension in the measurement of agglomeration effects.  
We apply the negative binomial regression model and the conditional logit 
model to estimate the effects of agglomeration economies on location choices by 
newly created foreign firms in Vietnam in 2005. By using a large dataset and 
detailed information about individual firms, it is possible to measure the effects of 
the country of origin and the industry of a firm on its location choice. The study 
shows that foreign investors are not only likely to locate near other foreign firms 
but also prefer to locate near foreign firms in the same industries and from the 
same countries of origin. Similar to Head et al. (1995), it is argued that this 
pattern of location choice supports an agglomeration-externality theory rather than 
a theory based on the differences of endowment factors. Further, the empirical 
results reveal that there is competition among provinces in attracting foreign 
investors, and the locations of Vietnamese firms have no effect on the location 
decisions by foreign investors in the same industries. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on agglomeration 
economies, location and foreign direct investment. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study of agglomeration effects on the location choices by foreign 
investors in Vietnam using detailed information about individual firms. The 
                                                
8 Meyer and Nguyen (2005) did not concentrate on agglomeration. Yet, the authors have a small data analysis 
and discussion about the effects of economic agglomeration on the location choices by foreign investors in 
Vietnam. 
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empirical results are particularly important for Vietnam’s provincial authorities in 
designing policies aimed at attracting foreign investments. 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of regional economies and the stylized facts of the FDI patterns by 
provinces in Vietnam. Section 3 reviews theories on localization. Section 4 
describes the dataset. Section 5 presents methodology and empirical results. The 
final section is devoted to conclusions.  
 
2. An overview of regional economies and the stylized facts of the 
FDI pattern in Vietnam 
Regional economies 
Vietnam is divided into fifty-nine provinces and five centrally-controlled 
municipalities in eight regions based on geographical and socio-economic 
conditions. The eight regions are Red River Delta, Northeast, Northwest, North 
Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, Southeast, and Mekong 
River Delta (see Fig. 3.2). The Red River Delta, the Southeast, and the Mekong 
River Delta have much smaller areas compared with the others, but they are the 
most densely populated areas, accounting for 58.7% of the country’s population in 
2005. By contrast, the Northwest and the Central Highlands are the least 
populated regions with less than 9% of the country’s population in 2005 (see 
Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: General indicators of the regions in Vietnam 
 
Region 
Population 
share 2005 
(%) 
Agricultural 
share 2005 
(%) 
Industrial 
share 2004 
(%) 
Service 
share 2005         
(%) 
Income per 
capita 2004     
(thousand VND) 
Red River Delta 21.7 17.6 19.2 19.9 5858.4 
Northeast 11.3 8.1 4.5 6.2 4558.8 
Northwest 3.1 2.2 0.2 1.1 3188.4 
North Central Coast 12.8 8.5 2.4 6.1 3805.2 
South Central Coast 8.5 5.2 4.0 7.8 4978.8 
Central Highlands 5.7 11.8 0.6 3.4 4682.4 
Southeast 16.2 11.7 57.1 36.3 9996.0 
Mekong River Delta 20.8 35.0 8.0 19.3 5653.2 
Source: The Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam in 2005. 
Note: The agricultural output value is at constant 1994 prices, the other indicators are at current 
prices. 
 
The Red River Delta including Hanoi, the capital and the Southeast 
including Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city of Vietnam are also the most 
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developed regions in Vietnam. These regions are the major industrial centers of 
the country, producing 19.2% and 57.1% respectively of the country’s industrial 
output in 2004. The Northwest and the Central Highlands, on the other hand, are 
the least industrialized regions with industrial output less than 1% of the nation’s 
total in 2004 (The Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam in 2005). 
Regarding agricultural production, the Mekong River Delta and the Red 
River Delta are the two major rice-producing areas in Vietnam, accounting for 
52.6% of the country’s agricultural output in 2005. The Southeast, the Mekong 
River Delta, and the Red River Delta are also the most important centers for 
services in Vietnam, and they have the three largest cities of Ho Chi Minh City, 
Can Tho, and Hanoi, respectively. Those regions accounted for 75.5% of the 
country’s total service output in 2005 (see Table 3.1). 
As a result of being the biggest centers in agriculture, industry, and services, 
the living standards of people in the South East, the Red River Delta, and the 
Mekong River are the highest in Vietnam. 
 
The FDI pattern 
Since the Law of Foreign Investment was passed in 1987, the flows of FDI 
into Vietnam have been considerable and have also increased over time. However, 
the increasing trend has not been smooth. After a big jump during the period 
1988-1996, Vietnam experienced a sharp decline in FDI flows at the final years of 
1990s due to strong influence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. However, the 
FDI inflows started to pick up again as countries in the region recovered from the 
crisis and the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 
2001. Especially, the situation has changed much since Vietnam became a formal 
member of the WTO in the beginning of 2007. According to the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam (MPI), in 2007 FDI inflows into Vietnam 
achieved the highest record with $21.3 billion of registered capital after twenty 
years of issuing the first Law on Foreign Direct Investment. 
The statistic data of the MPI show an uneven distribution of FDI in both 
industrial sectors and regions during the period 1988-2007 by the number of 
investment projects and the amount of registered capital. In terms of industrial 
sector, nearly 70% of projects and registered capital were running to manufacture, 
around 20% to service and the rest to agriculture. Within the manufacture, while 
during the early part of 1990s, the majority of FDI were in oil and mining sector, 
but recently light and heavy industries dominate the field. In addition, the share of 
FDI in agricultures now is increasing compared with that in the 1990s. In service 
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sector, the hotel and tourism activities account for the largest proportion. A 
different point is that in the early history of the FDI in Vietnam, in the service 
sector, there was no investment in construction of industrial zones, offices and 
apartments, but now these fields start attracting significant part of FDI inflows. 
In terms of nationalities of investors, the data of the MPI reveals that during 
1988-2007, there were eighty one countries and territories investing in Vietnam.  
The inward FDI in Vietnam is dominated by regional investors, accounting for 
nearly 80% of the total number of investment projects, registered capital and 
implemented capital. The top five investors were South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, 
China, and Singapore. Although the United States is a late comer, its investment 
in Vietnam has increased since the Bilateral Trade Agreement between the two 
countries was signed, and now it is in the eighth position of investment ranking. 
The investments from European countries were still small, accounting for about 
10% of the numbers of projects, 15% of the registered capital and 20% of the 
implemented capital. 
 
Figure 3.1: The regional distributions of FDI in Vietnam during 1988-2007  
 
Source: The MPI 
 
Regarding regional distribution, during the period 1988-2007, all sixty four 
provinces in Vietnam had received FDI, but most of them flew to the Southeast 
and the Red River Delta regions. Figure 3.1 shows that more than 60% of projects 
and 52% of registered capital ran to the Southeast region of which most of them 
flew to Ho Chi Minh City and its two neighboring provinces, Dong Nai and Binh 
Duong, and nearly 25% of investment projects and registered capital went to the 
Red River Delta of which Hanoi, the capital city, accounted for the largest 
proportion. By contrast, the Northwest and the North Central Coast attracted less 
than 1% of the FDI inflows. These results are consistent with the statistics come 
from the enterprise surveys conducted by the GSO that are presented in Chapter 1, 
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therefore confirming a highly uneven distribution of FDI among regions within 
Vietnam. 
It seems that there is a relationship between the regional economic 
conditions and the FDI inflows. In Chapter 1, we summarized the empirical 
studies on the distribution of the FDI in Vietnam to show that market potential, 
labor force, infrastructure, agglomeration effects and institutional performance by 
local authorities are important determinants of FDI inflows into regions within 
Vietnam. However, besides conventional determinants of FDI location, recent 
theories of economic geography suggest that benefits arising from agglomeration 
economies drive foreign firms to locate in a particular place, therefore affecting 
FDI inflows. In the next section, we first review the theories that explain 
agglomeration economies and then we advance three hypotheses of this study. 
 
3. Theories of localization 
Industry localization is defined as “the geographic concentration of 
particular industries” (Head et al., 1995). One of the mechanisms motivating this 
concentration is the existence of agglomeration economies, which are positive 
externalities that stem from the geographic clustering of industries. In this context, 
firms contribute to the externalities and also benefit from the externalities (Shaver 
and Flyer, 2000). 
The issue on industry localization attracted the attention of economists in 
the late nineteenth century. The work of Marshall (1920) is considered as an early 
and influential economic analysis on this phenomenon. Marshall identifies three 
externalities that stem from industry localization: (i) localization enables firms to 
benefit from technological spillovers, (ii) localization provides a pooled market 
for workers with specialized skills that benefits both workers and firms, and (iii) 
localization creates a pool of specialized intermediate inputs for an industry in 
greater variety and at lower cost. These positive externalities have the potential to 
enhance the performance by firms that agglomerate.  
According to Krugman (1991), the concept of technological spillovers is 
quite vague and general but it is the most frequently mentioned as a source of 
agglomeration effects. Useful information can flow between near firms, designers, 
engineers, and managers. For foreign companies, the spillovers of information can 
be the flows of experience-based knowledge about how to operate efficiently in 
the host countries (Head et al., 1995). Many authors use such clusters as 
California’s Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 to show that technological 
externalities are the most obvious reason for firms to agglomerate (Krugman, 
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1991; Saxenian, 1994). However, by contrast with the labor pooling or 
intermediate goods supply that are in principle measurable, technological 
spillovers can be invisible and difficult to measure. It can therefore be difficult to 
state clearly that either technological spillovers or specialized labor play a more 
important role in creating high-technological clusters, for instance in Silicon 
Valley and the high-fashion cluster in Milan. 
As anticipated by Marshall (1920), localized industry allows a pooled 
market for workers with specialized skills to benefit both workers and firms. 
David and Rosenbloom (1990) argue that an increased number of firms reduce the 
possibility that a worker will be unemployed for a long time. Finally, this also 
benefits firms by increasing the supply of specialized employees and reducing the 
risk of high-wage requirements from labor. Popular examples of this phenomenon 
are microelectronic manufacture in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) and carpet 
manufacture in Dalton, Georgia (Krugman, 1991). 
Krugman (1991) argues that the combination of scale economies and 
transportation costs will motivate the users and suppliers of intermediate inputs to 
cluster near each other. Such agglomerations reduce the total transportation costs 
and make large centers of production become more efficient and have more 
diverse suppliers than small ones. This will encourage firms in the same industries 
to concentrate in one location. Krugman points out that a historical accident 
makes a firm locate in a particular place, and then the cumulative location choices 
allow such an accident to influence the long-run geographical pattern of industry.  
From these observations, it seems that firms benefit from geographical 
localization when agglomeration economies exist. So far, there have been two 
types of studies that support the existence of agglomeration benefits. The first is 
qualitative studies of agglomerations that identify the existence of industry 
clusters and document the existence of agglomeration externality mechanism 
(Krugman, 1991; Saxenian, 1994). The second is empirical studies that try to find 
whether a firm has benefits when locating near other firms in the same industry or 
from the same country of origin. For example, the empirical research of Head et 
al. (1995), Head and Ries (1996), Head, Ries and Swenson (1999), Crozet et al. 
(2004), Guimaraes et al. (2000), and Coughlin and Segev (2000) find that firms in 
the same industries and from the same countries of origin have tendencies to 
locate near each other. However, the empirical study of Shaver and Flyer (2000) 
shows that under the existence of agglomeration economies, many firms will 
perform better if they do not cluster. These authors argue that firms not only 
capture benefits from agglomeration economies but also contribute to 
agglomeration economies. Therefore, large firms with the greatest capacity in 
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technologies, human capital, training programs, suppliers, and distributors will try 
to locate away from their competitors because the benefits they gain from locating 
near their competitors will be less than what the competitors gain from them.  
The problems firms will experience when participating in an industrial 
cluster can be the spillover of technology, employee defection to competitors, and 
the sharing of distributors and suppliers with neighboring firms. Yoffie (1993) 
shows that semiconductor managers decide to locate far from their competitors 
due to their concern that their technology might spill over to the near firms. Baum 
and Mezias (1992) indicate that locating closer to other hotels in Manhattan 
increases the survival chance of a hotel, but this benefit of agglomeration 
diminishes when hotel districts become crowded, pushing up prices and 
exacerbating competition.  
In this study, based on the FDI patterns in Vietnam, three hypotheses aimed 
at verifying the existence of agglomeration economies are tested. The empirical 
research on different countries – see the studies of Boudier-Bensabaa (2005) on 
Hungary, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) on Vietnam, Head and Ries (1996) and 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) on China, Crozet et al. (2004) on France, and Guimaraes 
et al. (2000) on Portugal – show that new foreign firms are likely to locate near 
other foreign investors. By doing that, they may use the experience and 
performance by earlier investors as indicators of the underlying business climate 
at the location. Hence, it is possible to expect an empirical relationship between 
the location choice by a new foreign firm and the prior number of foreign firms in 
a particular province. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the number of foreign firms already established in a 
province, the more likely new foreign investors are to invest in that province. 
 
In the case of Vietnam, as presented in section 2 of this chapter, there is an 
uneven distribution of foreign investments. It is proposed that the provinces that 
already have a lot of foreign investment will be more attractive to new foreign 
investors due to agglomeration effects. Following the work of previous authors 
(Boudier-Bensabaa, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Cheng and Kwan, 2000), the 
stock number of foreign investors at provincial level in the previous year is used 
as a proxy for foreign-specific agglomeration. 
When studying the behavior by Japanese firms in the United States, Head et 
al. (1995; 1999) find that new Japanese firms prefer to locate near both Japanese 
and US firms in the same industries. Moreover, Japanese firms are likely to locate 
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near Japanese firms in the same manufacturer-led keiretsu9. Crozet et al. (2004) 
also find similar evidence about the industrial concentrations of foreign firms in 
France. It seems that the benefits from technological spillovers, specialized labor 
markets, and the availability of input suppliers to the industry motivate firms in 
the same industries to cluster. Based on the empirical results of previous studies, 
the following hypothesis is advanced. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of domestic firms and foreign firms in a 
specific industry already located in a province, the more likely new foreign 
investors in that industry are to locate in that province.   
 
In order to test this hypothesis, it is proposed that new foreign firms have a 
tendency to locate in the provinces where many Vietnamese firms and other 
foreign firms in the same industries already existed. The lagged stock number of 
Vietnamese firms and foreign firms in the same industries by province are used as 
proxies for industry-specific agglomeration. 
Besides finding that foreign firms are likely to locate near firms in the same 
industries, Head et al. (1995; 1999) and Crozet et al. (2004) also show that 
foreign firms prefer to locate near firms from the same countries of origin. Head et 
al. (1999) argue that agglomeration effects between Japanese firms may arise due 
to their different characteristics from the firms of other countries. For example, 
the preference for higher skilled workers because of a stronger desire for quality 
control or greater use of complex machinery might motivate a new Japanese firm 
to locate near earlier arrivals to be able to hire away employees trained in 
Japanese methods. Thus, it is possible to expect an empirical relationship between 
location choice by a new foreign firm and the prior number of foreign firms from 
the same countries of origin in a particular province. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the number of foreign firms from a specific country 
already located in a province, the more likely new foreign investors from that 
country are to locate in that province.  
 
Based on the location patterns of foreign investors in Vietnam, it is 
proposed that foreign investors from the same countries of origin are likely to 
concentrate in a particular region. Following the work of Crozet et al. (2004), the 
                                                
9 Keiretsu can be considered as industrial or vertical groups, i.e. those headed by large manufacturing 
companies whose members consist largely of component suppliers. 
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lagged stock number of foreign firms from the same countries of origin by 
province is used as a proxy for country-specific agglomeration. 
 
4. Data 
The dataset that is used in this study is obtained from the yearly surveys of 
the enterprises operating in Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam since 2000. These are comprehensive surveys covering all state 
enterprises, non-state enterprises that have equal or greater than 10 employees, 
20% of sampled non-state enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, and all 
foreign enterprises across 64 provinces and cities in Vietnam. The contents of the 
surveys cover indicators to identify enterprises including their name, address, 
type, and economic activities of the enterprises, and indicators to reflect 
production situations of the enterprises such as their employees, income of 
employees, asset and capital source, turnover, profit, contributions to the state 
budget, investment capital, taxes and other obligations to the government, job 
training, and evaluations on the investment environment. To our knowledge, this 
dataset has not been used for studies on location choices by foreign investors in 
Vietnam.  
The sample includes foreign investors that started their activities in 2005. 
The newly created foreign firms in 2005 are identified by using tax codes that are 
unique for each firm to merge the cumulative number of foreign firms in 2005 
with those in 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001 and 2000. Then the years in which foreign 
firms started their operation and industrial codes are used to track back the data to 
guarantee that the remaining firms are the newly created foreign firms in 2005. In 
sum, there were 568 new foreign firms created in 2005. The previous investors 
that are used to form the agglomerations are the cumulative number of foreign or 
Vietnamese firms up to 2004. In this study, firms from all industrial sectors in 4-
digit industries and in all forms of ownership such as 100% foreign-owned and 
joint venture firms are included in the regression models.   
Fig.3.2 depicts the geographical patterns of new foreign firms in 2005 by 
province. By looking at the color changes over the provinces on Fig. 1, we can see 
that most of the new foreign firms concentrated in Ho Chi Minh City and its two 
neighboring provinces, Binh Duong and Da Nang that belong to the Southeast 
region, and Hanoi that belongs to the Red River Delta region. While just these 
four provinces and cities accounted for 78.5% of the 568 new foreign firms in 
2005, 30 out of the 64 provinces in Vietnam had no new foreign investors in 
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2005. Most of these provinces are in the North Central Coast, the Northwest and 
the Mekong River Delta regions (see Appendix 3.1 for more details).  
 
Fig. 3.2: The geographical distribution of new foreign firms in Vietnam, 2005 
 
 
Source: Based on the dataset of the Survey on Enterprises in Vietnam in 2005, the GSO. 
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5. Methodology and empirical results 
Various modeling approaches and levels of aggregation have been used for 
analyzing industrial location such as ordinary least squares (Boudier-Bensabaa, 
2005), conditional logit model (Head et al., 1995; Crozet et al., 2004; Guimares 
and Figueiredo, 2000), negative binomial regression model (Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005; Coughlin and Segev, 2000), and Generalized Method of Moments (Cheng 
and Kwan, 2000). These procedures have been applied to foreign direct 
investment aggregated to the country level or the provincial level and, more 
frequently in recent years, to the firm level. By virtue of possessing a large and 
detailed dataset, this study can use two different models to examine the three 
hypotheses: the negative binomial regression model and the conditional logit 
model. With the negative binomial regression model, it is possible to use only 
aggregated number of foreign firms at the provincial level. However, this model 
cannot exclude the fixed effects of the provinces that may lead to the biasness of 
the estimates. The conditional logit model can overcome this disadvantage by 
using the information about each foreign firm.  
 
5.1. Agglomeration effects on location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam, 
using the negative binomial regression model 
The model and variables 
Following the works of Coughlin and Segev (2000) and Meyer and Nguyen 
(2005), the negative binomial regression model is used with the provincial-level 
data across the sixty four provinces in Vietnam. A Poisson or a negative binomial 
distribution is frequently used to characterize processes that generate nonnegative 
integer outcomes such as the number of accidents that occur at a particular 
intersection. Thus, the number of new foreign firms locating in a specific province 
is a reasonable candidate for a Poisson or a negative binomial distribution. If there 
is overdispersion (i.e. the variance greater than the mean), estimates from the 
Poisson regression model will be inefficient (Long, 1997). In this case, the 
negative binomial regression model is preferred.  
 
Dependent variables   
The dependent variables are the number of newly created foreign firms and 
the number of new foreign firms by province that operate in the manufacturing 
sector. In 2005, there were 568 new foreign firms of which 381 were 
manufacturers. The Poisson or the negative binomial regression model only 
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allows examining Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 present the 
descriptive statistics and the correlations of variables used in this analysis. 
 
Agglomeration variables 
In order to examine Hypothesis 1 that new foreign investors tend to locate in 
provinces where many other foreign firms have already existed, the cumulative 
number of foreign firms by province up to 2004 is used as a proxy. To examine 
Hypothesis 2 that firms in the same industries tend to cluster in particular regions, 
the cumulative number of foreign and Vietnamese firms in the manufacturing 
sector at provincial level up to 2004 is used as proxies. By 2004, there were 3145 
foreign firms of which 2325 operate in the manufacturing sector, and 88420 
Vietnamese firms of which 18125 are manufacturers. 
 
Control variables 
It is expected that provincial endowment factors can influence a firm’s 
desire to invest in a particular province, such as the size of the provincial 
economy, the size of the provincial market, infrastructure, human resources, and 
geographical location. For instance, Ho Chi Minh City will always have a larger 
market than Ha Tinh province. Binh Duong will always enjoy a better location 
than Kon Tum or Ca Mau. Ha Noi will always have better infrastructure and more 
developed human resources than Ha Giang. So, the larger and more developed 
provinces such as Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi, Ba Ria – Vung Tau, Da Nang, 
Dong Nai, and Hai Phong will have more competitiveness simply because of their 
initial endowments.  For this reason, following the work of Meyer and Nguyen 
(2005), the control variables that are included in the regression model are the size 
of local consumer market measured by the population of province, GDP by 
province, human capital development measured by the number of undergraduate 
students by province, and infrastructure conditions proxied by the number of 
industrial zones by province and the distance to the nearest big harbor. These data 
are cumulated up to 2004 and taken from the Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam, 
the GSO.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
1. New firm  Number of newly created foreign firms by province in 2005 8.87            30.34         0 201 
2. New manufacturing  firm Number of newly created foreign manufacturing firms by 
province in 2005 
5.95            18.20          0 109 
3. Foreign firm  Number of foreign firms by province, cumulated up to 2004 49.14           157.45          0 1004 
4. Foreign manufacturing firm   Number of foreign manufacturing firms by province, 
cumulated up to 2004 
36.32            117.39         0 652 
5. Vietnam manufacturing firm Number of Vietnamese manufacturing firms by province, 
cumulated up to 2004 
283.20           670.73        10 4845 
6. Population Average population, in thousands by province, in 2004 1281.74    865.72      295.1     5730.8 
7. Student Number of undergraduate students by province in 2004 21635.31         76338.09        356 498928 
8. GDP GDP in million VND by province in 2004 1.13e+07       2.07e+07     818111 1.37e+08 
9. Industrial zone Number of industrial zones by province cumulated up 2004 0.95           2.40          0   12 
10. Distance to harbor The distance in km to the nearest big harbor by province 149.99      99.26   0 387.61 
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Table 3.3: Correlations in the dataset 
Variables Notation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. New firm  newfirm 1          
2. New manufacturing  firm newmanfirm 0.89 1         
3. Foreign firm  forfirm04 0.99 0.90   1        
4. Foreign manufacturing firm   manfirm04 0.95 0.97   0.97   1       
5. Vietnam manufacturing firm manvn04 0.89 0.62   0.87   0.75 1      
6. Population pop04 0.62 0.40   0.61   0.51   0.76      1     
7. Student student04 0.65 0.40   0.64   0.48   0.84   0.59   1    
8. GDP gdpmil04 0.74 0.49   0.74   0.63   0.84   0.68   0.66   1   
9. Industrial zone iz04 0.83 0.84   0.86   0.88   0.66   0.48   0.42   0.71   1  
10. Distance to harbor harbordis04 -0.33 -0.36   -0.34 -0.35   -0.31   -0.29   -0.20   -0.32   -0.38 1   
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Empirical Results  
The empirical analysis is implemented as follows. First, Hypothesis 1 is 
examined to see if the number of already existing foreign firms in a province 
affects location decision by a new foreign in that province. Then, the regression 
model is applied to the foreign manufacturing firms for testing Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 3.4: Agglomeration effects in the negative binomial and Poisson models 
Negative binomial regression Poisson regression Independent 
Variables 
New firm 
1 
New mnf firm 
2 
New firm 
3 
New mnf firm 
4 
Foreign firm 
 
 
Foreign 
manufacturing firm   
 
Vietnam 
manufacturing firm 
 
Population 
 
 
Student 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Industrial zone 
 
 
Distance to harbor 
 
 
α 
 
 
Obs (provinces) 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
Chi square 
0.0086** 
(0.0040)   
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.0004           
(0.0004)     
 
3.91e-06      
(3.49e-06)      
 
-2.14e-08     
(1.79e-08)     
 
-0.0058 
(0.1568)     
 
-0.0074****     
(0.0022)     
 
1.4781 
(0.4485) 
 
61 
 
0.18 
 
53.01**** 
- 
 
 
0.0140**   
(0.0071)      
 
-0.0004   
(0.0013)     
 
-0.0002      
(0.0005)     
 
7.65e-06   
(4.85e-06)      
 
-2.97e-08   
(3.77e-08)     
 
-0.1180     
(0.2089)     
 
-0.0082****   
(0.0024)    
 
1.5355 
(0.4926) 
 
61 
 
0.17 
 
46.29**** 
0.0034****   
(0.0005) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
 
6.15e-06****    
(4.33e-07) 
 
-3.39e-08****    
(7.17e-09)     
 
0.1591****    
(0.0292)     
 
-0.0083****   
(0.0013)   
 
 
 
 
61 
 
0.86 
 
2036.72**** 
- 
 
 
0.0059****    
(0.0012) 
 
-0.0010**   
(0.0004)    
 
0.0003**   
(0.0001)      
 
7.63e-06****    
(1.06e-06)      
 
-1.10e-08   
(1.10e-08)     
 
0.0654   
(0.0525)     
 
-0.0101****   
(0.0015)    
 
 
 
 
61 
 
0.80 
 
1192.52**** 
 
Note: Standard error in parentheses with significance at the **** 0.5%, *** 1%, **5%, and 
*10% levels. 
New mnf firm: New manufacturing firm 
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After testing for Hypothesis Ho: α = 0, we find a strong and statistically 
significant evidence of overdispersion [chibar2 (01) = 89.52, p-value < 0.01]10. 
So the negative binomial regression model is used instead of the Poisson 
regression model to estimate empirical results. The number of observations is 61 
because the information about the variable student, the number of undergraduate 
students cumulated up to 2004, is missing for three provinces - Lai Chau, Dac 
Nong, and Hau Giang – for three years of 2000, 2001 and 2002 because the 
Vietnamese government divided the 61 existing provinces into 64 in 2003. 
The empirical results in Column 1 of Table 3.4 show evidence of 
agglomeration economies as the coefficient of the variable foreign firm, the 
cumulative number of foreign firms cumulated up to 2004, is positive and 
statistically significant.  This result suggests that new foreign firms are more 
likely to locate in provinces with greater numbers of already existing foreign 
firms.   
In order to test Hypothesis 2, the sample was restricted to include only 
newly created foreign firms in manufacturing sector. The negative binomial 
regression model was used since the testing of Hypothesis Ho: α = 0 shows strong 
evidence of overdispersion [chibar2 (01) = 76.37, p-value < 0.01]. 
In Column 2 of Table 3.4, the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the variable foreign manufacturing firm, the number of foreign 
manufacturing firms cumulated up to 2004, supports the hypothesis that foreign 
firms in the same industries are likely to locate near each other. However, the 
negative and statistically insignificant estimate of the variable Vietnam 
manufacturing firm, the number of Vietnamese manufacturing firms cumulated up 
to 2004, suggests that the locations of Vietnamese firms do not influence the 
location decisions by foreign firms in the same industries.  
Different from the results of Meyer and Nguyen (2005), most of the control 
variables are statistically insignificant except the variable distance to harbor11, the 
distance to the nearest big harbor. The negative sign of the variable distance to 
                                                
10 The Poisson regression model accounts for only observed heterogeneity (i.e., observed difference among 
sample members). In practice, the Poisson regression model rarely fits due to overdispersion. That is, the 
model underfits the amount of dispersion in the outcome, leading to biased-downward standard errors that 
result in spuriously large z-values and spuriously small p-values. The negative binomial regression model 
addresses the failure of the Poisson regression model by adding a parameter, α, that determines the degree of 
dispersion in the predictions by reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among observations (see Long and 
Freese, 2006 for more details). 
11 The study has run the regression model with the quadratic variable harbordissq (the square value of the 
variable distance to harbor) and found that the coefficient of harbordissq is statistically insignificant while 
the coefficient of the variable distance to harbor is still statistically significant and negative although the 
significance is reduced. This evidence suggests that the effect of distance to harbor on the location decisions 
by foreign firms is linear. 
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harbor means that the nearer a province is to a big harbor, the more attractive it is 
to foreign investors. This evidence suggests that foreign investors prefer to locate 
in a place with upgraded infrastructure to reduce transportation costs. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 present the estimates of the Poisson 
regression model. By contrast with the results of the negative binomial regression 
model, the coefficients of most variables are highly statistically significant and the 
Pseudo R2 is very high. The reason is that the Poisson regression model in this 
case ignores unobserved heterogeneity among observations, leading to biased-
downward standard errors that result in spuriously large z-values and spuriously 
small p-values.  
It is noted that Table 3.3 shows high correlations between the variables 
foreign manufacturing firms and Vietnamese manufacturing firms as well as 
between the variables population and GDP. We suspect that the result of non-
significance of the variable related to the presence of Vietnamese firms is due to 
collinearity problems among explanatory variables. In order to check if the 
empirical results suffer from these problems, we have re-run some additional 
regressions inserting alternatively the variable foreign manufacturing firms and 
the variable Vietnamese manufacturing firms as well as between the variable 
population and the variable GDP and find that the estimated results are robust and 
do not appear to result from collinearity among the regressors (See Appendix 3.2 
for more details).  
Overall, the regression results support the hypotheses that foreign firms 
agglomerate. Foreign firms in Vietnam are likely to locate near each other and 
near other foreign firms in the same industries. However, the locations of 
Vietnamese firms have no influence on the location decisions by foreign firms in 
the same industries. The findings are consistent with many previous studies on 
location choices by foreign investors in different countries such as the studies of 
Boudier-Bensebaa (2005), Meyer and Nguyen (2005), Head et al. (1995), Cheng 
and Kwan (2000), and Crozet et al. (2004). 
 
5.2. Agglomeration effects on location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam, 
using the conditional logit model 
By using the negative binomial model, we find the evidence of 
agglomeration effects. However, the concern is that there may be provincial fixed 
effects which generate a misleading correlation between the cumulative number of 
firms which have entered a province and the new entries in the year in question. 
These results may be caused by unobserved heterogeneity across provinces 
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leading to a spurious agglomeration coefficient. Suppose that we have attributed 
the entry to clustering while it is in fact the better facilities of a province that are 
responsible. These facilities are defined as fixed effects if they are unchanged over 
time, unobservable and affect the number of new entries in provinces. If 
unobserved effects correlate with the explanatory variables, the estimation will be 
biased and inconsistent.  
In order to eliminate fixed effects of the provinces, the conditional logit 
model is used since this model bases on the information about individual firms to 
estimate the effects of agglomeration on its location choice. With the detailed and 
precise information about each foreign firm operating in Vietnam, it is feasible to 
apply this model to examine all the three hypotheses mentioned in section 3. 
The conditional logit model is widely used in previous empirical works on 
agglomeration effects (Head et al., 1995; Crozet et al., 2004; Shaver and Flyer, 
2000; Guimaraes et al., 2000). This model is derived from the result of McFadden 
(1974) with the assumption that each investor chooses a location that will yield 
the highest profit. Profit depends on the available inputs that go into firms’ 
production function including agglomeration effects stemming from economic 
activities of near similar firms. In this model, the information about the location 
choice that an investor made and attributes for the chosen location and other 
locations in the choice set are exploited. 
Following Head et al. (1995), the study considers that the investor i, if it 
locates in province j, will derive an expected profit of Πij. This investor chooses 
the location with the greatest expected profitability that can be represented as 
followed: 
Πij  = αj + β’Xij  + εij 
where αj includes the characteristics of province j. αj is considered as province-
specific endowment effects that determine the attractiveness of provinces to 
investors12. Xij is agglomeration variables measured as the count number of firms 
cumulated up to 2004. Each measure varies across investors i, because investors 
differ by industry and country of origin. εij is an investment location specific 
random disturbance that is attributable to errors associated with imperfect 
perception and optimization by decision makers and unobservable location 
characteristics that affect the profitability of locating in a given site. 
                                                
12 Head et al. (1995) show that in both theories of localization, endowment-driven localization and 
agglomeration model of industry localization, firms in the same industry cluster geographically. However, 
only in the presence of agglomeration externalities does the clustering add to the attractiveness of the 
location. 
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The investor i prefers the location j among the choice set M if it yields 
higher profits than any other possible choices:    
Πij > Πik   ∀ k, k ≠ j, and j, k € M. 
The probability of choosing the location j is thus:   
Prob(Πij > Πik )  ∀ k, k ≠ j. 
McFadden (1974) shows that if, and only if, εij is distributed as a Type I 
Extreme Value independent random variable, then the probability that a location j 
yields the highest profitability for investor i among all the alternative locations in 
the choice set M is presented by the logit model: 
Pr(ij) = 
∑ +
 + 
M
mim
ijj
X )'exp(
)X'exp(
βα
βα
       j, m € M 
The maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate endowment effects 
and agglomeration effects.  
 
Variables 
As the part using the negative binomial negative model, the data in this part 
is from the surveys of all firms operating in Vietnam conducted by the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam since 2000. In the conditional logit model, the 
information about the industry, the country of origin, and the location of each 
foreign firm is used. The attributes of provinces in the location choice set are 
collected from the Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 
present the descriptive statistics and the correlations of variables used in this 
model. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the province chosen by each foreign firm that was 
newly created in 2005. In total, there were 568 new foreign firms that distribute in 
34 provinces among 64 provinces in Vietnam. Conditional logit model requires 
that all choices be selected at least once. So, 30 provinces that are not selected any 
time from the choice set are removed, including Ha Tay, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, 
Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, 
Lai Chau, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, 
Phu Yen, Dak Lak, Ninh Thuan, Binh Phuoc, An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, 
Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Tra Vinh, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, and Ca Mau. Most of 
these provinces are from the Northeast, the North Central Coast, and the Mekong 
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River Delta regions. The other 34 provinces create a set of unordered choice for 
each foreign firm, say, M = 1, 2,…, 34. Let yij (j € M) be a dependent variable for 
the choice actually chosen by the ith foreign firm. That is, yij = 1 if foreign firm i 
chooses the location j, and yij’ = 0 for j’≠ j; j, j’ € M. In total, there are 19312 
observations that equal 568 foreign firms multiplied with 34 provinces.  
 
Agglomeration variables 
The study estimates the effects of three types of agglomerations on the 
location choices by foreign investors in Vietnam. In each case, the agglomeration 
is measured as cumulative counts of firms up to 2004. It is noted that cumulated 
up to 2004, there were 3145 foreign firms and 88420 Vietnamese firms. 
Following the work of Guimaraes et al. (2000), Head et al. (1995) and Crozet et 
al. (2004), there are three types of agglomeration effects as follows: 
• Foreign-specific agglomeration: the cumulative number of foreign firms 
by province up to 2004 is used as a proxy. 
• Industry-specific agglomeration: the cumulative number of Vietnamese 
firms in the same 4-digit industries by province, the cumulative number 
of foreign firms in the same 4-digit industries by province and the 
cumulative number of foreign firms in the same industries in the 
neighboring provinces up to 2004 are used as proxies. 
• Country-specific agglomeration: the cumulative number of foreign firms 
from the same countries of origin by province up to 2004 is used as a 
proxy. 
Including the cumulative number of Vietnamese firms in the same 4-digit 
industries is a strategy to separate agglomeration and endowment effects. The 
reason is that although αj captures the attractiveness of province j to the “average” 
investors, unobserved characteristics of investors can make some provinces more 
attractive to certain investors. For example, a firm in an industry with high factor 
intensities will choose provinces with abundant endowments of these factors. This 
suggests that industry-level agglomeration variables will be correlated with the 
unobserved factor conditions pertaining to that industry that constitute the error 
term in the model. This problem can be solved by including province- and 
industry-specific characteristics. However, this strategy is infeasible with the 
sample of 568 foreign firms in about 155 different 4-digit industries. The 
significant attraction of the old firms to new ones in the same industries or the 
countries of origin, after controlling for the patterns of Vietnamese firms, can 
provide the evidence of agglomeration effects (see Head et al., 1995). In other 
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words, the number of Vietnamese firms in the same 4-digit industries acts as a 
proxy for industry-specific endowment effects. 
Using the idea of Head et al. (1995), the number of foreign firms in the 
neighboring provinces is included in the model. This variable allows the 
possibility that, for example, Binh Duong province is attractive to wearing apparel 
manufacturers not only because of the wearing apparel producers there but also 
because of the wearing apparel producers in the neighboring provinces: Ho Chi 
Minh City, Tay Ninh, Dong Nai, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An, and Tien Giang. 
 
Control variables  
In the conditional logit model, the same control variables of the negative 
binomial regression model are used. These control variables reflect the 
characteristics of the provinces that are considered as province-specific 
endowment effects determining the attractiveness of the provinces to foreign 
investors. The control variables for the size of local consumer market measured 
by the population of province, GDP by province, human capital development 
measured by the number of undergraduate students by province, and infrastructure 
conditions proxied by number of industrial zones by province and the distance to 
the nearest big harbor are included in the model. These data are cumulated up to 
2004 and taken from the Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam, the GSO.  
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
1. Choice 19312 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if firm i chooses location j and 
equals 0 for other location j’, j≠ j’ and j, j’ belong to the 
location choice set 
0.03 0.16 0 1 
2. Foreign firm 19312 The cumulative number of foreign firms by province up to 2004 89.29           206.10          0 1004 
3. Vietnamese firm 19312 
The cumulative number of Vietnamese firms in the same 4-digit 
industries by province up to 2004 
14.48    65.74          0 1905 
4. Same industry 19312 
The cumulative number of foreign firms in the same 4-digit 
industries by province up to 2004 
2.00            9.32          0 146 
5. Neighboring firm 19312 
The cumulative number of foreign firms in the same 4-digit 
industries in neighboring provinces up to 2004 
8.43    23.13          0 201 
6. Same country  18802* 
The cumulative number of foreign firms from the same countries 
of origin by province up to 2004 
12.13    41.67          0 328 
7. Population 19312 Average population in thousands by province in 2004 1344.40     922.07      366.1     5730.8 
8. Student 18744** Number of undergraduate students by province in 2004 35782.88         100522.5        434 498928 
9. GDP 19312 GDP in million VND by province in 2004 1.57e+07       2.72e+07    1527060 1.37e+08 
10. Industrial zone 19312 Number of industrial zones by province in 2004 1.64    3.08          0 12 
11. Distance to harbor 19312 The distance in km to the nearest big harbors by province 115.07    94.90          0 384.42 
    Notes:     *  In 568 new foreign firms in 2005, there are 15 firms without information about countries of original (18802 obs = 19312 – 15x34). 
** The information about number of students is missing in one province of the location choice set (18744 obs = 19312 – 1x568). 
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Table 3.6: Correlations in the dataset 
Variables Notation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Choice choice 1           
2. Foreign firm forfirm04 0.41   1          
3. Vietnamese firm vnfirm4dgsic 0.25   0.47   1             
4. Same industry same4dgsic 0.34   0.53   0.59 1        
5. Neighboring firm border4dgsic 0.07   0.28   0.13   0.37 1       
6. Same country  samecountry 0.32   0.68   0.31   0.42   0.26 1      
7. Population pop04 0.33   0.78   0.51   0.44   0.12   0.48   1     
8. Student student04 0.26   0.62   0.49   0.32   0.00   0.34   0.73   1    
9. GDP gdpmil04 0.30   0.74   0.46   0.41   0.23   0.45   0.77 0.65 1   
10. Industrial zone iz04 0.34   0.86   0.33   0.44   0.40   0.61   0.58   0.39 0.71   1  
11. Distance to harbor harbordis04 -0.13  -0.34   -0.13   -0.18   -0.21   -0.24   -0.34   -0.17 -0.30  -0.40   1 
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Empirical results 
Table 3.7 presents the agglomeration coefficients generated by maximum 
likelihood estimation. The highly statistically significant coefficients of the 
variables foreign firm, the cumulative number of foreign firms by province up to 
2004 and Vietnamese firm, the cumulative number of Vietnamese firms in the 
same 4-digit industries by province up to 2004, in Column 1 reveal that new 
foreign firms are likely to locate in provinces where already existed a relatively 
large number of foreign firms in the same industries.   
In Columns 2, the cumulative number of foreign firms in the same 4-digit 
industries up to 2004 (same industry) is added to the regression model. The 
positive and highly statistically significant coefficient of the variable same 
industry proves that the locations of new foreign investments are influenced by 
the previous location choices by other foreign firms in the same industries. Head 
et al. (1995) consider this phenomenon as the “follow the leader” pattern of 
foreign firms; that is difficult to interpret as anything other than agglomeration 
effects.  
However, when we insert the variable related to the number of foreign firms 
in the same industry (same industry), the coefficient of the cumulative number of 
Vietnamese firms in the same 4-digit industries (Vietnamese firm) becomes 
negative and statistically insignificant while there is no change for the variable 
foreign firm.  This result shows that the positive correlation (0.60) between same 
industry and Vietnamese firm is important. Vietnamese firms and foreign firms in 
the same industries tend to invest in the same locations. If we do not include the 
variable same industry in the regression, its effect is attributed to Vietnamese firm 
giving a positive bias to the Vietnamese firm coefficient. Whenever we include 
same industry variable, the coefficient of Vietnamese firm is negative and 
insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, by running the likelihood ratio tests 
we find that the models which omit the variable same industry appear 
misspecified and are dominated by the models including it in the regressions. 
Compared with Head et al. (1995), this result reflects a different tendency in 
the location decisions by foreign investors in Vietnam from that of Japanese 
investors in the United States. Head et al. (1995) found that Japanese firms prefer 
to locate near US firms in the same industries. The regression model, however, 
shows that the location choices by new foreign investors are not influenced by the 
locations of Vietnamese firms. Different from the location patterns of US and 
Japanese firms, Appendix 3.1 shows that the location distributions of foreign 
firms and Vietnamese firms are not very matched. While most foreign 
investments concentrate in the Red River Delta and Southeast regions, especially 
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in the cities and provinces of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong, and Dong 
Nai, Vietnamese firms are distributed quite evenly in all provinces. The negative 
and statistically insignificant coefficient of the variable Vietnamese firm 
encourages us to believe that the estimates of agglomerations are not influenced 
by industry-specific endowment effects.  
 
Table 3.7: Agglomeration effects in the conditional logit model 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variables: location choice 
        1                             2                               3                        4 
Foreign firm 0.0042**** 
(0.0006)         
0.0038**** 
(0.0007)         
0.0039****   
(0.0006)     
0.0033****   
(0.0006)      
Vietnamese firm 0.0015****  
(0.0004)      
-0.0005 
(0.0005)        
-0.0004     
(0.0004)     
-0.0004  
(0.0004)     
Same industry - 0.0226****   
(0.0032)       
0.0207****   
(0.0031)      
0.0195****   
(0.0031) 
Neighboring firm -  -0.0073***   
(0.0026)     
-0.0081****   
(0.0026) 
Same country  -  - 0.0032****   
(0.0008)      
Population 0.0006***   
(0.0002)     
0.0007***  
(0.0003)       
0.0006***   
(0.0002)      
0.0006***   
(0.0002)      
Student 4.50e-06****   
(4.48e-07)      
4.98e-06****   
(4.54e-07)      
4.86e-06****   
(4.56e-07)      
4.91e-06****   
(4.56e-07)      
GDP -5.08e-08****   
(1.12e-08)     
-5.14e-08****  
(1.12e-08)       
-5.28e-08****   
(1.13e-08)     
-5.18e-08****   
(1.12e-08)     
Industrial zone 0.1078****  
(0.0323)      
0.1081****  
(0.0324)       
0.1225****   
(0.0328)      
0.1263****   
(0.0328)      
Distance to harbor -0.0037****   
(0.0012)     
-0.0037****   
(0.0012)     
-0.0037****   
(0.0012)     
-0.0037****   
(0.0012)     
 
Log-likelihood 
 
-1203.2 
 
-1175.21 
 
-1171.4 
 
-1163.8 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40 
Chi square 1453.8**** 1509.7**** 1517.4**** 1532.3**** 
No. of choosers 568 568 568 568 
No. of choices 34 34 34 34 
Note: Standard error in parentheses with significance at the **** 0.5%, *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 
10% levels. 
 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the variable 
neighboring firm in Columns 3 and 4 indicates that a larger number of foreign 
firms in the same industries in a province decrease the attractiveness of its 
neighboring provinces to new foreign investors. It appears that there is 
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competition among provinces in attracting foreign investors. In Column 4, the 
number of foreign firms from the same countries of origin is added in the 
regression model to determine whether firms from the same countries of origin 
tend to locate near each other.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of the variable same country, the cumulative number of foreign firms from the 
same countries of origin up to 2004, indicates that new foreign firms benefit from 
locating near firms from the same countries of origin. The larger coefficient of the 
variable same industry than that of the variable same country suggests that the 
benefits foreign firms gain from industry-specific agglomerations are higher than 
from country-specific agglomerations.  
Different from the results of the negative binomial model, all control 
variables here are statistically significant except the negative sign of the variable 
GDP is out of expectation. These results indicate that the characteristics of the 
provinces are important determinants in attracting foreign investors. 
As discussed in the previous part, we are also concerned that high 
correlations between the variables same industry and Vietnamese firms as well as 
between the variables population and GDP may lead to the result of non-
significance of the variable related to the presence of Vietnamese firms in the 
same industry. In order to check if the empirical results suffer from collinearity 
problems, we have re-run some additional regressions inserting alternatively the 
variable same industry and the variable Vietnamese firms as well as between the 
variable population and the variable GDP and find that the estimated results are 
robust and do not appear to result from collinearity amongst the regressors.  (See 
Appendix 3.2 for more details).  
In summary, the empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign 
investors are not only likely to locate near other foreign firms but also prefer to 
locate near foreign firms in the same industries and from the same countries of 
origin due to the benefits from agglomeration economies. Moreover, we found 
that provinces in Vietnam compete with each other to attract foreign firms and 
location choices by foreign investors are not affected by location of domestic 
firms.  
 
5.3. Robustness tests 
In order to investigate whether the empirical results are robust, the both 
regression models are re-estimated by using a variety of sub-samples of the 
dataset. Following Guimaraes et al. (2000), it is possible to test the existence of 
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agglomeration economies in location decisions by foreign investors according to 
firms’ capital ownership and size.  
 
Table 3.8: Agglomeration effects in the negative binomial regression model 
Independent  
Variables 
nffewer100emp 
        1 
nf100%forcap 
          2 
mffewer100emp 
        3 
mf100%forcap 
          4 
Foreign firm 0.0074** 
(0.0039)      
0.0086** 
(0.0045)      
- - 
Foreign 
manufacturing 
firm 
- - 0.0144*   
(0.0081)      
0.0160**   
(0.0082)      
Vietnam 
manufacturing 
firm 
- - -0.0009   
(0.0014)     
-0.0006   
(0.0014)     
Population -0.0003           
(0.0004)     
-0.0004           
(0.0005)     
-0.0001      
(0.0005)     
-0.0001      
(0.0006)     
Student 4.67e-06      
(3.45e-06)      
3.56e-06      
(3.85e-06)      
9.57e-06   
(5.17e-06)      
8.73e-06   
(5.27e-06)      
GDP -1.81e-08     
(1.76e-08)     
-2.09e-08     
(1.92e-08)     
-1.96e-08   
(3.82e-08)     
-3.16e-08   
(4.63e-08)     
Industrial zone 0.0263 
(0.1575)     
0.0017 
(0.1761)     
-0.1404     
(0.2425)     
-0.1696     
(0.2360)     
Distance to harbor -0.0080****     
(0.0025)     
-0.0087****     
(0.0026)     
-0.0104****   
(0.0032)    
-0.0108****   
(0.0030)    
Obs  61 61 61 61 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.18 
Chi square 51.68**** 46.93**** 42.58**** 42.94**** 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses with significance at the **** 0.5%, *** 1%, ** 5%, 
and * 10% levels. 
nffewer100emp: new firms have fewer than 100 employees 
nf100%forcap: new firms of 100% foreign capital 
mffewer100emp: new firms have fewer than 100 employees in manufacturing sector 
mf100%forcap: new firms of 100% foreign capital in manufacturing sector 
 
In the previous parts, all kinds of investments with foreign participations 
i.e., 100% foreign capital owned firms and joint venture enterprises are included 
in the regression models. For the first test of the results’ robustness, only newly 
created firms of 100% foreign capital are used. We argue that these firms can 
decide the locations by themselves while the decisions by join venture enterprises 
somehow depend on the both Vietnamese and foreign sides. Of 568 newly created 
foreign firms in 2005, there were 491 firms of 100% foreign capital, of which 347 
are operating in the manufacturing sector.  
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Table 3.9: Agglomeration effects in the conditional logit model 
Independent  
Variables 
Dependent variable: location choice 
 
nffewer100emp         nfmore100emp          nf100%forcap 
            1                             2                                   3 
Foreign firm 0.0030****   
(0.0008)     
0.0033*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0033****   
(0.0007)      
Vietnamese firm 0.0000          
(0.0005)     
-0.0002 
(0.0013) 
-0.0003     
(0.0004)     
Same industry 0.0317****   
(0.0046)      
0.0149** 
(0.0067) 
0.0193****   
(0.0032) 
Neighboring firm -0.0083**    
(0.0041)     
-0.0024 
(0.0032) 
-0.0074***   
(0.0027) 
Same country  0.0032****   
(0.0010)      
0.0032** 
(0.0015) 
0.0023***   
(0.0008)      
Population 0.0006**      
(0.0003)      
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0006**   
(0.0002)      
Student 5.93e-06****   
(5.13e-07)      
-9.41e-08     
(1.80e-06)     
4.85e-06****   
(5.19e-07)      
GDP -5.31e-08****   
(1.39e-08)     
-4.24e-08**     
(1.93e-08)     
-5.11e-08****   
(1.12e-08)     
Industrial zone 0.1473****   
(0.0400)      
0.0627             
(0.0602)     
0.1457****   
(0.0347)      
Distance to harbor -0.0042***   
(0.0015)     
-0.0031*            
(0.0019)     
-0.0044****   
(0.0013)     
Log-likelihood -820.4 -302.6                      -990.6 
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.29 0.41 
Chi square 1373.1**** 240.8*** 1361.4**** 
No. of choosers 445 123 491 
No. of choices 34 34 34 
Note: Standard error in parentheses with significance at the **** 0.5%, *** 1%, ** 5%, and 
*10% levels 
nffewer100em: new firms have fewer than 100 employees in manufacturing sector. 
nfmore100emp: new firms have equal or more than 100 employees in manufacturing sector. 
 
To investigate how agglomeration economies affect location decisions by 
firms with different size, we divide new foreign firms created in 2005 into kinds: 
large and small ones.  Foreign firms are defined small if they have fewer than 100 
employees, otherwise they are considered large. It is argued that regions in 
general compete for large firms. However, location is not a big concern for a giant 
firm because in any places it might have higher competitiveness than the others. 
In 2005, there were 445 new foreign firms with fewer than 100 employees, of 
which 265 are manufacturers. To make it more simple, we include only small 
foreign firms in the negative binomial model, but include both of small and large 
firms in the conditional logit model. 
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The empirical results of the negative binomial regression and conditional 
logit models with the restricted samples are presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
Despite the smaller dimensions of the samples, the coefficients of variables are 
remarkably stable. All the agglomeration variables that were statistically 
significant in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 are still statistically significant in these 
regressions (see Table 3.8 and Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.9). 
However, the double coefficient of the variable same industry, the 
cumulative number of foreign firms in the same 4-digit industries up to 2004, in 
Column 1 compared with that of Column 2 (Table 3.9) shows that small foreign 
firms have a stronger motivation to locate near other foreign firms in the same 
industries than large foreign firms. This seems consistent with the argument of 
Shaver and Flyer (2000) that under the existence of agglomeration economies, 
small firms will have greater benefits since the agglomeration externalities allow 
them to access technologies of near larger competitors.  
By contrast with Shaver and Flyer (2000), large foreign firms in this study 
also agglomerate. However, the statistically insignificant coefficient of the 
variable neighboring firm, the cumulative number of foreign firms in the same 4-
digit industries in neighboring provinces, shows that large firms do not care about 
the existence of firms in the same industries in the bordering provinces. Different 
from the estimation results of small foreign firms or total foreign firms, most 
control variables for the large foreign firms are statistically insignificant (see 
Column 2 of Table 3.9). It seems that the characteristics of provinces are not a big 
concern for a large foreign firm. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study argues that agglomeration externalities influence the location 
decisions by foreign firms. The empirical results show that the location choices by 
new foreign firms in Vietnam are affected by the locations of the prior foreign 
investments in general and by those of firms in the same industries and from the 
same countries of origin in particular. These findings hold even when province-
specific endowment and industry-specific endowment effects are controlled by 
using the variables indicating the characteristics of each province and the 
industry-level stocks of Vietnamese firms. Moreover, we find that the 
geographical distributions of Vietnamese firms have no effect on the location 
choices by foreign investors and there is competition among provinces in 
attracting foreign investors. It is noted that the empirical results hold when we test 
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the existence of agglomeration economies in location choices by foreign firms 
regarding their ownership and size. 
These findings are consistent with the empirical results that are estimated 
for foreign investments in developed countries such as the United States, France, 
and Portugal (Head et al., 1995; Crozet et al., 2004; Guimaraes et al., 2000). It 
indicates that the behavior by foreign investors in both developed and developing 
countries are probably similar. Their same motivations are to obtain the highest 
benefits when investing abroad. Apparently, the positive externalities such as 
technological spillovers will induce foreign firms to cluster in a particular region. 
Moreover, locating near each other creates a network of foreign firms that allows 
a foreign firm to access suppliers and to exchange information more easily. This 
network may consist of foreign firms in the same industries that are considered as 
industrial or vertical groups. These groups might be headed by large 
manufacturing companies whose members are component suppliers. Vertical 
linkages can create a pool of specialized intermediate inputs to an industry in 
greater variety and at lower cost as suggested by Marshall (1920). So, for 
example, a firm that produces plastic auto parts might be attracted to a province 
that has considerable auto production even if there is no concentration of plastic 
parts producers in that province (Head et al., 1995).  
This research contributes to the literature on agglomeration economies, 
location and foreign direct investment in some aspects. To the best of our 
knowledge, the study on location decisions by individual firms has never been 
carried out in Vietnam due to the lack of detailed data at firm level. This is also 
one of a very few studies of agglomeration effects on location choices by foreign 
investors in developing and transition economies. The empirical findings on 
agglomeration economies may be useful for provincial authorities in designing 
policies to attract more foreign direct investment. Benefits of agglomeration 
externalities suggest that authorities should create policies to draw initial 
investments into concentrated production regions such as industrial zones. Then 
the cumulative number of foreign firms will create positive agglomeration 
externalities and make that region more attractive. This policy has been 
implemented effectively in the small province Binh Duong in the Southeast region 
of Vietnam. In 2005, Binh Duong province accounted for 19.8% of the total 
foreign investment in Vietnam while hosting only 2% of the total number of 
Vietnamese firms. This success is partially based on the policies of this province 
to establish many industrial zones and to create a good business environment for 
foreign investors from the first days when the central government granted the 
provinces more autonomy in the management of foreign investment.  
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This study has two limitations. The first is that the empirical results refer to 
only 2005. In order to see whether the results apply to other time periods, future 
research will have to work with larger dataset covering more years, so as to 
increase the cross time variance in the set of agglomeration variables. Moreover, 
there is a concern that as in the conditional logit model the observations related to 
provinces that were not selected by new foreign firms in 2005 are lost. This might 
potentially distort results if the cumulated number of foreign firms up to 2004 in 
these “omitted provinces” that used as a proxy for agglomeration effects is not 
trivial. By calculating this proxy, we find that the cumulated number of foreign 
firms up to 2004 in these “omitted provinces” accounted for a very small 
proportional, around 0.035% of the total number of foreign firms up to 2004. Our 
choice set of location thus may reinforce the results: those provinces there were 
not selected in the year 2005 are probably also provinces where the cumulated 
number of firms is negligible thus confirming the argument of agglomeration 
economies. Therefore, by working with larger dataset covering more years, we 
also can have more exact conclusions about agglomeration effects. The second 
limitation is that we have studied the location decisions by foreign firms only at 
the provincial level. The conditional logit model may work better with a smaller 
choice set. Therefore, future research should extend to macro areas by looking at 
the location choices by foreign firms at the regional level.  
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Appendix 3.1: The location distributions of firms in Vietnam 
 
Region/ 
Province/ City 
No. of newly 
created foreign 
firms in 2005 
No. of cumulative 
foreign firms  up to 
2004 
No. of cumulative 
Vietnamese firms  
up to 2004 
Red River Delta 128 650 24537 
Ha Noi 72 379 14698 
Hai Phong 22 127 2498 
Vinh Phuc 7 29 680 
Ha Tay 0 24 1236 
Bac Ninh 7 10 877 
Hai Duong 10 42 1081 
Hung Yen 7 26 526 
Ha Nam 2 1 438 
Nam Dinh 0 4 986 
Thai Binh 1 6 851 
Ninh Binh 0 2 666 
Northeast 15 99 6097 
Ha Giang 0 0 271 
Cao Bang 0 1 262 
Lao Cai 0 8 517 
Bac Kan 0 1 242 
Lang Son 2 10 324 
Tuyen Quang 0 0 299 
Yen Bai 0 4 356 
Thai Nguyen 0 11 791 
Phu Tho 6 24 966 
Bac Giang 5 13 894 
Quang Ninh 2 27 1175 
Northwest 3 9 1035 
Lai Chau 0 0 129 
Dien Bien 1 0 251 
Son La 1 2 272 
Hoa Binh 1 7 383 
North Centra Coast 1 30 5343 
Thanh Hoa 0 7 1184 
Nghe An 0 7 1422 
Ha Tinh 0 2 547 
Quang Binh 0 1 749 
Quang Tri 0 3 478 
Thua Thien - Hue 1 10 963 
South Central Coast 8 95 6167 
Da Nang 2 30 1908 
Quang Nam 2 12 622 
Quang Ngai 0 2 669 
Binh Dinh 1 9 1031 
Phu Yen 0 8 474 
Khanh Hoa 3 34 1463 
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Central Highlands 11 51 2829 
Kon Tum 1 0 253 
Gia Lai 1 2 671 
Dak Lak 0 1 832 
Dak Nong 1 3 156 
Lam Dong 8 45 917 
Southeast 396 2129 29737 
Ho Chi Minh 201 1004 22723 
Ninh Thuan 0 4 329 
Binh Phuoc 0 3 472 
Tay Ninh 20 49 675 
Binh Duong 111 625 1734 
Dong Nai 62 373 2063 
Binh Thuan 1 14 676 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 1 57 1065 
Mekong Delta River 6 82 12675 
Long An 2 48 1083 
Dong Thap 1 2 966 
An Giang 0 3 1139 
Tien Giang 0 5 1489 
Vinh Long 0 3 833 
Ben Tre 1 3 964 
Kien Giang 0 2 1759 
Can Tho 2 13 1284 
Hau Giang 0 0 338 
Tra Vinh 0 0 446 
Soc Trang 0 0 740 
Bac Lieu 0 2 546 
Ca Mau 0 1 1088 
Total 568 3145 88420 
Source: The GSO, the Enterprise Surveys in Vietnam in 2004 and 2005 
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Appendix 3.2: Robustness checks of the models 
 
A. Negative binomial regression 
As discussed in the previous parts, we are concerned that empirical results 
may suffer from collinearity problems among explanatory variables. In order to 
check robustness of the models, we have re-run some additional regressions 
inserting alternatively the variable foreign manufacturing firms (manfirm04) and 
the variable Vietnamese manufacturing firms (manvn04) as well as between the 
variable population (pop04) and the variable GDP (gdpmil04). We always include 
in the regressions all control variables, except the variable pop04 and find that the 
estimated results are robust and do not appear to result from collinearity amongst 
the regressors, therefore confirming that  foreign firms are likely to locate near 
each other and near other foreign firms in the same industries. However, their 
location choices are not affected by location of Vietnamese firms. It is noted that 
the conclusions are the same if we always include in the regressions all control 
variables, except the variable gdpmil04. 
 
 
A1- Include only forfirm04 and exclude pop04 
 
 
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         61 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      52.05 
Dispersion     = mean                             Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -119.7585                        Pseudo R2       =     0.1785 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     newfirm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   forfirm04 |    .007203   .0034923     2.06   0.039     .0003583    .0140478 
   student04 |   3.43e-06   3.45e-06     1.00   0.320    -3.32e-06    .0000102 
    gdpmil04 |  -2.57e-08   1.78e-08    -1.44   0.149    -6.05e-08    9.22e-09 
        iz04 |   .0233513   .1584438     0.15   0.883    -.2871929    .3338954 
   harbordis |  -.0070175   .0022052    -3.18   0.001    -.0113396   -.0026954 
       _cons |   1.525112   .3949372     3.86   0.000     .7510495    2.299175 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |    .395117   .3060559                     -.2047416    .9949755 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   1.484558   .4543577                      .8148579    2.704658 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   89.58 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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A2- Include only manfirm04 and exclude pop04 
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         61 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      45.95 
Dispersion     = mean                             Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -109.35944                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1736 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  newmanfirm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   manfirm04 |   .0127158    .007093     1.79   0.073    -.0011861    .0266177 
   student04 |   6.58e-06   3.67e-06     1.79   0.073    -6.24e-07    .0000138 
    gdpmil04 |  -4.62e-08   3.00e-08    -1.54   0.123    -1.05e-07    1.26e-08 
        iz04 |  -.0838512    .201955    -0.42   0.678    -.4796757    .3119733 
   harbordis |  -.0080103   .0024052    -3.33   0.001    -.0127245   -.0032961 
       _cons |   1.568937   .4080033     3.85   0.000     .7692647    2.368608 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .4328395   .3201442                     -.1946316    1.060311 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   1.541629   .4935435                      .8231379    2.887268 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   82.55 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
 
 
A3- Include only manvn04 and exclude pop04 
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         61 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      41.17 
Dispersion     = mean                             Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -111.74867                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1555 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  newmanfirm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     manvn04 |   .0013518   .0012212     1.11   0.268    -.0010416    .0037453 
   student04 |   3.03e-06   4.90e-06     0.62   0.536    -6.57e-06    .0000126 
    gdpmil04 |  -6.02e-08   3.60e-08    -1.67   0.094    -1.31e-07    1.03e-08 
        iz04 |   .3050211   .1091187     2.80   0.005     .0911523    .5188898 
   harbordis |  -.0085718   .0024574    -3.49   0.000    -.0133881   -.0037554 
       _cons |   1.667939   .4223932     3.95   0.000     .8400633    2.495814 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |    .575509    .310987                     -.0340144    1.185032 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   1.778035   .5529459                      .9665576    3.270793 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   94.37 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
 
 
B. Conditional logit model  
Similarly as in the negative binomial model, we have re-run some additional 
regressions inserting alternatively the variable same industry (same4dgsic) and the 
variable Vietnamese firms (vnfirm4dgsic) as well as between the variable 
population (pop04) and the variable GDP (gdpmil04). We always include in the 
regressions all control variables, except the variable pop04 and find that the 
estimated results are robust and do not appear to result from collinearity amongst 
the regressors.  
When we insert the variable related to the number of foreign firms in the 
same industry (same4dgsic), the coefficient of the variable vnfirm4dgsic, numbers 
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of Vietnamese firms in the same industry, becomes negative and statistically 
insignificant while there is no change for the other variables.  This result shows 
that the positive correlation (0.60) between same4dgsic and vnfirm4dgsic is 
important. Vietnamese firms and foreign firms in the same industries tend to 
invest in the same locations. If we do not include the variable same4dgsi in the 
regression, its effect is attributed to vnfirm4dgsic giving a positive bias to the 
vnfirm4dgsic coefficient. Whenever we include same4dgsic variable, the 
coefficient of vnfirm4dgsic is negative and insignificantly different from zero. 
Moreover, by running the likelihood ratio tests we find that the models which 
omit the variable same4dgsic appear misspecified and are dominated by the 
models including it in the regressions.  
It is also noted that the conclusions are the same if we always include in the 
regressions all control variables, except the variable gdpmil04. 
 
 
B1 - Include only vnfirm4dgsic and exclude pop04 
 
 
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      18216 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =    1384.81 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1237.6667                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3587 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      choice |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
vnfirm4dgsic |   .0017871   .0004152     4.30   0.000     .0009734    .0026009 
   student04 |   5.68e-06   4.07e-07    13.95   0.000     4.88e-06    6.48e-06 
    gdpmil04 |  -1.70e-08   1.84e-09    -9.23   0.000    -2.06e-08   -1.34e-08 
        iz04 |   .2958584   .0162552    18.20   0.000     .2639989     .327718 
   harbordis |  -.0048122   .0012235    -3.93   0.000    -.0072102   -.0024142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B2- Include vnfirm4dgsic, same4dgsic and exclude pop04 
 
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      18216 
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =    1457.91 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1201.1171                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3777 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      choice |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
vnfirm4dgsic |  -.0006223   .0005087    -1.22   0.221    -.0016193    .0003746 
  same4dgsic |   .0262433   .0032533     8.07   0.000     .0198671    .0326196 
   student04 |   6.09e-06   4.16e-07    14.64   0.000     5.28e-06    6.91e-06 
    gdpmil04 |  -1.80e-08   1.88e-09    -9.59   0.000    -2.17e-08   -1.43e-08 
        iz04 |   .2765016   .0167227    16.53   0.000     .2437256    .3092775 
   harbordis |  -.0046295    .001217    -3.80   0.000    -.0070147   -.0022443 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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B3- Exclude vnfirm4dgsic and pop04 
 
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      18216 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =    1522.52 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1168.8133                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3944 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      choice |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   forfirm04 |   .0021584   .0004492     4.80   0.000     .0012779    .0030389 
  same4dgsic |   .0180987   .0025865     7.00   0.000     .0130294    .0231681 
border4dgsic |  -.0081448   .0026788    -3.04   0.002    -.0133951   -.0028945 
 samecountry |    .003184   .0008453     3.77   0.000     .0015274    .0048407 
   student04 |   5.17e-06   4.45e-07    11.64   0.000     4.30e-06    6.05e-06 
    gdpmil04 |  -2.37e-08   2.07e-09   -11.41   0.000    -2.77e-08   -1.96e-08 
        iz04 |   .1747559   .0281758     6.20   0.000     .1195324    .2299794 
   harbordis |  -.0039081   .0011754    -3.32   0.001    -.0062118   -.0016044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
B4- Exclude same4dgsic and pop04 
 
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      18216 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =    1479.23 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1190.4593                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3832 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      choice |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   forfirm04 |    .002459   .0004417     5.57   0.000     .0015933    .0033247 
vnfirm4dgsic |   .0013815   .0004043     3.42   0.001     .0005891    .0021738 
border4dgsic |  -.0089385    .002313    -3.86   0.000    -.0134719    -.004405 
 samecountry |   .0036842   .0008468     4.35   0.000     .0020246    .0053438 
   student04 |   4.77e-06   4.44e-07    10.74   0.000     3.90e-06    5.64e-06 
    gdpmil04 |  -2.37e-08   2.07e-09   -11.47   0.000    -2.78e-08   -1.97e-08 
        iz04 |   .1795017   .0282227     6.36   0.000     .1241862    .2348173 
   harbordis |  -.0039263    .001169    -3.36   0.001    -.0062175   -.0016351 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Notes: 
We are also concerned about the fact that - a part from iz04 and harbordis - 
all the regressors we include in the analysis are in absolute numbers, and they 
might all capture the effect of the size of the province.  We thus have re-run 
regressions including the variables iz04; harbordis; student = student04/ pop04; 
gdp_per capita = gdpmil04/pop04; and with or without gdpmil04. The estimated 
results show that the original results of both the negative binomial model and 
conditional logit model are robust and the scale of GDP appears important rather 
than GDP per capita.  
In sum, by re-running alternative regressions, we confirm that the estimated 
results presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 are robust and do not appear to result from 
collinearity among the regressors. 
 
 120 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  
The Survival of New Foreign Firms in Vietnam 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A rich body of empirical studies, spanning numerous countries and time 
periods, has provided sufficient evidence for several leading scholars (Cave, 1998; 
Sutton, 1997; Geroski, 1995) to infer stylized facts and stylized relationships 
about the basic elements concerning firm dynamics and industry evolution, or the 
manner in which firms enter into an industry, grow or stagnate and ultimately 
survive or exit from the market.  
Considerable studies on the survival of new firms have revealed that these 
firms experience of high failure rates (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989; 
Mata and Portugal, 1994) and this finding is largely shared by those studies which 
have focused especially on the survival of new foreign firms. However, most of 
these studies are empirically carried out on foreign firms in developed countries. 
Typical are the works of Li (1995) on the survival of foreign subsidiaries in US 
computer and pharmaceutical industries; Mitchell, Shaver, and Yeung (1994) on 
Canadian firms that entered US medical sector market; Berkema, Bell, and 
Pennings (2002) on entries in different countries by Dutch firms; McCloughan 
and Stone (1998) on foreign manufacturing plants in UK Northern region; Mata 
and Portugal (2000; 2002) on foreign entries in Portugal. By contrast, there is a 
remarkable lack of study on the survival of foreign entries in transition and 
developing countries.  
This is the reason why this paper intends to contribute to the existing 
literatures on firm survival with the focus on the life time of foreign firms 
subsequent to entry in Vietnam. The empirical results can be important for 
managers of multinational companies in evaluating the chances of their success 
and implementing strategic choices for their survival in a foreign market, 
especially in a transition economy just like Vietnam.    
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Most studies have used panel data of firms in varied countries to investigate 
determinants of firm survival (Dunne et al., 1989; Audretsch and Mahmood, 
1994, 1995; Audretsch, 1991; Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Mata and Portugal, 
1994, 2000, 2002; Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 1995; Li, 1995). At the firm 
level, these studies mostly show that firm size, number of plant firms possess, 
entry mode as a fully-owned subsidiary, ownership advantages, the extent of 
diversification, and organizational learning and experience exert a negative effect 
on the failure rate of firms. At the industrial level, technological regime, industry 
life cycle, and industry growth have been proved to have a positive effect on the 
firm survival while minimum efficient scale, entry rate, and industry 
concentration are likely to decrease the chances of survival of new firms.  
This chapter studies the life span of 187 new foreign firms in Vietnam that 
were created in 2000 and measures for how many years they stay in the market 
over the 2000-2005 period. The Cox proportional hazard model is employed to 
ascertain the relative importance of industry- and firm-specific variables in 
explaining the time period between firm birth and its disappearance from 
economic activity. The empirical results show that foreign firms with larger start-
up size and growing current size are more likely to stay longer in the market. We 
also find that foreign firms entering the market with wholly-owned subsidiaries 
rather than doing joint ventures with local partners can live longer. In addition, 
locating in industrial zones or export processing zones increases the survival 
probability of foreign firms due to tax priority and other incentives. However, by 
contrast to our prediction, agglomeration economies have no significant effect on 
firm survival. Further, cultural distance is found to have a quite strong impact on 
the survival of foreign firms. Proximities in culture make it easier for foreign 
firms in cooperating with local partners; therefore increasing their success in 
foreign markets. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be 
tested and variables. Section 3 discusses methodological issues, including the 
description of the data source, the methods used in computing the variables, and 
the statistical methodology employed. Also in this section, the study gives an 
overview of the sample characteristics and exit patterns. Section 4 provides 
empirical results. Section 5 tests the robustness of the estimates. The final section 
is conclusions. 
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2. Hypotheses and variables 
Many academic studies have focused on patterns of international expansion 
(Dunning, 1993; Head et al., 1995; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). However, most of 
them have concentrated exclusively on the firm-level factors that motivate the 
parent firm to pursue overseas investment or factors to allow a host country to 
attract foreign investment. There are few empirical studies that have addressed the 
issues of performance and survival of foreign subsidiaries after their entry in a 
new foreign market (Li, 1995). The goal of this section is to discuss the 
characteristics, industries as well as locations of firms which are likely to affect 
their survival and to develop a set of specific hypotheses about their expected 
effects.  
 
2.1. Firm size 
Many empirical studies found that the probability of firm survival increases 
with firm size (Evans, 1987; Dunne et al., 1989; Mata and Portugal, 1994, 2000, 
2002; Mata et al., 2005, Disney et al., 2003). Firm size is mostly measured by 
number of employees, but alternative proxies such as value added and sales yield 
a very similar picture (Dosi, 2007). Researchers proved that both firm initial size 
and current size are important determinants on firm survival and have positive 
effect on the firm survival probability (Mata et al., 1995; Dunne et al., 1988). 
According to Mata et al. (1995), new firms enter markets typically below 
the minimum efficient scale in the industry. Therefore, they are confronted by a 
cost disadvantage vis a vis their efficiently scaled competitors which makes their 
survival more difficult. Hence, entrants with small initial size should be more 
likely to exit than large ones, because they cannot compete with incumbents while 
the larger firms can. Regarding foreign entrants, Dunning (1993) showed that 
when entering a new foreign market, a foreign firm has to face considerably 
higher entry costs than local firms, for instance the costs of acquiring information 
about that foreign market. As small firms own less resources such as financial 
capital and management skills, they are naturally disadvantaged and find it 
difficult to compete with local and other foreign firms, and hence more likely to 
fail. Further, Dunne et al. (1989) stated that initial size is a significant factor 
because it shows the role of firm history in explaining current failure. Indeed, 
Evan (1987) and Audretsch (1991; 1995) found that among a cohort of new firms 
in U.S. manufacturing, the probability of plant exit was decreasing with initial 
size. This finding is consistent with the empirical result of Mata and Portugal 
(1994) on Portuguese manufacturing firms. 
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Besides studying the effect of initial size on the firm survival, the scholars 
paying special attention to the post-entry evolution of new firms and its effects on 
survival prefer to employ the firm’s current size in their models (Mata et al., 
1995). As mentioned above, new firms generally enter market at small scales and 
have to face cost disadvantages compared with incumbents, which makes it more 
difficult for them to survive. Therefore, for those that are able to survive, they 
need to reduce this cost gap. This provides them with a strong incentive to grow. 
This is the main argument in Audretsch (1995), who found that initial size is 
positively related to survival, but negatively related to post entry growth, meaning 
that smaller firms grow faster. Because growth reduces average costs, firms 
should be less likely to exit after having grown. In other words, current size 
should be a better predictor of failure than initial size because the current size of 
firms can reflect the firm’s growth and the capacity of its reaction to their market 
success over time (Dunne et al., 1988; Mata et al., 1995).  
Indeed, Jovanovic (1982) is the first person discussing the importance of 
post-entry learning and growth on firm survival. The author argues that at birth 
new firms do not know their true ability. They decide the entry scale based on 
their beliefs about their ability level, but this level is very imprecisely estimated. 
By going into activity and observing their outcomes in the market, firms learn 
about their true abilities and revise the initial estimates. They therefore have to 
adapt to changing environments and link changes in their strategy choices to the 
changing configuration of that environment so that they can shape the process of 
selection and survival. Those firms which experience bad outcome realise that 
they are inefficient and accordingly exit from the market. On the contrary, those 
which perform well recognize that they are efficient. These firms not only survive, 
but they also grow. The empirical studies of Mata and Portugal (2000; 2002) and 
Mata et al. (1995) reveal that both domestic and foreign firms in Portugal with 
larger current size, being the most efficient, are less likely to exit. These results 
are also supported by the works of Dunne et al. (1989) on U.S. manufacturing 
plants and Disney et al. (2003) on manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom. 
Based on the above arguments, we in this study will investigate the effects 
of both initial and current sizes on the survival of new foreign firms in Vietnam 
and propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger foreign firms are less likely to exit from the market than 
smaller ones.  
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2.2. Ownership structure 
Hymer (1976) stated that foreign investors have a competitive disadvantage 
relative to local competitors due to lack of information on local market conditions 
and higher costs of communication and transportation. To overcome these 
disadvantages and to operate profitably in foreign markets, they must have some 
kind of firm specific advantage.  
According to the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), the 
sources of firm specific advantages arise from “tacit knowledge” such as technical 
knowledge, patents, and management skills. Tacit knowledge as illustrated in the 
work of Nelson and Winter (1982) is an embedded component of both individual 
skills and organization routines. Unlike machines or blueprints, they cannot be 
easily transferred to other firms. They can exist and create value only in the firms 
in which they have evolved. Kogut and Zander (1993) find that the more tacit the 
technology is, the more firms prefer to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries rather 
than sharing the knowledge with other partners. In their views, there is a 
distinguishable boundary in the knowledge between the partners in the joint 
venture. It therefore is difficult to have a common understanding between partners 
by which to transfer knowledge from idea in to productions and markets 
efficiently.  
According to transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975), foreign firms 
when making joint venture with local partners might suffer from transaction costs 
arising from writing and enforcing contracts, haggling over terms and contingent 
claims, and administering transactions (Kogut, 1989). Moreover, Mata and 
Portugal (2000) state that a joint venture may be troubled not only by cultural 
differences between the partners, but also by difficulties in sharing proprietary 
assets. Further, by making both parties residual claimants on firm’s profits, they 
create in both parties incentives to free-rider, which make these ventures highly 
unstable. And as the co-operative ventures ages, local partners may learn the 
firm’s technology to their own advantage and become competitors in the future 
(Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Such costs and conflicts among parties 
make wholly-owned subsidiaries preferable to joint ventures.  
Nevertheless, in some cases, joint ventures are preferred than wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. From the point of view of host countries, the benefits they can expect 
to obtain from foreign investment are knowledge about the latest technologies as 
well as management skills of foreign firms. However, market failures emerge 
because these knowledge and skills cannot be always tradable or imitated by the 
outsiders. Local firms find it difficult to acquire knowledge about the unspecified 
details of the technology, and foreign firms also find it difficult to buy knowledge 
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about the local markets such as information about administrative procedures, 
labour skills, demand conditions and relationship with local authorities (Mata and 
Portugal, 2000).  It thus becomes cheaper for the parties to share both assets 
through a joint venture than to trade them through the market. For example, joint 
ventures frequently assign management tasks to local partners who are better 
qualified than home country individuals to manage the local labour force and 
relationships with local suppliers, buyers, and governments.  
In terms of empirical works, most researchers use transaction cost theory to 
study entry mode choices by foreign firms. For instance, Meyer (2001) found that 
foreign firms in transition economies prefer to set up wholly owned subsidiaries 
rather than joint ventures with local partners. In these countries, foreign firms lack 
information about local partners, and domestic firms lack knowledge of market 
mechanism and inexperience in doing business with foreign partners. Therefore, a 
foreign firm has to pay high transaction costs relating to searching, negotiating 
and monitoring local partners. Moreover, in transition economies, the diffusion of 
knowledge is of particular concern because the institutional framework does not 
provide for the efficient protection of intellectual property rights. Hence, 
technology-intensive firms would prefer to internalize their transactions in high-
tech goods and services, including transfer of production know-how, assessment 
of market opportunities for innovation products, as well as the training of sales 
and service personnel (Oxley, 1999; Hennart 1991). Similarly, Anderson and 
Gatigon (1986) and Brouthers (2002) find that in a market where transaction costs 
associated with finding, negotiating and monitoring potential partners are 
perceived to be high, foreign firms tend to use wholly owned mode while firms 
perceiving low transaction costs tend to use joint venture mode. Moreover, 
Hennart (1991) and Yamawaki (1997) reveal that wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
Japanese multinationals were less likely to exit than joint ventures.  
The above arguments suggest a higher exit hazard for joint ventures when 
compared to wholly-owned subsidiaries, leading to the second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Wholly-owned subsidiaries are less likely to exit from the market than 
joint ventures. 
 
2.3. Location 
The factor endowment theory of international trade developed by Heckscher 
and Ohlin suggests that location of international production is based on 
comparative advantages of factor costs. Therefore, if firms use FDI to minimize 
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costs, they will move to the location where production costs are lowest. Location 
advantages can help firms reduce production costs, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of firms’ survival compared with their competitors locating in worse 
conditions. The concept of location advantages as reviewed by Cave (1982), 
Dunning (1993) and Brainard (1997) covers many aspects, including production 
costs and factor endowments such as labor force and infrastructure; market size; 
and policies to attract FDI. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the economic open policy in transition 
economies creates potential business opportunities for foreign firms. Most 
investors are attracted by new markets, low labor costs and favorable policies 
towards FDI in these countries (Meyer, 1998). One of the most important policies 
to attract foreign investors is establishment of industrial zones or export 
processing zones with priority policies mostly on taxation for foreign investors 
(Zhou et al., 2002). For instance, in China foreign firms locating in such as 
Special Economic Zones and Open Coastal Cities not only receive priorities in 
terms of profit tax, import duties and land use fees, but also get benefit from good 
infrastructure conditions and supporting services such as relating to administrative 
procedures. In fact, these special zones have attracted a major FDI inflows to 
China (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Zhou et al., 2002). In Vietnam, similar zones 
have been established since 1991 and offer lower profit tax and other incentives, 
especially if at least 80% of output is exported. The statistical data shows that in 
Vietnam the provinces possessing more industrial zones attract more foreign 
investors (The Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam – MPI website). 
Besides the attraction of preferential treatments, foreign firms are likely to 
locate in these special zones due to the existence of agglomeration economies, 
which are positive externalities stemming from the geographic clustering of 
industries. The localization theory stipulates that firms benefit from locating in the 
vicinity of other firms in the same industry. They benefit from specialized labour 
markets, the availability of suppliers to the industry, and the exchange of 
knowledge with other firms in the cluster (Marshall, 1920; Krugman, 1991). 
Moreover, new foreign investors which are unfamiliar with the new environment 
may use the experience and performance of earlier investors as indicators of the 
underlying business climate at the location. Crozet et al. (2004) study foreign 
firms in France and find that proximity allows foreign entrants to learn experience 
from others and to exploit earlier investors’ understanding of new business 
environment. Further, Head et al. (1995; 1999) showed that Japanese 
manufacturing firms in the United States prefer to cluster to obtain benefits from 
technology spillovers, specialized labor markets, and availability of input 
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suppliers to the industry. Some empirical studies in transition economies such as 
China (Head and Ries, 1996; Cheng and Kwan, 2000) and Hungary (Boudier-
Bensabaa, 2005) also reveal that foreign firms prefer to concentrate in the same 
place. Indeed, in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we find evidence to 
support the existence of agglomeration effects on location choices by foreign 
firms in Vietnam. Foreign investors are not only likely to locate near other foreign 
firms but also prefer to locate near foreign firms in the same industries and from 
the same countries of origin. 
However, some empirical studies showed that firms would strategically 
choose locations to gain exposure to others’ localized knowledge while reducing 
leakage of their own knowledge because they are not only receivers but also 
sources of knowledge spillovers. Shaver and Flyer (2000) shows that under the 
existence of agglomeration economies, many foreign firms will perform better if 
they do not cluster. Large foreign firms with the greatest capacity in technologies, 
human capital, training programs, suppliers, and distributors will try to locate 
away from their competitors because the benefits they gain from locating near 
their competitors will be less than what the competitors gain from them. Alcacer 
and Chung (2007) also find that foreign firms consider not only gains from inward 
knowledge spillovers but also the possible cost of outward spillovers. While less 
technologically advanced firms favor locations with high levels of industrial 
innovative activity, technologically advanced firms choose only locations with 
high levels of academic activity and avoid locations with industrial activity to 
distance themselves from competitors. 
The problems firms will experience when participating in an industrial 
cluster can be the spillover of technology, employee defection to competitors, and 
the sharing of distributors and suppliers with neighboring firms. Yoffie (1993) 
shows that semiconductor managers decide to locate far from their competitors 
due to their concern that their technology might spill over to the near firms. Baum 
and Mezias (1992) indicate that locating closer to other hotels in Manhattan 
increases the survival chance of a hotel, but this benefit of agglomeration 
diminishes when hotel districts become crowded, pushing up prices of the input 
resources and exacerbating competition.  
In this study we suppose that in a transition economy like Vietnam, benefits 
that a new foreign firm locating in industrial zones gains from tax priority 
policies, good infrastructure conditions and agglomeration economies may higher 
than the loss it suffers from high competition with  other proximal firms. The next 
hypothesis therefore is posited as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3: Locating in industrial zones or export processing zones increases 
the likelihood of survival of foreign firms. 
 
However, in order to have a better understanding of the effect of 
agglomeration economies on firm survival, we include in the model the 
agglomeration economies variable proxied by the number of foreign firms in the 
same industry in the province where the firm locates. The following part will 
present a more detailed discussion about this issue. 
 
2.4. Control variables 
Other variables need to be taken into account in the empirical analysis. At 
the firm level, the study includes the cultural distance, profit before tax, and 
multi-plant operation. 
Dunning (1993) suggests that one of the disadvantages of foreign firms 
compared with local firms is differences in culture. The differences in culture may 
lead foreign firms to difficulties in understanding and cooperating with local 
partners that can reduce their potential performance. In fact, in recent years intra-
regional foreign investment has tendency to increase and plays a key role in 
transnational corporations-controlled international networks. During the period 
2002-2004, average annual intra-Asian flows are the largest stream of foreign 
direct investment within the group of developing countries (The World 
Investment Report 2006).  In addition, Barkema et al. (1996) find that cultural 
distance is a prominent factor in foreign entry, especially when this involves 
another firm. Because the venture requires ‘double layered acculturation’, and the 
firm has to accommodate both strange corporate and national cultures. Based on 
these arguments and evidence, the study suggests that cultural differences 
decrease the probability of foreign firm survival.  
Besides factors foreign firms possess at the time of entry such as initial 
sizes, countries of origin and entry modes that can affect the likelihood of firm 
survival, the performance by firms after entry are also an important factor. 
Scholars have used many different indicators to measure firm performance such 
as sales growth, numbers of employees, turnovers, volume of export, and profit 
(Malmberg et al., 2000; Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Baum and Wally, 2003). In 
this study, we use profit as an indicator for firm performance and argue that a 
foreign firm is considered to be successful in doing business if it can consistently 
generate profit over time.  
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Regarding the factor of multiple plants, Mata and Portugal (2000; 2002) 
when studying the survival of foreign firms in Portugal find that foreign firms are 
significantly more likely to operate multiple plants than their domestic 
counterparts. Moreover, numbers of plants operated by foreign firms have positive 
effect on their likelihood of survival. The authors explain that in difficult 
situations, multi-plant firms can accommodate the failure of one of their plants 
without failing themselves, while single-plant firms cannot.  
Besides firm-specific characteristics that are supposed to have impact on the 
firm survival, we also analyze the effects of the environment in which entry 
occurs. The characteristics of industries, locations and effects of agglomeration 
economies will be considered.  
At the industry level, this study analyzes the influences of entry rate, 
industry size, and industry growth on the survival of firms. Mata and Portugal 
(1994; 2002) indicate that the extent of entry in a market increases the 
competitiveness in that market. So in markets with high entry rate, the firms’ 
lifetime is expected to be shorter. Because in such market, not only is each new 
firm subjected to more intense competition from those of its own kind, but also 
each generation of entrants has to face a continuously renewed challenge posed by 
the new waves of entrants each years. There is plenty of evidence that industries 
where entry is easy are also industries where exit is more likely. Dunne et al. 
(1988) and Mata and Portugal (1994) find a strong positive correlation between 
the flows of entry and exit across markets. Because the effects of entry depend on 
the relationship between the extent of entry and market size, the study also 
includes a variable of industry size and expects that the industry size will have a 
negative effect on the survival of foreign firms.  
We also control for the growth rate in the industry. Industries which are 
quickly growing are likely to be environments in which the probability of exit of 
new foreign firms is lower. Because in fast growing industries, firms may grow 
without inflicting market share losses to their rivals and, therefore, the likelihood 
of aggressive reactions is lower. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), Mata and 
Portugal (1994; 2000; 2002), and Mata et al. (1995) find a positive and 
statistically significant effect of industry growth on the survival of new firms, and 
Li (1995) and Shaver (1995) find this effect to hold specially for foreign firms. 
As discussed in the previous section, foreign firms have tendencies to locate 
in places where required factors of their production are relatively abundant to 
reduce production and transportation costs. This study thus supposes that locating 
in regions with high income per capita, development in human capital, and 
advantages in infrastructures and transportation will decrease the likelihood of 
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failure of foreign firms. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) when studying the survival 
of newly-created Greek manufacturing firms find that firms located in the 
country’s largest urban environment, Athens, face better survival prospects. This 
result suggests that ‘centripetal’ forces such as agglomeration economies and 
other market-pull factors remain a strong determinant in location choices by 
foreign firms.  
Moreover, the region with good conditions attracts more and more new 
foreign investments. Then at a certain level, the cumulative number of foreign 
firms will create positive agglomeration externalities and make that region more 
attractive. Many empirical studies have found that benefits from agglomeration 
economies motivate foreign firms in the same industries to locate in a specific 
place. For example, Head, Ries and Swenson (1995; 1999) find that new Japanese 
firms prefer to locate near both Japanese and US firms in the same industries, and 
Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) also find a similar evidence about the 
industrial concentrations of foreign firms in France. It is thus possible to expect a 
positive relationship between agglomeration economies and the likelihood of 
foreign firm survival.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data 
The dataset used in this study is also obtained from the yearly surveys of the 
enterprises operating in Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam since 2000. These are comprehensive surveys covering all state 
enterprises, non-state enterprises that have equal or greater than 10 employees, 
20% of sampled non-state enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, and all 
foreign enterprises across 64 provinces and cities in Vietnam. The contents of the 
surveys cover indicators to identify enterprises including their name, address, 
type, and economic activities of the enterprises, and indicators to reflect 
production situations of the enterprises such as their employees, income of 
employees, asset and capital source, turnover, profit, contributions to the state 
budget, investment capital, taxes and other obligations to the government, job 
training, and evaluations on the investment environment. Moreover, its 
longitudinal capacity, i.e., each firm is identified through a unique tax code, 
allows a firm to be followed over time; therefore we can find out the foreign firms 
that in fact were surveyed in the previous years but have the year of operation of 
the later years due to mistakes during conducting the surveys. For instance, some 
foreign firms that have the year of operation of 2002, but in fact they already 
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appeared in the survey in 2000. Thus, by using both tax code and the year of 
starting operation, we can find the exact number of new foreign firms created in a 
specific year and to establish the longevity of their investments in Vietnam over 
time. To our knowledge, this dataset has not been used for studies on the survival 
of foreign firms in Vietnam. 
The purpose of this study is to follow a cohort of firms that started 
operations in 2000 to measure their life span in the period 2000-2005. For this 
purpose, survival is defined as the continued presence of the foreign firms in 
Vietnam, and failure as the firms’ exit. To identify the changes of the foreign 
firms created in 2000, the study implemented a three-step procedure. First, we 
merge all surveyed foreign firms over six years from 2000 to 2005 by using their 
tax codes. It is noted that numbers of foreign firms that are surveyed in a 
particular year include foreign firms that already started their operations and still 
exist until the day of survey and new foreign entrants of that year. After merging, 
we can obtain the longitudinal information of all foreign firms during the six 
years. Second, by using the information about the year of starting operation, we 
can keep all foreign firms that were created in 2000 and have their history records 
during the period 2000-2005. In 2000, we have 187 newly-created foreign firms. 
Finally, we measure the life span of each new foreign firm.  
The dataset also has several limitations. First, we do not know the identity 
of the foreign owners. This prevents us from using the parents’ characteristics to 
explain the exit of subsidiaries. Second, we are not able to distinguish greenfield 
and acquisition foreign entrants. So the study cannot analyze how the entry mode 
affects the probability of firm survival. Third, we cannot tell mergers and 
acquisitions from true exits. This can happen when a foreign firm after a period of 
operation decides to merge with or to acquire another foreign firm. So the 
identifiers (tax code) of the merging firm or the acquired firm disappear, and they 
are thus counted as exits in the dataset while they are in fact still surviving. 
Furthermore, there are some foreign firms that appeared in one survey and 
disappeared in the next survey and then reappeared after that. This can be due to 
mistakes when conducting the surveys, or because the firm did not want to answer 
the questionnaire, or many other reasons. For these cases, the study uses the last 
time the foreign firms appeared during the period 2000-2005 to calculate their life 
time. 
 
3.2. Statistical model 
Conventional statistical methods, such as the method of ordinary least 
squares, are ill-suited to deal with duration analysis. The main reason is that 
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information with respect to duration is typically incomplete, since at the time of 
the survey there is a number of cases that did not fail. Those observations are 
called right-censored because their durations in fact exceed a given (known) 
threshold. Standard estimation procedures do not account properly for this 
problem, producing biased and inconsistent estimates (see Mata and Portugal, 
1994). We need, therefore, to employ models especially designed to take this 
problem into account, which lead us naturally to the hazard model. The key 
concept in the hazard model is the hazard rate which gives the probability that a 
unit exits the initial state within a particular time interval, given that it survived up 
until then. 
Following Wooldridge (2002), the hazard function h(t) without covariates 
that is the instantaneous rate of leaving per unit of time is written: 
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where T is the firm’s life duration, f(t) is probability density function of T and S(t) 
is the survivor function that is the probability of “surviving” past time t.  
Empirical estimates of either survival or hazard rates can easily be computed 
employing respectively the Kaplan-Meier estimator or the life-table methodology.  
Usually in economics, we are interested in hazard functions conditional on a 
set of covariates. When the covariates do not change over time, the conditional 
hazard is:  
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And when the covariates change over time, the conditional hazard is: 
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However, this study aims at not only evaluating either survival or hazard 
rates but also investigating the influence of the covariates on the probability of 
failure. In other words, the study will implement a multivariate model of the 
survival of foreign firms. For this purpose, the proportional hazard model 
proposed by Cox (1972) will be applied. The proportional hazard that a foreign 
firm j faces can be written as:  
)exp()();( 0 jxj Xthxth β=  
where h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard function that is common to all foreign firms in 
the population, X is a vector of explanatory variables for the j
th
 firm that can be 
time-invariant or time-variant covariates,  and β is a vector of parameters. 
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Negative coefficients equivalent to risk ratios exp(βX) less than one implies that 
the hazard rate decreases and the probability of survival increases, while positive 
coefficients and risk ratio greater than one imply an increase in the hazard rate and 
a decreases in the probability of survival. 
Clearly, the baseline hazard function equals the hazard function for X = 0. 
Accordingly, the effect of a unit change in a covariate is to produce a constant 
proportional change in the hazard rate. In other words, the hazard subject j faces is 
multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard, and the function exp(βX) was 
chosen simply to avoid the problem of h(t; x) ever turning negative. Parametric 
procedures require that h 0 (t) assumes a specific form, but an improper choice of 
the baseline hazard function can produce unreliable or unstable estimates. 
However, this problem can be solved since the β vector can be estimated with 
unspecified hazard baseline function via the definition of the proper partial 
likelihood function (Cox, 1972). Thus, a non-parametric procedure can be used to 
estimate the effects of covariates.  
Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood methods. The lifetime 
variable is an increasing count of the years that a foreign firm survives and will be 
right censored if it still survives until the end of the period 2000-2005. The hazard 
rate (dependent variable) is the probability that a firm exits its lifetime period, 
given that it survives up till the last year of the period. 
Following the discussions of the hypotheses, the explanatory variables are 
computed mostly based on the works of Mata and Portugal (1994; 2000; 2002) 
and Head et al. (1995) as follows: 
• Initial size:  the number of employees when foreign firms started 
operation in 2000. 
• Current size: the current number of employees over years. 
• Ownership structure: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign 
firms are wholly owned by foreign investors, 0 if they are joint ventures. 
• Location: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign firms are 
located in an industrial zone or an export processing zone, 0 otherwise.  
• Cultural distance: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign 
investors are from the Asian countries, 0 otherwise. 
• Multi-plant operation: the number of plants operated by foreign firms. 
• Firm performance: Profit before tax. 
• Entry rate: the number of new foreign firms created in 2000 in the same 
2-digit industry. 
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• Industry size: the number of all kinds of firms in the industry; and the 
number of employees in all kinds of firms in the same 2-digit industry. 
• Industry growth: Growth rate of industry employment, computed as the 
difference in the log of employment in all kinds of firms in the same 2-
digit industry in two consecutive years.  
• Location-specific characteristics: income per capita by province, human 
capital development measured by the number of undergraduate students, 
and infrastructure conditions proxied by the distance to the nearest big 
harbor. 
• Agglomeration economies: the number of foreign firms in the same 2-
digit industry by province.  
With the exception of initial size and entry rate which refer to the conditions 
at the time of the firm’s entry and the distance to the nearest big harbors that does 
not change over time, all variables are time-varying. It means that they can have 
different values over the life time of foreign firms. In some cases, these variables 
reflect post-entry decisions and in other cases they simply reflect the evolution of 
the environment. The study specifies exit between moment t-1 and t as a function 
of the independent variables observed at moment t. 
 
3.3. Sample  
The sample includes 187 foreign firms that entered in Vietnam in 2000. 
These new foreign firms are identified by using the procedures previously 
discussed in section 3.1. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present some descriptive 
statistics of the sample and the correlations of the variables. 
Table 4.1 shows that 87% of the total numbers of entrants are wholly-owned 
by foreign investors. This is consistent with the argument of Meyer (2001) that 
foreign entries in transition economies where institutional frameworks are only 
partially reformed, and therefore inconsistent and unstable prefer to establish 
wholly-owned subsidiaries to reduce transaction costs. Over the five years of 
operation from 2000 to 2005, the ownership structure of foreign firms is quite 
stable. There are only two firms that transferred from joint ventures to wholly-
owned firms. Most foreign firms operate a single establishment at the time of 
entry and there is no big change after the five years. Regarding the nationalities of 
foreign investors, around 83% are Asian investors of which a half are from 
Taiwan. Around 50% of new foreign firms are located in industrial zones or 
export processing zones, and most of them are operating in manufacturing sector. 
Nearly 43% of new foreign firms chose Hanoi, the capital and Ho Chi Minh City, 
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the biggest city to set up their operation. On average, foreign entrants employed 
139 employees at the first year of operation. However, there is a big gap between 
the minimum and maximum number of employees. At the minimum level, 
entrants employed only 1 employee while the maximum number is 2627. Over the 
five years of operation, the firm size that is measured by the number of employees 
increased. In 2005, the average number of employees was 375, increasing more 
than twice and a half time as large as the average start-up size. The statistics on 
the industry variables presented in Table 4.1 are less straightforward to interpret 
than the data on firm variables because these variables refer to the industry.  
Sample correlations between the independent variables are shown in Table 
4.2. In general, the correlation coefficients are low and no serious collinearity 
problems are detected in the regression estimation. 
 
3.4. Patterns of exit 
First, the study estimates the probability of firm survival at the different 
ages by using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Table 4.3 shows that the overall 
survival rate is about 89% in the year foreign firms were created, but around 23% 
of them die before they reach the age of five. The highest numbers of foreign 
firms died in the year of entry (21 firms had exited in 2000) compared with the 
later years implying that the first year of operation is the most difficult time for 
new entrants. However, these figures are substantially altered if the study takes 
into account the differences in firm-specific characteristics such as initial size, 
current size, ownership structure, location, and cultural distance. 
The results in Table 4.3 and Graph 4.1 demonstrate that larger foreign firms 
are likely to live longer than small foreign firms in both initial size and current 
size. Foreign firms are defined large if they have equal or more than 100 
employees, otherwise they are considered small. It seems that the effect of current 
size on the survival of foreign firms is stronger than initial size. Firms with small 
current size are more likely to exit than firms with small initial size, and firms 
with larger current size have higher survival rates than firms with larger initial 
size after five years of operation. It is noted that in the first year, only 33% of the 
entrant had large size but after five years large firms accounted for 61% of the 
total surviving firms. This result indicates that post-entry evolution is an important 
determinant of firm performance (Mata et al., 1995).  
As expected, foreign firms that entered under wholly-owned mode are likely 
to live longer than joint ventures. After five years of operation, only 57% of joint 
ventures survive while 81% of wholly-owned foreign firms can continue their 
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sixth year. In terms of the firm location, the results also support the hypothesis 
that locating in industrial zones or export processing zones increases the 
likelihood of survival of foreign firms.  While only 12% of foreign firms located 
in industrial zones died before reaching the fifth year, this number is 33% for 
firms located outside industrial zones. Moreover, Kaplan-Meier estimator shows 
that foreign firms belonging to Asian investors can live longer than firms owned 
by the other countries. Whereas 80% of Asian firms can survive until the sixth 
year, only 63% of foreign firms owned by other investors can do that.  In addition, 
the results and the graphs also show that ownership structure has the strongest and 
immediate effect on the firm survival compared with the other indicators. It seems 
that being a wholly-owned foreign firm creates super advantages and increases its 
competitiveness compared with being a joint venture.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Variables Obs Description Average Min Max 
1. Initial size 973 The no. of employees when foreign firms started operation in 2000 149.50* 1       2627 
2. Current size 943** The current number of employees over years 253.82* 1       4773 
3. Ownership structure 973 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign firms are wholly owned by 
foreign investors, 0 if they are joint ventures 
0.87 0 1 
4. Location 973 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign firms are located in an 
industrial zone or an export processing zone, 0 otherwise 
0.51 0 1 
5. Cultural distance 973 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign investors are from Asian 
countries, 0 otherwise 
0.83 0 1 
6. Plant 973 The number of plants operated by foreign firms 0.34 0 25 
7. Profit  922** The profit before tax of foreign firms in mill. VND 3528.05 -347129 248848 
8. Entry rate 973 The number of new foreign firms created in 2000 in the same 2-digit industry. 10.25 1 20 
9. Number of all firms 973 The number of all kinds of firms in the same 2-digit industry 1535.02 12      25003 
10. Number of all employees 973 The number of employees in all kinds of firms in the same 2-digit industry. 144832.30 1028    1005981 
11. Industry growth 786** 
Growth rate of industry employment, equal the difference in the log of employment in 
all kinds of firms in the industry in two consecutive years 
0.15 -2.21     2.42 
12. Income per capita  973 Income per capita (VND/person) in the province where firms locate 8796.32 1940.26   43359.81 
13. Student 973 Number of undergraduate students in the province where firms locate 122803.50 226     515723 
14. Distance to harbor 973 The distance in km to the nearest big harbors by province 34.54 0     313.01 
15. 
Agglomeration 
economies 
973 
The no. of foreign firms in the same 2-digit industries in the province where 
firms locate 
26.59 0 147 
Note: * These numbers are not exact because the average values here are divided by 973 obs., over five years 2000-2005 and each year the number of firms were 
reduced. The true values that are calculated based on the obs. of each year are 138.80 (2000), 175.33(2001), 247.72(2002), 286.28(2003), 335.11(2004), 374.56(2005). 
** There are 973 observations in total. The smaller numbers of observations are due to missing or lacking information during the surveys.  
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Table 4.2: Correlations in the dataset 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Initial size 1               
2. Current size 0.71 1              
3. Ownership structure -0.06 0.01 1             
4. Location 0.10 0.16 0.16 1            
5. Cultural distance 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.05 1           
6. Plant 0.14 0.09 -0.17 -0.07 -0.21 1          
7. Profit  0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.12 -0.05 1         
8. Entry rate 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.17 -0.16 0.07 1        
9. Number of all firms 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.20 -0.07 0.08 1       
10. Number of all employees 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.55 1      
11. Industry growth -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 1     
12. Income per capita  -0.13 -0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 0.05 -0.13 -0.23 0.06 -0.01 0.05 1    
13. Student -0.17 -0.07 -0.08 -0.29 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 -0.19 0.15 0.01 0.13 0.58 1   
14. Distance to harbor 0.10 0.01 -0.14 -0.26 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.07 -0.04 -0.39 -0.12 1  
15. Agglomeration economies -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.15 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 0.14 -0.04 0.19 0.06 0.34 0.22 0.36 1 
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Table 4.3: Kaplan-Meier estimator for survival function of foreign firms by different indicators 
Sample Survival rates 
Duration 
No. at 
risk 
Fail 
No. 
censored 
All 
firms 
Initial Size    
(0-100) 
Initial Size   
(100+) 
Cur. Size   
(0-100) 
Cur. Size   
(100+) 
Ownership  
( equal 0) 
Ownership  
( equal 1) 
Unlocate 
in IZ 
Locate 
in IZ 
Not Asian 
country 
Asian 
country 
Year 2000 187 21 0 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.71 0.92 0.86 0.92 0.79 0.91 
After 1 year 166 2 0 0.88 0.85 - 0.85 0.92 0.67 0.91 0.84 - 0.76 0.90 
After 2 years 164 6 0 0.84 0.80 - 0.78 0.92 0.64 0.88 0.78 - 0.71 0.88 
After 3 years 158 4 0 0.82 0.78 0.90 0.74 0.91 - 0.85 0.74 0.91 0.71 0.85 
After 4 years 154 10 0 0.77 0.72 0.87 0.65 0.89 0.57 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.80 
After 5 years 144 0 144 0.77 0.72 0.87 0.65 0.89 0.57 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.80 
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Graph 4.1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
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4. Empirical results 
Table 4.4 presents the empirical results with the risk ratios and their p-value. 
We recall that risk ratios less than one imply decreases in the hazard rate. In the 
first regression, the variables initial size and industry growth are not included. 
Because the variable initial size is highly correlated with the variable current size 
and the variable industry growth has missing information for the year 2000. 
Column 1 shows that the hazard ratios of the variables current size, ownership 
structure, location, and cultural distance are less than one and strongly 
statistically significant.  
The risk ratio on the variable current size indicates that foreign firms with 
large current size will face a lower probability of exit. However, compared with 
the variables ownership structure and location, the risk ratio of the variable 
current size is much higher, almost equals one. It shows that although current size 
has effect on the hazard rate of foreign firms, but the effect is not strong. 
However, Table 4.3 shows a big difference in survival rates estimated by Kaplan-
Meier estimators between firms with current size less and greater than 100 
employees. After five years of operations, 89% of large foreign firms can continue 
their sixth year while this number is 65% for small ones. In the second regression, 
the study uses the variable initial size instead of current size and finds that it also 
has the same effect as current size on the survival of foreign firms, but its 
statistical significance is lower than the current size (see Column 2). These results 
indicate that both initial size and current size have positive effects on the 
likelihood of the survival of foreign firms. However, the higher statistical 
significance of current size seems to emphasize the importance of post-entry 
growth to firm performance on their survival probability. 
As expected, the ownership structure has a strong effect on the exit hazard 
of foreign firms in Vietnam. Wholly-owned foreign firms face hazard of exit of 
54% less than joint ventures. Consistent with the estimates by Kaplan-Meier 
estimator, the ownership has the strongest effect compared with firm size and firm 
location. To understand this result more clearly, it is important to summarize some 
stylized facts about the structure of foreign investments in Vietnam.   
During 1990s, joint ventures were the most common form of foreign 
investment, often with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the Vietnamese partner. 
In this period, two-thirds of total foreign investment commitments were made 
with SOEs and only 2% in joint ventures with private sectors. Because in the early 
years after the economic reformation in 1986 SOEs were the only legal partners 
for foreign firms desiring to enter as joint ventures. At that time, private 
enterprises not only accounted for a small share of the economy but also they 
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were too small to meet the requirements of large foreign investors. Moreover, 
SOEs with their privileged positions could help foreign firms a smooth entry into 
the Vietnamese market (Kokko et al., 2003). However, since 2000, the licensed 
capital for wholly-owned projects has been larger than that of joint ventures. One 
explanation is the amendment to the Law on Foreign Investment in 1992 which 
gave wholly-owned firms the same status as joint ventures. Further, it becomes 
easier for foreign investors to access information about investment environment in 
Vietnam, leading to a reduction in the role of local partners. As a result, by 2006 
wholly-owned foreign firms accounted for about 75% of foreign investment in 
Vietnam (The MPI). 
In the context of Vietnam, both the transaction cost theory and the resource-
based view are suitable to explain the entry mode choices by foreign investors. As 
a transition economy, the institutional framework of Vietnam is still in the process 
of changing and only partially reformed, therefore unstable, inconsistent and 
inefficient. Several important legal documents, such as the law on the protection 
of intellectual property right, were issued but of low enforcement. Foreign firms 
in Vietnam are therefore concerned about the knowledge diffusion and prefer to 
internalize their transactions. Further, Vietnam has been characterized by a lack of 
transparency and a service sector to support business development (The PCI 2006 
Report). Foreign firms have difficulties in access to information about local 
economic agents, and domestic firms lack knowledge of market mechanism and 
inexperience in doing business with foreign partners. Hence, by setting a wholly 
owned subsidiary rather than a joint venture, a foreign firm can avoid transaction 
costs relating to searching, negotiating and monitoring local partners. 
These arguments suggest that being a wholly-owned foreign firm in a 
transition country like Vietnam brings foreign firms advantages, thereby 
increasing the survival probability compared with setting up joint ventures with 
local partners. However, we should note that given the dataset, we do not have 
information about merger or acquisitions from true exits. For instance, as joint 
ventures often end with one of the partners acquiring the commonly owned 
venture, this may lead to conclude that failure is more likely in case of a joint 
venture although the firm has not really exit, but it has been bought by one of the 
partners. This problem might distort the empirical result if most joint ventures 
disappear with this way.  
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Table 4.4: The determinants of exit hazard of foreign firms in Vietnam 
Independent  
Variables 
(1) 
Risk ratio 
(2) 
Risk ratio 
(3) 
Risk ratio 
Initial size  0.996* 
(0.07) 
 
Current size 0.996** 
(0.03) 
 0.996* 
(0.10) 
Ownership structure 0.468** 
(0.04) 
0.492** 
(0.05) 
0.735 
(0.64) 
Location 0.503* 
(0.09) 
0.473* 
(0.06) 
0.249** 
(0.04) 
Cultural distance 0.552* 
(0.09) 
0.564 
(0.11) 
0.493 
(0.19) 
Plant 0.884 
(0.58) 
0.844 
(0.51) 
0.664 
(0.51) 
Profit  0.999 
(0.43) 
0.999 
(0.59) 
0.999 
(0.99) 
Entry rate 0.996 
(0.91) 
0.991 
(0.78) 
1.008 
(0.87) 
Number of all firms 0.999 
(0.96) 
0.999 
(0.95) 
1.000 
(0.63) 
Number of all employees 1.000 
(0.78) 
1.000 
(0.76) 
1.000 
(0.92) 
Industry growth   2.572 
(0.30) 
Income per capita  0.971 
(0.57) 
0.968 
(0.56) 
0.795 
(0.34) 
Student 1.000 
(0.36) 
1.000 
(0.41) 
1.000 
(0.26) 
Distance to harbor 1.001 
(0.69) 
1.001 
(0.61) 
0.983 
(0.27) 
Agglomeration economies 0.998 
(0.86) 
1.000 
(0.98) 
0.999 
(0.94) 
Number of obs. 922 922 745 
Number of firms 187 187 166 
Number of exit 40 40 19 
Log likelihood -188.8 -190.2 -81.86 
Chi square 30.18*** 27.44*** 26.71** 
Note: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p<0.10. p-values are in parentheses. 
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The location of foreign firms also has the expected sign. Locating in 
industrial zones or export processing zones decreases the likelihood of exit of 
foreign firms by 50%. The most important explanation to this result can be the 
favoring policies issued by the Vietnamese government in order to attract foreign 
investments into industrial zones, export processing zones and hi-tech zones13. 
The standard profit tax rate is 28% and preferred rates range from 10% to 20% if 
the investment is located in priority areas or satisfies certain investment 
promotion criteria (Law on Enterprise Profit Tax, No. 09/2003/QH11 issued on 
June 17, 2003 by the Vietnamese Assembly). For instance, foreign enterprises 
operating in export processing zones enjoy a profit tax rate at 10% and 15% in 
respect of production and service enterprises; operating in industrial zones enjoy 
profit tax rates at 15%, 10%, and 20% respectively for production, exporting and 
service enterprises; and operating in hi-tech zones have to pay 10% of profit tax 
after an eight-year tax holiday from the first year in which the enterprises are 
profitable. Moreover, these foreign firms also receive preferential policies on land 
renting prices, factory renting prices as well as supports in administrative 
procedures by provincial authorities. These priority policies drive foreign firms to 
cluster in these zones. The spatial patterns of foreign enterprises by region in 
Vietnam somehow reflect this phenomenon. In 2005, just Ho Chi Minh City and 
its two neighboring provinces, Binh Duong and Dong Nai, that are located the 
Southeast region accounted for about 65% of the total foreign firms (The GSO, 
2007). These city and provinces also accounted for more than 50% of the total 
number industrial zones and export processing zones in Vietnam.  
In the previous part, we have supposed that besides tax priority and other 
incentives foreign firms are also attracted to locate in industrial zones due to 
benefits stemming from agglomeration economies. Indeed, in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 we have found the evidence to support the existence of agglomeration 
effects on location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam. Foreign investors in the 
same industry prefer to concentrate in the same place.  However, the statistical 
insignificance of the control variable agglomeration economies seems to 
contradict the results obtained in the previous chapters. It shows that 
agglomeration has no effect on the firm survival and the effect of location is 
attributed only to tax priority and other incentives offered by industrial zones. It is 
                                                
13 An industrial zone is a concentrated zone specializing in the production of industrial goods and services for 
industrial goods production. 
An export processing zone specialized in the production of goods for export and in provision of services of 
services for the production of export goods and export activities. 
A hi-tech zone is a zone where hi-technology industrial enterprises and units providing hi-technology 
development services, including scientific technological research and development, training and other related 
services are concentrated. 
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noted that we have re-run the regressions by inserting alternatively the variable 
location or the variable agglomeration economies but the results do not change. 
This contradiction can be explained by using the works of Shaver and Flyer 
(2002) and Alcacer and Chung (2007). These authors argue that firms not only 
capture benefits from agglomeration economies but also contribute to 
agglomeration economies. Firms would therefore strategically choose location to 
gain exposure to others’ localized knowledge while reducing leakage of their own 
knowledge to their competitors. Hence, once a firm locates in a certain place 
where other firms already established, the firm may obtain benefits from 
agglomeration economies, therefore increasing its probability of survival. 
However, the firm’s specific knowledge can be spilled over and it benefits the 
proximal firms, therefore increasing the competition and reducing firm survival 
probability. Particularly, if agglomerating firms are in the same industries, the 
competition is much higher as input resources become scarce and their prices are 
bid up. For example, Baum and Mezias (1992) show that locating closer to other 
hotels in Manhattan increases the survival chance of a hotel, but this benefit of 
agglomeration diminishes when hotel districts become crowded, exacerbating 
competition. The opposite effects of firm localization make the variable 
agglomeration economies statistically insignificant. 
With respect to other control variables, except cultural distance, all other 
variables reflecting firm-specific characteristics, industry-specific characteristics, 
and location advantages have no statistically significant effects on the foreign firm 
survival. In the third regression (see Column 3), when the variable industry 
growth is included in the model, it reduces the statistical significance of the 
current size, increases the statistical significance of firms’ location and makes 
ownership structure statistically insignificant. The un-robustness of the results 
may be due to the many missing observations of the variable industry growth, 
leading to the inconsistent estimates. 
As predicted, cultural distance has an effect on the survival of foreign firms. 
Foreign firms owned by Asian investors face a hazard of exit of 45% less than 
foreign firms from other countries. Similarities in culture make foreign investors 
easier to understand and cooperate with local partners, therefore reducing 
transaction costs in negotiating or monitoring local partners. This finding is 
consistent with the pattern of foreign investors in Vietnam. For example, up to the 
end of 2005, there were seventy five countries and territories investing in 
Vietnam. Among them, the number of investors from Asian countries accounted 
for 78.7%, Europe 11.6%, and America and Caribbean 5% of the total foreign 
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enterprises. The top five investors were Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, 
and China (The GSO, 2007).  
In summary, the empirical results support the hypotheses that firm size 
(current and initial sizes), being a wholly-owned foreign firm and locating in 
industrial zones or export processing zones have positive effects on the survival of 
foreign firms. Compared with ownership structure and firm location, firm size 
shows a smaller influence on the firm survival. However, the higher statistical 
significance of current size than start-up size suggests that the ability to adapt to 
changing environment as well as the post-entry successful performance increase 
the survival likelihood of foreign firms. Moreover, we also find that similarities in 
culture create advantages for foreign firms in cooperating with local partners, 
therefore increasing the chance of their success.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
In order to validate the robustness of the empirical results, the regression 
model is re-estimated using a larger dataset covering new foreign firms created in 
2000 and 2002, so as to increase the cross time variance in the set of time-varying 
variables. We do not consider foreign firms created in 2001 because there is quite 
a lot of missing information about their characteristics in this year. 
Following the steps used to compute the number of foreign entries in 2000, 
we have 263 new foreign firms created in 2002. Similar to new firms in 2000, 
most entrants in 2002 are wholly-owned firms. The majority of them operate a 
single establishment at the time of entry and there is no big change after three 
years of operation. Regarding the nationalities of foreign investors, around 86% 
are Asian investors. More than a half of entrants locate in industrial zones or 
export processing zones, and most of them are operating in manufacturing sector. 
On average, foreign entrants employed 164 employees at the first year of 
operation, higher than entrants in 2000. After the three years of operation, the 
average firm size increases more than twice times. 
By using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, the patterns of exit of foreign entrants 
in 2002 are similar to that of foreign entrants in 2000. The first year of operation 
is still the most difficult time for new firms when the number of new firms that 
exited in this year is highest. Compared with 2000, the overall survival rate of 
foreign entrants after three years of operation is lower, implying that competition 
among firms in the market becomes stronger by time.    
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Table 4.5: The determinants of exit hazard of foreign firms in Vietnam 
created in 2000 and 2002 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
Risk ratio 
(2) 
Risk ratio 
Initial size  0.998** 
(0.05) 
Current size 0.997*** 
(0.001) 
 
Ownership structure 0.632* 
(0.07) 
0.672 
(0.12) 
Location 0.654* 
(0.07) 
0.638* 
(0.06) 
Cultural distance 0.730 
(0.21) 
0.713 
(0.18) 
Plant 0.774 
(0.42) 
0.758 
(0.38) 
Entry rate 1.018* 
(0.09) 
1.016 
(0.11) 
Number of all firms 0.999 
(0.87) 
1.000 
(0.80) 
Nymber of all employees 1.000 
(0.14) 
1.000 
(0.36) 
Income per capita  1.038** 
(0.03) 
1.040** 
(0.02) 
Student 1.000 
(0.59) 
1.000 
(0.60) 
Distance to harbor 1.001 
(0.29) 
1.001 
(0.28) 
Agglomeration economies 0.996 
(0.45) 
0.996 
(0.48) 
 
Number of obs. 
 
1874 
 
1918 
Number of firms 450 450 
Number of exit 93 93 
Log likelihood -527.1 -535.0 
Chi square 46.70*** 34.38*** 
Note: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p<0.10. p-values are in parentheses. 
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As expected, larger foreign firms are likely to live longer than smaller ones 
in both initial size and current size. Foreign firms that entered under wholly-
owned mode are likely to live longer than joint ventures. However, due to the 
shorter period of analysis, the difference is not as big as new firms created in 
2000. After the three years of operation, 78% of joint ventures survive while 82% 
of wholly-owned foreign firms can continue their forth year. In terms of firm 
location and cultural distance, the results also show that locating in industrial 
zones or export processing zones helps firms live longer, and similarities in 
culture reduce the exit hazard of foreign firms.  
To test the robustness of the estimated results, this study combines the 
foreign firms created in 2000 and 2002, forming a pooled cross section. We use 
the same methods to compute the explanatory variables. Kaplan-Meier estimators 
show that when the dataset is extended, the expected patterns of exit are 
remarkably stable as discussed in section 3.4. Table 4.5 presents the estimated 
results with the coefficients, the risk ratios and their p-value by applying the 
proportional hazards model. In the models, we exclude the variables profit and 
industrial growth because they have a lot of missing information. Again, it is 
noted that negative coefficients and risk ratios less than one imply a decrease in 
hazard rate while positive coefficients and risk ratios greater than one imply an 
increase in hazard rate. 
Column 1 of Table 4.5 presents that the three hypotheses are still hold, 
meaning that foreign firms with larger start-up size and growing current size are 
more likely to stay in the market for more periods. Moreover, being wholly-
owned foreign firms or locating in industrial zones or export processing zones 
increase the likelihood of the survival of foreign firms. However, the effect of 
cultural distance loses its statistical significance although its sign is still as 
expected. In Column 2, we replace current size with initial size to regress the 
model. The estimated result of initial size is quite stable, showing that foreign 
firms with larger initial size are more likely to stay in the market.  
Another difference in this model is that the variables entry rate and income 
per capita by province have statistically significant effects on the failure rate of 
new foreign firms (Column 1). The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of the variable entry rate implies that when industries are characterized by higher 
entry rate, the hazard rates of new foreign firms are higher. This result is 
consistent with the argument of Mata and Portugal (1994; 2002) that in industries 
with high turbulence, not only is each new firm subjected to more intense 
competition from those of its own kind, but also each generation of entrants has to 
face a continuously renewed challenge posed by the new waves of entrants each 
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year. In fact, the positive correlation between flows of entry and exit across 
industries are found in many studies such as Geroski (1995), Mata and Portugal 
(1994), and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988).  
In terms of the effect of income per capita by province, its positive and 
highly statistically significant coefficient implies that new foreign firms that 
locate in provinces with high income per capita face a higher probability of 
failure. In Vietnam, large and major cities or provinces have higher income per 
capita than the other provinces. They also have better conditions to attract the 
foreign investments. For example, in 2005 just two cities (Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi) and one province (Binh Duong) accounted for nearly 65% of the total 
foreign firms. This also means that foreign firms located in such cities have to 
face higher competition, leading to a higher rate of firm exit. This result is 
consistent with the estimated result of entry rate, supporting the classical 
argument by Geroski (1995) that entry and exit rates are highly positively 
correlated. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has examined the longevity of new foreign firms created in 2000 
in Vietnam over the period 2000-2005. We find that more than 10% of new 
foreign firms died during the year of entry and more than 20% cannot reach the 
age of five. Moreover, the survivors become larger inside over time. Five years 
after having started, the average size of new foreign firms is more than twice and 
a half as large as their start-up size.  
The Cox proportional hazard model is used to estimate the effects of firm 
size, ownership structure and firm location on the survival of new foreign firms. 
The empirical results show that foreign firms with larger start-up size and growing 
current size are more likely to stay in the market for a longer time. This finding is 
consistent with the studies of Dunne et al. (1989) and Mata et al. (1995). This 
result confirms that the ability to adapt to new environments and post-entry 
growth are important for the survival of new foreign firms. We also find that by 
setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries rather than doing joint ventures with local 
partners, foreign entrants can increase their survival probability because they can 
avoid high transaction costs arising from searching, negotiating and monitoring 
local partners.  
In addition, the study indicates that preferential polices on taxation and 
other incentives decrease the failure hazard of foreign firms locating in industrial 
zones or export processing zones. However, by contrast to our prediction, 
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agglomeration economies have no significant effect on firm survival. Our 
explanation to this result is that firms are not only the receivers but also the source 
of knowledge spillovers. These opposite effects make the variable agglomeration 
economies statistically insignificant. Moreover, cultural distance is found to have 
a strong impact on the survival of foreign firms. Proximities in culture make it 
easier for them in cooperating with local partners; therefore increasing their 
success in doing business in a foreign market. It is noted that these empirical 
results are robust when the dataset is extended by including both new foreign 
firms created in 2000 and 2002 in the regression models. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on the firm survival, 
especially the survival of foreign subsidiaries in a transition country just like 
Vietnam. The empirical results are important for managers of multinational 
companies in evaluating the chances of their success and implementing strategic 
choices for the survival of their subsidiaries in a foreign market. The study 
suggests that foreign firms should establish wholly-owned subsidiaries rather than 
joint ventures to avoid transaction costs arising from imperfect market. Moreover, 
industrial zones or export processing zones may be the best choice of location for 
foreign entrants. The empirical findings could be also useful for the provincial 
authorities in Vietnam in designing policies to attract more foreign direct 
investment. Institutions shape the efficiency of markets and influence firms’ 
strategies and organizational forms (North, 1990). So it is important to have a 
stable, efficient and consistent institutional framework that can reduce or 
eliminate transaction costs, and under this framework, foreign and local firms are 
treated equally. This creates a fair playing field for all firms so that they can apply 
the best strategies when doing business without being concerned about transaction 
costs or costs caused by a weak institutional framework. 
An obvious limitation of this study is the short duration of the time span of 
foreign firms considered for the analysis, just five years (2000-2005) due to the 
limitation of the dataset. This can lead to incomplete conclusions about the effects 
of explanatory variables on failure rates of new foreign firms. Future research 
should work with longer-period dataset, so as to increase the cross time variance 
in the set of time-varying variables and ensure the unbiasness of the empirical 
results.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
This dissertation studies behavior by foreign firms in a transition economy 
like Vietnam which is characterized by high transaction costs arising from 
unstable and inconsistent institutional frameworks. We focus on three main issues. 
First, we investigate the effect of institutional practices by local authorities on the 
entry rates of foreign firms in Vietnam. Second, we explore factors affecting 
location choices by foreign investors, thereby suggesting an explanation of 
agglomeration effects. Finally, we study the survival of foreign entrants in 
Vietnam.   
The dataset used for empirical studies is obtained from the yearly surveys of 
the enterprises operating in Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam since 2000. These are comprehensive surveys covering all state 
enterprises, non-state enterprises that have equal or greater than 10 employees, 
20% of sampled non-state enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, and all 
foreign enterprises across 64 provinces and cities in Vietnam. The contents of the 
surveys cover indicators to identify enterprises including their name, address, 
type, and economic activities of the enterprises, and indicators to reflect 
production situations of the enterprises such as their employees, income of 
employees, asset and capital source, turnover, profit, contributions to the state 
budget, investment capital, taxes and other obligations to the government, job 
training, and evaluations on the investment environment. This dataset provides a 
very useful source to analyze the behavior by foreign investors at the firm level. 
This dissertation is started with theoretical reviews on FDI with the aim to 
explore the motivations driving a firm to expand investment abroad, the reasons 
why FDI is preferred to other investment forms and the main factors affecting 
location decisions by foreign firms. Since our thesis focuses on location choices 
by foreign firms in Vietnam, we spend more room on the discussion of the 
location theories such as the theory of comparative advantages, localization 
theory, institutional based view and information cost approach. Subsequently, we 
present a literature review on FDI determinants in transition economies and in 
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Vietnam. We state that market size, labor costs and the riskiness of investment 
environments are key factors affecting FDI inflows into these countries. The final 
section provides the description of data source that is used for the empirical 
studies in Vietnam.  
The second chapter studies the effect of institutional practices by local 
authorities on the entry rates of foreign firms in Vietnam over the period 2000-
2005. The Vietnamese provincial competitiveness index in 2006 (PCI 2006) and 
its two sub-indices reflecting attitudes of local government toward state-owned 
enterprises and the capability of private enterprises to access to necessary 
information for their business are used as proxies for institutional implementations 
by provincial authorities. The empirical results reveal that provinces with better 
institutional practices attract more foreign firms. The efforts of local authorities in 
interpreting and implementing central regulations and policies are an important 
factor creating attractiveness toward domestic and foreign investors. Transparency 
and access to information are found to have a strong effect on the attractiveness of 
a province to foreign investors. By contrast to our prediction, the favorable 
treatments of local authorities toward SOEs do not inhibit the entry of foreign 
firms to the region. The empirical findings support our argument that institutional 
practices by local governments influence the FDI spatial distributions among 
regions within the country. Formal legal changes initiated at the centre have 
varied impacts across provinces because the implementation of laws and 
regulations at local level depends on the informal institutions determined by 
attitudes (norms and cognitions) of local authorities. 
The third chapter examines the effects of agglomeration economies on the 
location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam. We argue that foreign firms have 
tendency to locate in a particular location due to the existence of agglomeration 
economies, which are positive externalities that stem from the geographic 
clustering of industries. As indicated by Marshall (1920), the positive externalities 
which include technological spillovers among producers, a pooled market for 
workers with specialized skills that benefits both workers and firms, and a pool of 
specialized intermediate inputs for an industry in greater variety and at lower cost 
have the potential to enhance the performance by firms that agglomerate. By 
using a large dataset that provides detailed information about individual firms, we 
examine the location choices by 568 newly created foreign firms in 2005 in about 
150 different 4-digit industries. The estimates of the negative binomial regression 
model and the conditional logit model strongly support our hypotheses that 
agglomeration benefits motivate foreign firms in the same industries and from the 
same countries of origin to locate near each other. Moreover, the empirical results 
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show that provinces in Vietnam compete with each other to attract FDI and the 
locations of Vietnamese firms have no effects on the location decisions by foreign 
firms in the same industry.   
The last chapter investigates the survival probability of foreign entrants in 
Vietnam by looking at the life span of 187 foreign firms created in 2000 over the 
period 2000-2005. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model, we find that 
foreign firms with larger start-up size and growing current size are more likely to 
stay longer in the market. We also find that when entering in transition economies 
where transaction costs are high, foreign firms prefer to be internalized rather than 
combined with a local partner. The advantages from a being wholly-owned 
foreign firms decrease their failure hazard. Further, by locating in industrial zones 
or export processing zones, foreign firms can increase the probability of survival 
thank to the priorities on taxes as well as the supports from local authorities. 
However, by contrast to our prediction, agglomeration economies have no 
significant effect on firm survival. As expected, cultural distance is found to have 
a strong impact on the survival of foreign firms. Proximities in culture make it 
easier for foreign firms in cooperating with local partners, therefore increasing 
their success in foreign markets. 
In summary, three sets of main conclusions emerge from this dissertation. 
First, the location choices by foreign firms in Vietnam are driven by traditional 
location advantages, agglomeration effects and the institutional practices by 
provincial authorities. Vietnam characterized by a new market with more than 80 
million people and relatively low factor and labor costs is an attractive place for 
market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking investors. In addition, 
economic openness and favoring policies toward foreign firms, especially those 
locating in industrial zones or export processing zones, also encourage FDI 
inflows. As a result, FDI is highly concentrated in and around two economic 
hubs- Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi that are characterized by good infrastructure 
conditions, large market, relatively better human capital and an intensive 
existence of industrial zones. Moreover, the concentration in a particular place 
once again benefits foreign firms thanks to agglomeration effects. Consequently, 
these two economic hubs attract more and more foreign investment over time 
compared with other provinces, creating unequal distribution of FDI inflows and 
uneven economic development among regions within Vietnam.  
Second, we have learned that although the economic openness and changes 
in policies toward supporting the establishment and operation of private 
enterprises encourage foreign firms to invest in Vietnam, they still have to face a 
complex institutional environment with both formal and informal aspects due to 
 154 
the inconsistency and variation in institutional performance among regions and 
between the central and local levels. While decentralization of administrative 
responsibilities to provinces has created opportunities for entrepreneurial-minded 
local authorities to push forward economic reform, and just foster the 
development of both local businesses and foreign investment, it is also a risky 
political strategy because the success of the reform depends on decisions made in 
the provinces that are not centrally controlled. The main risks include the 
possibilities of insufficient administrative capabilities, or self-serving policy 
decisions made to protect local interests or to create rents for the officials in 
charge. Moreover, decentralization of authority also implies that rules may be 
different across country which is great concern to some businesspersons. We 
therefore can state that the uneven progress of reform creates transaction costs that 
may inhibit business development, both because of additional risks of institutional 
changes and because of adjustment costs for business operating across multiple 
provinces. However, in our opinion, decentralization policy is successful in 
encouraging creativeness and competitiveness among provinces to attract foreign 
investments in Vietnam.  
Finally, we can recognize that in the context of Vietnam, foreign investors 
have to consider many different factors such as modes of entry and locations 
when making their investment decision to succeed in the market. The majority of 
foreign firms prefer the mode of wholly owned affiliate when entering Vietnam to 
avoid high transaction costs associated with finding, negotiating, contracting and 
monitoring domestic partners as the statement of Brouthers (2002). In addition, 
most of foreign investors in Vietnam are from Asian countries such as Taiwan, 
Singapore, Japan, South Korean, and Malaysia. Similarity in culture may create 
advantage for foreign firms in understanding local partners, thereby reducing 
transaction costs. Furthermore, many foreign firms, especially operating in 
manufacturing sector, consider industrial zones as the best choice to locate their 
plants in order to overcome early difficulties in the new market due to the 
government’s supports in taxes as well as favoring policies on land and factory 
renting prices and supports in administrative procedures. Indeed, the empirical 
results of the last chapter reveal that being a wholly-owned foreign firm or 
locating in industrial zones or export processing zones increase the likelihood of 
the survival of foreign firms. And similarities in culture may make foreign firms 
easier in cooperating with local firms, therefore increasing the chance of their 
survival.  
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1. Contributions 
We believe that this dissertation can contribute to the debate around FDI at 
several levels. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on FDI in 
Vietnam using data at the firm level to investigate investment behavior by foreign 
firms. Due to the lack of and difficulties to access detailed information, all other 
empirical studies on FDI in Vietnam can exploit only data at the provincial level. 
Moreover, possessing detailed information about individual firms allows us to 
apply the right econometric models such as the conditional logit model to analyze 
location choices by foreign firms and the Cox proportional hazard model to 
analyze the survival of new foreign firms that have never been used to study FDI 
in Vietnam before.  
Second, we explore new aspects relating to behavior by foreign firms in 
Vietnam. For instance, in Chapter 2, we study institutional performance by local 
authorities as a main deterrence for foreign entrants. Indeed, there were the works 
of Tran et al. (2008) and Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang (2007) discussing 
this issue. But like the other studies on FDI in Vietnam, they only employ data at 
the provincial level with time-constant variables. In our study, we use panel data 
for six years with a huge number of observations covering new foreign entrants in 
all industries and provinces and include both time-varying and time-constant 
variables in the Tobit model. In Chapter 3, we focus on agglomeration effects as 
an important factor to motivate firms to cluster in a particular province, thereby 
affecting their location decisions by looking at the location choice by each 
individual foreign firm. In fact, agglomeration effects were mentioned in the 
studies of Meyer and Nguyen (2005) and Le Viet Anh (2004), but they just 
stopped at exploiting data at the provincial level and using only lagged FDI stock 
as proxy. They also did not have deep analysis of effects of agglomeration 
economies. In Chapter 4, the survival of foreign firms for the first time in Vietnam 
is analyzed. By examining factors influencing the survival probability of foreign 
firms, we can learn how they behave to overcome difficulties arising from a 
developing and transition country like Vietnam.  
Third, our studies contribute a better understanding of FDI in developing 
and transition economies as there is still very little empirical research on FDI in 
these countries and most of them focus on East European Countries (Meyer, 1998; 
2001; 2004) and China (Head and Ries, 1996; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; etc.). 
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2. Policy implications 
In this dissertation, we have mentioned the opportunities for facilitating 
foreign investment by allowing local authorities to take initiatives, and we show 
that the substantial variation of FDI within Vietnam is to a large extend induced 
by the diverse development of informal institutions and the uneven 
implementation of reform initiatives. Provinces that pursue FDI-friendly policies 
in the liberalization process such as Binh Duong or Dong Nai provinces may 
benefit from first-mover advantages in the long run and develop into a hub of 
economic activity. In addition, we have learned that provinces with industrial 
zones attract more FDI because provincial authorities providing land to industrial 
zones not only create real estate markets, but they also signal a commitment to 
creating a favorable investment climate. Moreover, benefits from agglomeration 
economies also make industrial zones become more attractive locations for 
foreign firms. 
Based on the above considerations, we suggest that policies to improve the 
investment climate in emerging countries like Vietnam have to incorporate both a 
national and a local level. The government needs to create means to encourage 
local authorities to pursue policies in the same spirit of reform and 
decentralization of FDI-related responsibilities requires development of 
institutions at the local level. In addition, we mentioned in Chapter 2 that although 
most provinces in Vietnam have made important improvements in economic 
governance which have contributed to the recent increase of FDI, a number of 
issues such as relating to land access, dispute resolution and information provision 
continue to constrain development of foreign sector. Thus, the government needs 
to tackle the remaining issues on the reform agenda and prepares the Vietnamese 
economy for increasing international competition. In the scope of this dissertation, 
we suggest some main policies that the government should do in the coming time 
in order to surge FDI in the whole country as well create a better distribution of 
FDI among the regions within Vietnam as following. 
• Improving transparency of regulation information especially in tax 
system, land, and administrative procedures to ensure that all economic 
actors have the same chance to access necessary information; therefore 
reducing corruptions and informal charges. 
• Providing technical assistance that may support the creation of 
administration capabilities at local level for instance by training local 
officials and providing monitoring mechanism that prevents self-serving 
administrative governance and corruption. 
 157 
• Enhancing the confidence of foreign firms in legal institutions by 
establishing courts for setting contractual disputes, protecting property 
rights, and appealing corrupt or self-serving behavior by government 
officials. 
• Investing more in vocational training in order to supply firms with more 
suitably trained/ skilled labors as foreign firms as well as other 
entrepreneurs steadily move into more sophisticated production 
processes and services sectors. 
• Beyond changing formal institutions, reform minded government may 
aim to influence informal institutions. Besides changing the law, it is 
important to build political support and create awareness for the benefits 
of new rules. For example, it does not suffice to declare a special 
economic zone; rather the quality of the entire institutional framework 
pertaining to the zone is crucial to attract FDI. 
• Encouraging the horizontal exchange of information and experience 
between provinces and middle levels in ministries. In other words, the 
highly departmentalized structure of the public sector in Vietnam should 
be opened to facilitate cross-departmental and cross-provincial 
communication and learning. 
• The only way for less developed regions such as Northeast, Northwest, 
North Central, North Central Highland and Mekong River Delta to 
attract more FDI is to build strategies based on their comparative 
advantages. And more public investment on infrastructure and education 
should be spent in these regions. However, all these actions are difficult 
to be implemented in short or middle term. 
Although these policy lessons are suggested to apply in Vietnam, they are 
also relevant for other developing and transition economies that are large and 
administratively decentralized such as China and India. In these countries, there 
also exists a very unequal distribution of FDI with concentration on a small 
number of locations, creating a big gap in economic development among regions 
within countries, and the governments are concerning about attracting FDI to 
other places. If done well, they may benefit from decentralization of policy 
responsibilities to allow local authorities to take their own entrepreneurial 
initiative. 
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3. Limitations and further research 
Besides the contributions to the debate around FDI, this dissertation also has 
some limitations. With respect to Chapter 2, we discover the effects of only two 
aspects of institutions (SOEs bias and transparency and access to information) on 
the location of foreign entrants. Future research should consider other aspects that 
may have important influence on business strategies of foreign firms. In addition, 
we use the PCI referring to only the year 2006 as a proxy for institutions. This can 
lead to bias conclusions about the effect of institutional practice due to un-
variation of the variable PCI across time. Future studies should exploit the PCI 
variable in longer periods, so as to increase its cross time variance and ensure the 
exactness of the empirical results. In Chapter 3, the empirical results refer to only 
2005. In order to see whether the results apply to other time periods, future 
research will have to work with larger dataset covering more years, so as to 
increase the cross time variance in the set of agglomeration variables. Moreover, 
in this chapter, we study the location decisions by foreign firms only at the 
provincial level. The conditional logit model may work better with a smaller 
choice set, suggesting that future research should extend to macro areas by 
looking at the location choices by foreign firms at the regional level. Regarding 
Chapter 4, due to the limitation of the dataset, we can study the life span of 
foreign firms only for five years, from 2000 to 2005. The short time of research 
can lead to inexact conclusions about the effects of explanatory variables on 
failure rates of new foreign firms. Therefore, future research should work with 
longer-period dataset, so as to increase the cross time variance in the set of time-
varying variables and ensure the unbiasness of the empirical results.  
In addition to limitations arising from each empirical study that require us 
more work to improve them, we also need to expand our research to other aspects, 
thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of the foreign firms’ 
behavior in Vietnam. In this dissertation, we mentioned that in the context of 
Vietnam as a developing and transition economy, foreign firms have to consider 
many different factors such as entry mode and location when making their 
investment decisions. However, up till now we have mainly examined the latter 
aspect by exploring determinants affecting location preference of foreign investors 
and studying factors influencing the survival probability of foreign entrants. Thus, 
the future study should concentrate on the entry mode choices by foreign firms 
when entering Vietnamese market.  At present, the FDI law in Vietnam does not 
permit acquisitions for foreign investors, except for special cases such as 
acquisitions from other foreign owners. This reduces the options for entry modes 
to either wholly-owned enterprise or joint venture. The starting point of the study 
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will be the papers of Meyer (2001), Meyer et al. (2009) and Brouthers (2002). 
Meyer (2001) and Meyer et al. (2009) find that entrants are more likely to 
establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in economies that have progress in the 
market-supporting institutions. Moreover, they discover that entrants originating 
from countries with lower distance proximity to transition economies are more 
likely to establish wholly-owned firms. Similarly, Brouthers (2002) examines the 
entry mode choices by European Union firms that have invested mostly in 
developing and transition economies and finds that firms perceiving high 
transaction costs in a market tend to use wholly-owned mode while firms 
perceiving low transaction costs tend to use joint venture mode. He also explores 
that the mode selection appears to be driven by a combination of general 
transaction cost characteristics, institutional context (legal restriction), and 
cultural context (investment risk).  
The second future research will focus on the effects of location choices and 
mode choices on performance by foreign firms. So far, we have investigated the 
effects of location and mode choices on the survival probability of foreign firms 
but we do not know how these choices affect firm performance.  Entry mode 
theory assumes that firms will select the mode that provides the best return on 
investment. Brouthers et al. (2000) and Woodcock et al. (1994) suggest that mode 
choices based on the transaction costs model provide firms with the most efficient 
structure. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) find that in high market potential 
countries, firms utilizing wholly-owned mode can achieve economies of scale that 
provide them with lower marginal cost, and as a consequence better performance. 
Malmberg et al. (2000) study the relationship between agglomeration effects and 
firm performance that is measured by export value and find that firms that locate 
in the region where there are larger numbers of other firms operating in the same 
industry will have larger export values.  
The final issue that I plan to study consists of the mutual interdependence 
between FDI strategies and the local environments in emerging or transition 
economies. We have mentioned in Chapter 2 that in transition economy like 
Vietnam when formal institutions fail to ensure efficient functioning of market 
and law enforcement may be inefficient, local firms may adjust to the context by 
just relying on network-based coordination mechanism to overcome various forms 
of market failure. So far, the literature has analyzed the issues largely separately: 
strategy scholars analyze how FDI strategies are adjusted to local contexts, and 
institutions in particular (Peng, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Brouthers, 2002), whereas 
development scholars analyze the way FDI influences the local context. However, 
foreign investors may have to adjust to local institutions, but at the same time they 
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also can influence the institutional development. Informal institutions may be 
influenced by different values and norms arisen from different kind of businesses, 
and even formal institutions may be influenced by governments changing 
legislation in view of attracting FDI, possibly even under direct negotiations or 
lobbying by large foreign firms. On the other hand, the local environment, and in 
particular the institutional framework can influence entry and subsidiary strategies 
of multinational enterprises (Meyer, 2004; Lewin et al. 1998; Lewin and Kim, 
2004).  
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire 1A-ðTDN and Selected Variable 
Definitions for the Enterprise Survey in 2005 
(Source: The GSO, 2007) 
 
 
Questionnaire 1A- ðTDN is used for the survey of all state enterprises, non-state 
enterprises that have equal or more 10 employees, 20% of sampled non-state 
enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, and all foreign enterprises in all 
industrial sectors excluding cooperatives of agricultural, forestry, fishing sectors 
and business households. The survey was implemented in all sixty four cities and 
provinces in Vietnam. The data is calculated up to the 31st of December each year. 
 
1. Name of the enterprise: the business name, the tax code and the year of 
starting operation. 
 
2. Address of the enterprise: number of house, commune, district, province, 
telephone and fax numbers and email address. 
 
3. Ownership type of enterprise 
An enterprise in these surveys is defined as an economic unit that 
independently keeps business account and acquires its own legal status. It may 
be set up and operate under the regulations of State Enterprise Law, 
Cooperative Law, Enterprise Law, Foreign Investment Law or the Agreements 
between the Government of Vietnam and the Governments of Foreign 
Countries. There are three types of enterprise in the surveys: 
• The state enterprises:  enterprises with 100% of state capital operating 
according to State Enterprise Law and under control of central or local 
governmental agencies; enterprises with 100% of state capital operating 
according to Enterprise Law, which are limited liability state enterprises and 
under the control of central or local governmental agencies; and stock 
companies with domestic capital, of which the government shares more than 
50% of registered capital. 
• The non-state enterprises: they are set up by domestic capital. The capital 
may be owned by cooperative, private with one or an individual group, or the 
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government whose share is equal or less than 50% of registered capital. 
There are following types of non-state enterprises: cooperatives; private 
companies; collective name enterprises; private limited liability companies; 
private stock companies; stock companies with equal or less than 50% of 
registered capital shared by the Government. 
•  The foreign direct invested enterprises: they are enterprises with capital 
directly invested by foreigners without considering how many percentages of 
the capital they share.  
There are following types of foreign enterprises:  100% of capital invested by 
foreigners and joint venture enterprises between domestic and foreign 
investors. 
 
Table A1: Type of ownership, code and names 
Code Names of ownership type 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Central state enterprise 
Local state enterprise 
Limited liability central state enterprises 
Limited liability local state enterprises 
Stock companies with governmental capital (> 50%) 
Cooperative 
Private company 
Cooperative name company 
Private limited liability companies 
Stock companies without governmental capital 
Stock companies with governmental capital (≤ 50%) 
100% owned foreign enterprise 
Joint venture between state and foreign enterprises 
Joint venture between non-state and foreign enterprises 
 
 
4. Business industry  
Industrial classification is based on main activity of enterprises. Each 
enterprise should belong to only one economic industry in which they have 
main activity. Main business activity is one that contributes the largest share 
to total gross output of the enterprise or was projected when the enterprise set 
up. It decides business direction and production target of the enterprise. If all 
these criteria cannot be satisfied, main activity of the enterprise is one that 
uses the highest number of employee during the year of survey. 
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5. Employees 
Employees of the enterprise are the total persons that the enterprise directly 
controls, uses, and pays wages or salaries. 
This concept does not include: persons who receive material of the enterprise 
to produce goods at their home; persons who are working as apprentices sent 
from vocational schools or training centers for practice and the enterprise does 
not pay salary; and persons who are sent to the enterprise to work by joint 
venture partners and the enterprise does not pay salary. 
 
Table A2: Questionnaire on the number of employees 
 Code At the begin of the year At the end of the year 
  Total Of which:  
female 
Total Of which:  
female 
1. Total of employees 
- Unpaid salary 
- Without working contract 
 
3. Number of new employees 
employed during the year 
 
4. Number of employees 
reduced during the year 
01 
02 
03 
 
 
04 
 
 
05 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
6. Assets  
Assets are the total assets of the enterprise including current assets and short-
term investments; fixed assets and long-term investments. 
• Current assets and short-term investments: they are assets that are owned 
and used by the enterprise. The time of using, rotation and recovering their 
values happens in a particular period or one year. They include money (cash, 
pay-in, certificates having value like money, gold and jewelry), inventories, 
receivable accounts, and short-term investments. 
• Fixed assets and long-term investments: they are total remaining values of 
fixed assets, values of under-construction projects, amount of long-term 
cosigning and long-term investments. 
A fixed asset is a production instrument that has the time of using more than 
one year and its value is equal or greater than 5 million of Vietnamese dong 
(VND). Fixed assets include tangible, intangible and financial hired fixed 
assets. 
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7. Capital sources 
Capital sources are total capital of the enterprise that come from different 
sources: capital of proprietor (equity) and other debts that enterprise has to pay 
(liability), including: 
• Equity: it is total capital that belongs to proprietor of the enterprise or of 
members of joint venture company or of shareholders of joint stock company 
and funds that are submitted to parent company by its subsidiary companies. 
• Liability: it is total debts the enterprise has to pay, including: borrowed 
money; debts the enterprise has to pay for sellers, the government, and 
employees (salary); or other types of debts. 
 
8. Net turnover 
Turnover of the enterprise is total income of the enterprise gained by selling 
its products or services after subtracting taxes (special selling tax, export tax, 
value added tax) and other reductions. Turnover is calculated during a certain 
period, usually one year. 
Net turnover does not include turnover gaining from financial activities except 
lending asset with its controllers and turnover gaining from irregular activities 
such as selling off asset and income from contract violating punishment from 
partners, etc. 
 
9. Profit before tax 
It is the amount of gains before paying enterprise profit tax from production, 
financial and other activities. It is total profits of enterprise, meaning that it is 
the remaining amount after taking gains minus losses of all activities. Profit is 
calculated during a certain period, usually one year. 
 
10. List of the enterprise’s branches 
The enterprise’s branches are its member units or divisions such as factories, 
shops, and mines. These units locate in particular places that implement 
economic activities under the control of one or two persons and accounting 
report to the parent enterprise. 
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Appendix B 
Provincial Competitiveness Index 
Firm-Level Survey Questionnaire 
(Source: The PCI 2005 Report) 
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Appendix C 
 
The Map of Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam 
 
